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Abstract
 
The aim of this thesis is to critically  examine John McDowell’s account of experience and 
perceptual judgment. McDowell’s principal thesis in Mind and World was that experience 
needs to be conceived as comprising conceptual content in order to assuage what he perceives 
as certain characteristic anxieties in modern philosophy in relation to empirical thought. In 
this way, McDowell’s notion of experience with a manifold of passively actualized 
propositional content became central to achieving that end. McDowell’s recently revised 
account of experience, now divested of propositional content, accordingly warrants an 
examination of the new form of conceptually  shaped experience that he offers, and of the 
necessity of positing experience with conceptual content, in order to avoid the Myth of the 
Given (as McDowell understands it).
 In accordance with the Mind and World paradigm of experience, I identify three central 
features that come to inform McDowell’s account of experience with conceptual content, 
which in turn constitute the divisions of Chapters in this thesis: 1. Rational Entitlement; 2. 
Objectivity; 3. Self-Determining Capacities. In this context, I come to elucidate the particular 
models of conceptual intelligibility  that are offered by McDowell in order to substantiate his 
stipulation of conceptual capacities as they are to be understood as operative in experience. I 
then come to critically assess McDowell’s revised account of experience as conceptually 
shaped, in relation to these three central features, as they are understood in Mind and World.
 Charles Travis presents an account of experience and perceptual judgment which 
contributes to McDowell’s critical rethink of his proposal in Mind and World that 
conceptually shaped experience has propositional content. In the context of discussing the 
three central features listed above, according to which I organize the discussion of experience 
and perceptual judgment, I consider those features as they are operative in Travis’s account, 
and how they may bear upon McDowell’s earlier and later accounts of experience.
 I propose to present a clear and charitable reading of both McDowell’s Mind and World 
account of experience and the newly revised account. Even so, I do contend that, with 
McDowell no longer able to draw upon the more robust models of how to conceive of 
experience as conceptually shaped (which sets forth in Mind and World), and in light of 
certain aspects of Travis’s account of perceptual judgment, such a cumulative methodology 
places McDowell’s account of experience as conceptually shaped in serious difficulty – such 
that it may warrant a reconsideration of those higher-order concerns, specifically  those 
associated with the Myth of the Given, that motivate and inform his treatment of experience 
and perceptual judgment.
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Introduction
! The aim of this thesis is to critically  examine John McDowell’s account of experience 
and perceptual judgment. I aim to present a perspicuous picture of both McDowell’s Mind 
and World account and his newly  revised account of experience put forward in his essay 
‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’. The topics under discussion in each of the three Chapters 
are offered as crucial features of McDowell’s account of experience as conceptually  shaped. It 
is by way of examining these key aspects in focus that I ultimately claim to provide important 
reasons as to why  McDowell’s conceptualist account of experience, and his associated 
therapeutic project in relation to the issue of mind-world relations, are now in serious 
difficulty.   
 The division of the Chapters is as follows: in Chapter 1, I set out McDowell’s story  of 
‘rational entitlement’ as it  comes to inform his account of experience and perceptual 
judgment. In Chapter 2, I then consider relevant aspects of ‘objectivity’ as they are implicated 
in McDowell’s account  of ensuring the content  of perceptual thought and the possibility of 
‘verdictive answerability’ to the world. And in Chapter 3, I clarify the relationship between 
relevant self-determining capacities and external constraint upon perceptual judgment as they 
are implicated in McDowell’s particular form of idealism.
 The methodology by which I present my central theses is one which further divides the 
respective Chapters into three parts: the first (A) gives McDowell’s account as it was in Mind 
and World; the second (B) illuminates Charles Travis’s account of such issues as they  find 
their place in his own alternative account of experience and perceptual judgment; and the 
third (C) attempts to clarify  McDowell’s new position in respect to the relevant aspects – as 
they take their shape according to the newly revised account of experience.    
 In the context of these respective subject matters, I elucidate the relevant and distinct 
models – offered by McDowell – so as to intelligibly  conceive experience as passively 
actualizing a conceptual content. Indeed, it is by way of these models that McDowell claims 
to substantiate the success of his philosophical therapy as applied to mind-world relations – 
and specifically, the interrelated issues of ensuring the very content of empirical thought and 
being answerable to the empirical world. 
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 At the same time, I present the philosophy of Travis as providing a compelling source for 
relevant external pressures that can be placed upon these models of intelligibly conceiving 
experience as constituted by conceptual content, particularly  as they are offered in Mind and 
World. As I present my discussion, McDowell’s earlier account of conceptually shaped 
experience is one which is viewed as vulnerable to certain persuasive criticisms put forth by 
Travis. 
 Viewed in this way, the success of McDowell’s revised account of experience is in turn 
weakened in light of certain internal considerations, specifically, the loss of these more robust 
models of intelligibly conceiving experience as conceptually shaped, which he once invoked 
as central in support of his therapeutic philosophy, as applied to issues of content and 
answerability. This cumulative methodology, I contend, thus places McDowell’s account of 
experience as constituted by conceptual content, and his associated therapeutic ambitions, in 
serious difficulty.
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    Chapter 1: Entitlement 
A. The Issue of Rational Entitlement 
1. The Myth of the Given 
 McDowell: “Empirical justifications depend on rational relations, relations within the space of 
 reasons. The putatively reassuring idea is that empirical justifications have an ultimate foundation 
 in impingement on the conceptual realm from outside. So the space of reasons is made out to be 
 more extensive than the space of concepts […] (last step) [...] pointing to something that is simply 
 received in experience.” 1 
 McDowell: “Avoiding the Myth requires capacities that belong to reason to be operative in 
 experiencing itself, not just in judgments made in response to experience.” 2
 Travis: “How does perception make the world bear for the perceiver on what to think and do 
 – in fortunate cases, as the world bears on what is so, or would be the thing to do? How, more 
 briefly, does perception make the world available for thought (or what is it for it to do this)?” 3
 According to John McDowell, to fall into the Myth of the Given is to suppose that one 
can acquire certain kinds of knowledge, in this case perceptual knowledge, without needing to 
have the relevant rational or conceptual capacities in place in order to acquire that knowledge 
in the first  place4. The idea that one could in fact do so engenders the mythical aspect of the 
Myth of the Given. This then constitutes an identifiable incoherence that must be avoided in 
order to posit an intelligible picture of perceptual judgement. 
 Now exactly  what model of perceptual judgement is required in order to avoid that 
perspicuous incoherence presents one of the defining issues which comes to characterise the 
7
1 John McDowell, Mind and World. (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 6.
2 John McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’. In Having the World in View : Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars (Cambridge 
MA : Harvard University Press, 2009), p. 259.
3 Charles  Travis, ‘Unlocking the Outer World’, p. 1. http://mlag.up.pt/?author=7 
4 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 256.
differences that hold between McDowell’s and Charles Travis’s respective accounts. Of 
course, as the various aspects which come to inform perceptual judgment come into focus – 
rational entitlement, objectivity and self-determination – the substantive differences which 
obtain between the two philosophers certainly do extend well beyond the (initial) 
disagreement pertaining to that notion of sensory experience which is considered necessary to 
avoid the Myth of the Given insofar as it  is a Myth. However, it is precisely the issue of what 
what constitutes falling foul of the Myth of the Given that divides each account of perceptual 
judgment as it unfolds. So, before discussing the details of McDowell’s and Travis’s pictures 
of experience and perceptual judgment, it is first necessary to elucidate a brief account of their 
respective notions of the Myth of the Given.
 Following Wilfred Sellars, McDowell situates episodes of perceptual knowledge in the 
space of reasons – the latter being a space in which one justifies what one judges or claims to 
be the case. This situation is then coupled with an ‘internalistic’ conception of knowledge, 
according to which, in order to have knowledge, one must  also be able to self-consciously 
identify how it is that one came to acquire that very knowledge.5  So to claim to have a 
particular kind of knowledge, in this case perceptual, one then has to be able to offer reasons 
in order to justify one’s entitlement to that particular knowledge. And so, in accordance with 
the kind of knowledge which is perceptual, one must be able to offer reasons as to why one is 
rationally entitled to such a purported perceptual claim.
 However, when we consider the case of perceptual knowledge a problem emerges. 
Perceptual knowledge is a kind of knowledge which comes to be acquired by way of 
sensibility. And, at least  as it is traditionally conceived, sensibility  does not belong to our 
capacities of reason. Accordingly, the sensory impressions of perceptual experience seem to 
resist any kind of rational or intelligible inclusion into the space of reasons, that is, the space 
8
5 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 270.
wherein one seeks to justify one’s perceptual judgements or claims. How could we make a 
mere ‘dent in the tablet of mind’ into a rational consideration? 6
 This then brings into focus McDowell’s own conception of the Myth of the Given. 
McDowell’s take upon the Myth of the Given is profoundly  influenced by Sellars. From 
Sellars, McDowell takes it that it  is precisely to fall into the Myth of the Given to think that 
sensibility without the involvement of rational capacities can make things available for 
cognition.7  Importantly, McDowell takes this to imply that conceptual capacities must 
therefore be involved in sensibility  itself so as to avoid the Myth (whereas Travis does not). In 
other words, one would fall foul of the Myth of the Given, if one appealed to sensory 
experience as a rational justification for one’s claim to perceptual knowledge, on a conception 
of sensory experience, along traditional lines, as lacking the involvement of our conceptual 
capacities. In such a case that  which would be appealed to in one’s purported justification 
would have to obtain outside of the space of the conceptual. So that to fall foul of the Myth of 
the Given, according to McDowell, merely  requires that the space of reasons, in the context of 
perceptual rational entitlement, be treated as extending beyond the realm of the conceptual. 
 For McDowell, our rational faculties must then be operative in sensibility itself. This, and 
nothing less, is what is necessary in order to achieve a coherent account of perceptual 
judgement that – in the context of rational entitlement – can appeal to sensibility itself as 
providing reasons for what  we judge to be so about objects visibly  present to us. As will 
become apparent, in discussion to follow, just as it is from Sellars that McDowell gets his take 
on the Myth, so it is also under Sellars’s tutelage that he invokes his various models of 
9
6 McDowell, ‘Experiencing the World’, in The Engaged Intellect : Philosophical Essays (Cambridge MA : Harvard University Press, 
2009), p. 252.
7 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 258.
conceptual intelligibility  for making sense of his stipulated notion of conceptual content as 
passively actualised in experience itself.
 McDowell’s notion of the intelligible extension of the space of reasons to sensibility  itself 
is also informed by what he sees as (with amendment) Donald Davidson’s central insight into 
rationality, viz., : that reasons-relations occur only between conceptual contents. For 
perceptual knowledge to be so placed in the logical space of reasons, in accordance with 
Davidson’s (amended) insight into rationality, the relatum of that logical space – both 
knowledgeable judgment and the experience that rationally entitles it  – must then be 
constituted by conceptual content. Moreover, at least according to McDowell’s Mind and 
World paradigm, to so extend the space of reasons to the domain of sensibility  requires that 
experience be treated as having propositional content.
 Even so, from McDowell’ point of view, it is Davidson who provides the example of 
another model of perceptual judgement which would also render problematic a 
knowledgeable relationship in respect to the empirical world, viz., a ‘Coherentism’, which 
according to McDowell, insufficiently  accommodates for rational external constraint upon 
perceptual judgment. By refusing to ground the justification of perceptual knowledge in 
sensibility, Davidson, as McDowell sees it, forgoes any rational assurance that such 
judgments are secured to the external reality  that  such thought purports to be about, any 
assurance that such judgments are not ‘spinning in the void’.
 Davidson of course – as will be discussed further – was also concerned with avoiding the 
Myth of the Given. And indeed McDowell’s notion of the Myth of the Given, sensibility 
conceived of as something that does not itself involve our rational capacities, is very  much 
influenced by Davidson. However, Davidson claims to avoid the Myth by  limiting the space 
of reasons, that is, by limiting the rational justification for perceptual judgments to the 
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contents of other beliefs. In this way  Davidson proposes to exclude sensory  impressions 
themselves (treated as causes of our perceptual judgements) from figuring in the rational 
entitlement of those judgements. Davidson then, according to McDowell, refuses the notion 
that ensuring empirical content depends upon preserving ‘answerability’ to sensory 
impressions, and maintains that impressions are not the kind of thing which we could be 
answerable to.8  Re-establishing the intelligibility  of this (repudiated) ‘answerability’ by 
crediting experience with conceptual content is precisely what Davidson is ‘blind to’.
 As McDowell reads Davidson, his ‘Coherentist’ model of perceptual judgment fails to 
incorporate the quite benign and unproblematic motivations, at least at the outset, of those 
models of perceptual judgment which by his lights eventually come to fall foul of the Myth of 
the Given, viz., that, purporting to be directed towards the empirical world, perceptual thought 
ought to be conceived of as, through experience, under rational external constraint from, and 
so answerable to, that world. Such concerns, as McDowell claims in Mind and World, provide 
the (understandable) motivation to then ‘recoil’ back into appealing to something like the 
Myth, thereby  ensuring an ‘interminable oscillation’ between the two models of thought. It  is 
in the context of this quandary, as he reads it,  that McDowell, by  way of therapy, offers his 
stipulated notion of conceptual content in experience.
 Charles Travis provides an account of the relationship between thought and the world 
which he claims avoids the ‘mythical’ aspect of the Myth – viz., that  one could acquire 
knowledge without having the relevant conceptual capacities in place to receive it. Travis 
presents a model of perceptual judgment which provides a cognitive role for the sensory; 
however perception, as Travis understands it, does not itself involve or draw upon the 
conceptual capacities of the subject, as McDowell would have it. 
11
8 McDowell, ‘Experiencing the World’, p. 246.
 Travis takes as his point of departure what he sees as the fundamental question of 
perception : how does perception make the world available for thought? 9  And his answer is 
that perception, which is not itself conceptually shaped, ‘silently’ affords us visual 
acquaintance with the objects in our surroundings, thereby making them available to 
recognition, given suitable expertise. Moreover, Travis holds that  our perceptual thoughts 
stand in a verdictive relation to the non-conceptual objects that we make judgments about, 
given the visual acquaintance with them that perception affords. Travis presents such an 
account as one that avoids the trivial incoherence that  he associates with the Myth of the 
Given, while at the same time avoiding what  he perceives as McDowell’s problematically 
idealist notion of conceptual experience. 
 So whilst Travis may  well agree with McDowell that ‘bare’ sensibility by itself cannot 
make things available to cognition, it does not follow, in his view, that conceptual capacities 
must therefore be in play prior to judgment, actualised in experience itself, so as to avoid the 
incoherent aspects of the Myth of the Given. Conceptual capacities are, of course, necessary 
in order to ‘unlock the outer world’, and make the world available to empirical thought; 
however, this does not occur in the senses themselves : the senses themselves are ‘silent’. 
 To establish reason’s reach as extending to the non-conceptual object itself, Travis posits 
a notion of recognition and experience by which to bind the conceptual content of judgement 
and the non-conceptual objects of perception in rational and reason-providing relations. As 
Travis’s notion of recognition plays out according to what he dubs Frege’s dividing line 
between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, it thus becomes apparent that Travis, unlike 
McDowell, evidently  has no need for Davidson’s constraint against extending the space of 
reasons to the non-conceptual object itself.  
12
9 Travis, ‘Unlocking the Outer World’, p.1.
 Of course, and as will be seen, by  McDowell’s reckoning, Travis’s is a model which 
nevertheless falls into the Myth – that is, in light of McDowell’s notion of what  it  takes to 
avoid its incoherence. That conviction remains firmly in place despite the fact that  McDowell 
comes to revise his account of experience in order to accommodate for those criticisms made 
by Travis in the course of the latter’s presenting his own Fregean model of perceptual 
judgement.  
 In Chapter 1, I propose to explore McDowell’s notion of conceptual experience, and to 
situate Travis as a central figure responsible for the change from his Mind and World 
propositional account of experience to his later picture of experience as having merely non-
discursive intuitional content. I will then assess the intelligibility  of what is left  of 
McDowell’s model of experience, and its stipulated notion of conceptual content, and how 
this then comes to bear upon some of the primary  aspects of McDowell’s Mind and World 
paradigm. 
2. McDowell: Models of Intelligibility and Passively Actualised Content 
McDowell : “Sellar’s key move here is to put forward a conception of experience as “so to speak, making” 
claims, or “containing” them [...] “thoughts”,  including experiences, figure in the first instance as posits in 
a theory constructed to explain overt behaviour, both linguistic and non-linguistic [...] these posits come 
with a model [...] the model in the case of  ‘thoughts’ is speech acts [...] the posited non-overt propositional 
episodes are modelled on episodes in which propositional content is overt, for instance claims literally so 
called. That goes for experiences in particular […] expressed claims are the model we need to exploit in 
grasping the concept of experiences.” 10
McDowell : “What we need, and can have,  is the idea of a case of  receptivity in operation that, even while 
being that, is an actualisation, together, of conceptual capacities whose active exercise, with the same 
togetherness, would be the making of a judgment.” 11 
13
10 McDowell, ‘Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint’. In Having the World in View : Essays on Kant, Hegel, and 
Sellars, p. 94.
11 McDowell, ‘Experiencing the World’, p. 249.
 In order to successfully navigate an intelligible path between Davidson’s externally  
unconstrained ‘Coherentism’ and the incoherence of the ‘Myth of the Given’, McDowell 
offers a notion of experience which is informed by certain models, analogies, and indeed 
disanalogies. McDowell makes particular use of overt speech acts and judgments. These 
models are of such importance because they  are the paradigmatic model of the conceptual. 
Being propositional in their nature they  are constituted by precisely  the same content as the 
‘ostensible seeings’ or ‘appearings’ McDowell wishes to posit in experience. And although 
they  differ in respect to the means of their actualisation, they  come to inform McDowell’s 
picture of conceptual experience, both in respect to his Mind and World paradigm, and his 
later changes.
 The reasons why these models are significant is that McDowell’s extension of the bounds 
of the conceptual to experience requires that he substantiate that account with recognisable 
conceptual aspects within experience. So the importance of the models is in respect to 
intelligibility. McDowell makes it  quite clear at the beginning of Mind and World that his 
extension of the conceptual to experience should not  fall into mere ‘word-play’, by simply 
calling experience conceptual, yet  divesting it of the recognisable features which 
(conventionally) characterise spontaneity. 
 In the Mind and World paradigm, we are directed by McDowell to understand the content 
of experience upon the model of judgment, just as thought itself was understood by Sellars on 
the model of overt speech. Across the three tiered system of speech, judgment, and intuition, 
McDowell supposes that the content of each is the very same. They just  differ in respect to 
how that content manifests itself. And indeed McDowell expends a large amount of 
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philosophical effort to reinforce that notion of shared content, albeit with different modes of 
actualisation.  
 It is of course possible to distinguish McDowell’s more ‘higher order’ concerns, foremost 
of which is dismounting from the ‘interminable oscillation’ he identifies, from the substantive 
details of the propositional models of intelligibility by means of which we are to understand 
how we can make sense of the idea that experience has conceptual content. So the particulars 
of the story of intelligibility  ought not to be, at least  at the outset, conflated with the higher 
order concerns of McDowell’s project. Such details of intelligibility  merely facilitate a means 
to an end.
 Even so, it is precisely those models of intelligibility which throughout lend substance to 
McDowell’s original response to his higher order concerns. So one of the central issues to be 
addressed in the chapters to follow is whether the radical diminishment of McDowell’s Mind 
and World picture of the conceptual content of experience, as he now moves away  from the 
idea that experience has propositional content, ultimately thwarts his Mind and World project. 
Does the later McDowell then lose the right to call experience conceptual? 
3. Givenness vs givenness : Traditional Empiricism vs Minimal Empiricism 
McDowell: “That is what I mean by a “minimal empiricism”: the idea that experience must constitute a 
tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we are to make 
sense of it as thinking at all. And this is one side of a combination of plausibilities that promises to account 
for the philosophical anxieties I alluded to. The other side is a frame of mind, which I shall come to, that 
makes it hard to see how experience could function as a tribunal, delivering verdicts on our thinking.” 12 
 The obvious starting point to distinguish McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricism’ from 
‘traditional empiricism’ is to distinguish between their respective notions of the ‘given’. 
15
12 McDowell, Mind and World, p. xii. 
According to McDowell’s Mind and World account, that which we are given in experience is 
a manifold of propositional content. The ‘propositional given’ is thus intended to displace the 
notion of a Given of experience, understood as a non-conceptual sensory impression. 
 According to McDowell, such notions have succeeded only in contributing to a paradigm 
which has created the problematic ‘interminable oscillation’ that he has identified in Mind and 
World. Hence they  have exhausted their usefulness as a means of understanding the relations 
between mind and world. The propositional given McDowell offers, allows us, he tells us, to 
look at things from a different ‘angle’13– and what’s more it  allows us to escape from that 
‘interminable oscillation’. 
 Customary  conceptions of experience as outside the conceptual sphere, according to 
McDowell, ultimately make it a ‘mystery’ about how our empirical thought has ‘content’ in 
the first  place, or how our thought is ‘answerable’ to the empirical world for its correctness. 
This necessitates a change in the very mode of understanding the relation between experience, 
thought and the world. For McDowell, what is required is a means of understanding 
experience as itself as a sensory episode with conceptual content. This is the function that 
propositional content is intended to serve. It provides the means in which to intelligibly 
conceive experience as itself conceptual, and provides a content within experience that is 
amenable to normative discourse: a content that can itself be taken up as a reason in our 
thinking. 
 How could such a thing as a ‘bare sensory impression’ stand in a reason-providing 
function? Devoid of the concepts which figure in thought, the sensory can do no such thing as 
stand in normative relations. Without a conceptual apparatus that can, amongst other things, 
give the necessary means of intelligibly comprehending experience as itself within the 
16
13 McDowell, ‘The Logical Form of an Intuition’, in Having the World in View : Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, p.34.
normative framework, one is left with nothing other than the incoherence of the Myth of the 
Given. 
4. Davidson’s ‘Blindspot’ 
Davidson: “My view is that particular empirical beliefs are supported by other beliefs, some of them 
perceptual and some not. Perceptual beliefs are caused by features of  the environment,  but nothing in 
their causality provides a reason for such beliefs. Nevertheless, many basic perceptual beliefs are true, and 
the explanation of  this fact shows why we are justified in believing them. We know many things where our 
only reasons for believing them are further beliefs.”14
McDowell: “For Davidson, receptivity can impinge on the space of reasons only from outside, which is to 
say that nothing can be rationally vulnerable to its deliverances […] if we go on using the Kantian terms, 
we have to say that the operations of spontaneity are rationally unconstrained from outside themselves. 
That is indeed a way of formulating Davidson's Coherentism.”15
McDowell: “But Davidson thinks experience can be nothing but an extra-conceptual impact on sensibility. 
So he concludes that experience must be outside the space of  reasons. According to Davidson, experience is 
causally relevant to a subject’s beliefs and judgments, but it has no bearing on their status as justified or 
warranted. Davidson says that “nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief except another 
belief” (p.310), and he means in particular that experience cannot count as a reason for holding a belief.”16 
 The best place to begin to develop an account of McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricism’ is 
with Davidson. Such a starting point is not however due to the fact that Davidson was in any 
sense an ‘empiricist’, but rather, it is under the influence of Davidson’s dictum that McDowell 
develops his rational entitlement account, and indeed his picture of intelligibly incorporating 
experience itself within the normative space of reasons. According to McDowell, it  is 
17
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Davidson’s great insight that rational entitlement is constituted by  rational relations between 
contents that involve an actualization of our conceptual capacities.  
 This is a rational constraint that McDowell shares with Davidson, and a position which 
comes to distinguish theirs from Travis’s. Of course, McDowell does indeed come to 
incorporate many aspects of Travis’s account, yet McDowell’s rational entitlement picture is 
one which remains grounded in what he takes to be Davidson’s central insight, viz., that 
rational relations between items essentially involve rational relations between conceptual 
items. For McDowell this commitment is a necessity in order to avoid the Myth of the Given. 
 That said, what becomes apparent is that Davidson and McDowell differ in respect to 
their motivation for avoiding the Myth of the Given. The motivation for avoiding the Myth of 
the Given is of such importance because it has significant implications in respect to their 
epistemic entitlement  pictures. Davidson’s principal motivation for avoiding the Myth of the 
Given is a desire to avoid ‘skepticism’. And as Davidson sees things, such skeptical concerns 
are intrinsic to any ‘empiricist’ picture. 
 I’ll discuss these skeptical concerns in the context  of addressing what Davidson sees as 
the ‘epistemic intermediaries’ in the empiricist picture of entitlement. For now, however, I 
wish to illuminate how Davidson comes to develop  his ‘Coherentist’ position in respect to his 
avoiding the Myth of the Given. 
5. Davidson on Experience 
 It is somewhat paradoxical that it is Davidson, and not McDowell, who assumes a model 
of perceptual judgment, a mode of intelligibility, associated more with the traditional 
empiricist position, as regards characterizing experience, than McDowell himself. Of course, 
Davidson gives experience itself no rational standing according to his rational entitlement 
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picture, as to do so would fall afoul of the Myth of the Given. And yet Davidson assumes 
from the very outset  the very  model which makes possible the oscillation back to the Myth of 
the Given. 
 Davidson does not indulge in a overly complex characterization of experience, as 
McDowell does in respect to intelligibility, because experience as he sees it, is of no 
immediate normative concern in the rational entitlement picture. His notion of experience is 
best understood as a ‘bare’ non-conceptual sensory  impression. (Because the sensory is 
positioned outside the space of concepts, experience – given with the necessity of avoiding 
the Myth of the Given – is thus situated outside the normative entitlement picture). In other 
words, experience as a non-conceptual episode, is situated outside the space of reasons.  
 Davidson is committed to the dictum that ‘nothing can count as a reason for holding a 
belief except another belief’.17  He therefore refuses the idea that experience, as something 
outside ‘the scope of beliefs’, can provide a basis for knowledge, or can operate as a 
‘tribunal’ that stands in judgment over beliefs. Experiences as ‘sensory  impressions’ are 
outside the epistemic relata of conceptual content (beliefs) and are accordingly  posited as 
outside the rational entitlement story. In Davidson’s space of reasons normative relations are 
thus restricted from tracing the justification for a perceptual judgment all the way back to 
experience itself. With Davidson’s assumed model of experience, any attempt to extend the 
rational entitlement picture to experience itself necessarily falls foul of the Myth.
 The most that experience can do in Davidson’s story is play a causal role in the formation 
of perceptual beliefs about objects in an extra-linguistic reality. So that when it comes to 
issues of entitlement, any reference to ‘experience’, can at best merely acknowledge the 
particular causal source of such beliefs, i.e. via visual perception. Of course, some causal 
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story is an essential aspect to any picture that intends to illuminate the acquisition of 
perceptual beliefs. However, the important point is that Davidson does not assign experience 
any rational justificatory  role in his entitlement story of perceptual beliefs. This is certainly 
McDowell’s take on Davidson.
 Perceptual beliefs therefore have rational support no further than in their ‘coherence’ with 
other beliefs culminating in something like a ‘world view’. So the ‘rational support’ of 
perceptual beliefs is co-linearly exhausted to the extent to which one’s provisions of beliefs 
are also. Davidson’s ‘triangulation’ story  in respect to ‘content’ can, of course, be taken as 
feeding into the ‘rational support’ structure of perceptual beliefs, but for immediate purposes, 
that which is ‘reason-providing’ in the normative sense in Davidson’s account goes no further 
than a caused perceptual ‘belief’.   
6. Davidson and ‘Appearings’ 
McDowell: “Perhaps a sensory impression causes it to appear to a subject that things are thus and so, and 
the appearing has implications for what the subject ought to think. But sensory impressions themselves,  as 
Davidson conceives them, cannot stand in rational relations to what a subject is to think.”18
McDowell : “One can have an experience that reveals to one that things are thus and so without coming to 
believe that things are thus and so. One need not avail oneself of every rational entitlement one has. 
Consider a case in which one is misled into mistrusting one’s experience. One does not believe it is 
revealing to one how things are, but in fact it is doing just that.”19 
 One of the means by  which McDowell comes to distinguish his ‘minimal empiricism’ 
from Davidson’s ‘Coherentist’ position is via a rational entitlement picture in which sensory 
experience can itself afford reasons for perceptual judgment. One of the ways this plays out 
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grammatically is via ‘appearings’. Davidson himself does not initially  use the term 
‘appearing’ in his account; however, McDowell makes use of ‘appearings’ in such a way  so as 
to draw out the differences in their entitlement pictures. Indeed, McDowell introduces the 
notion of ‘appearing’ as a way of illuminating the problems Davidson has in restricting his 
entitlement story within the boundary  of ‘belief’, rather than acknowledging McDowell’s 
extended space of concepts. 
 In Davidson’s story, ‘appearings’, as states with propositional content, are indeed within 
the space of the conceptual. However, for Davidson, an ‘appearing’ and a belief, are not to be 
so distinguished so that the space of reasons extends beyond belief. Because “nothing can 
count as a reason for holding a belief except another belief”, such ‘appearings’ are necessarily 
beliefs. It is only by  an ‘appearing’ being a belief that it can stand in rational relations, i.e 
stand as a reason. So Davidson can ground an observational claim to the extent that it 
‘appears’ that things are thus and so, on the understanding that this is indeed a belief that 
things are thus and so. 
 However, this does not (rationally) align ‘appearings’ with sensory  impressions. It does 
not extend the justification story all the way to the experience, to receptivity, itself. The 
sensory  impressions are not themselves constituted by content, the same content of 
‘appearings’. As already  mentioned, impressions are outside the space of concepts. Sensory 
impressions can impress upon the perceiver ‘appearings’, which are perceptual beliefs, but 
only in the causal sense of ‘impress’, not  in any normative function. So, to yet again reiterate, 
Davidson’s take on experience is as sensory impression which is not an ‘appearing’. Sensory 
impressions are themselves outside the conceptual, and outside the space of reasons. 20 
21
20 McDowell, Mind and World,  p. 139.
7. McDowell and ‘Appearing’ 
McDowell : “ […] nothing can count as a reason for holding a belief  except something else that is also in 
the space of concepts – for instance, a circumstance consisting in its appearing to a subject that things are 
thus and so.” 21
 Attending to the grammar of ‘appearing’, as it supposedly takes shape in each of 
McDowell’s and Davidson’s respective entitlement stories, is an attempt on McDowell’s part 
to illuminate Davidson’s ‘blindspot’. McDowell essentially has two problems with 
Davidson’s (assumed) account in respect  to ‘appearings’. The first  is that  ‘appearings’ are 
aligned with beliefs, and secondly, ‘appearings’ are not rationally bound to sensory 
impressions. 
 McDowell claims that the identification of ‘appearings’ with beliefs is an ‘unhappy’ one. 
‘Appearings’, in McDowell’s picture, provide a conceptual space in experience in which a 
belief is not acquired, and a judgment is not yet exercised. Reasons are provided in 
experience, they are the given content of experience, and that content can be manifestly 
expressed through the grammar of ‘appearings’. However, McDowell offers a conceptual 
space which exceeds the sphere of judgment, a space of entitlement in which an item (an 
‘appearing’) can stand in normative relations, but which in itself lacks the endorsement  of 
judgment.      
 ‘Appearings’, in McDowell’s account, provide a content that is passively  actualized in 
experience, that can entitle a ‘taking to be so’ without yet being a ‘taking to be so’. Thus, for 
McDowell, ‘appearings’ are intended to provide an epistemic intermediary position of a kind 
(deflationary) before belief or judgment. ‘Appearings’ are epistemic intermediaries of a kind, 
because experience has the very same content as a judgment. ‘Appearings’ rationally 
(epistemically) mediate between the objects that we perceive and our perceptual beliefs about 
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them. They are reason-providing and entitling because they are propositional in form and in 
content. Like a judgment, the content of an ‘appearing’ purports something to be the case. 
8. Intermediaries and Emissaries
Davidson: “I was clear from the start that unconceptualized “experience”, sense data, sensations, Hume’s 
impressions and ideas, could not coherently serve as evidence for beliefs: only something with 
propositional content could do this […] I also thought then, and think now, that empiricism as I 
understood it leads inevitably to skepticism.” 22 
Davidson: “Nor is McDowell right in thinking I do not want, as he does, to “give the deliverances of  the 
senses an ultimate evidential role”. What the senses “deliver” (i.e. cause) in perception is perceptual 
beliefs, and these do have an ultimate evidential role. If this is what it takes to be an empiricist, I’m an 
empiricist. An empiricist, however, in the “pallid” sense, since I postulate no epistemic intermediaries 
between reality and perceptual beliefs about reality. ”23
McDowell: “But the real trouble with conceiving experiences as intermediaries is that we cannot make 
sense of experiences, so conceived, as purporting to tell us anything, whether truthfully or not.  When we 
take receptivity itself  to impinge rationally on belief, we equip ourselves to understand experience as 
openness to the world. And now the problem of making it intelligible that experience is endowed with 
content lapses, and the question of truthfulness takes on a different look. We achieve an intellectual right 
to shrug our shoulders at skeptical questions. ”24 
 Davidson essentially  offers two distinct criticisms of ‘intermediaries’ in the rational 
entitlement picture. The first is bound to the traditional empiricist model, which would posit 
non-conceptual experience as evidence for empirical beliefs. According to such accounts there 
obtains a sensory intermediary between thought and the world, and this is in the form of a 
perceptual ‘object’ pertaining to one’s own sensory impressions. The second, which ultimately 
proves more problematic to McDowell’s minimal empiricist picture, and which is discussed 
further in the context of McDowell’s revised account, is the idea that  sensory impressions 
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with propositional content, ‘appearings’, can function as epistemic intermediaries between the 
world, as perceivable objects, and judgment about those objects.   
 I propose to separate the two notions of intermediaries in the following discussion. The 
first is the notion of intermediary as object, and the second is intermediary as content. While 
intermediary as object is not of primary relevance in this particular discussion, it does 
however provide the necessary insight into Davidson’s own entitlement picture, and perhaps 
more importantly, it provides the opportunity  to illuminate how McDowell’s empiricist 
picture appropriates a comparable space of reasons to Davidson’s, one which avoids the Myth 
of the Given, and in this manner differentiates itself from the traditional empiricist mould.   
9. ‘Intermediary’ as Object : Sensory Impressions 
 Davidson is quite right to criticize the traditional forms of empiricism as leading to 
skepticism. Justifying perceptual knowledge claims upon ‘sense data’, ‘unconceptualized’ 
impressions, sensations etc, will indeed inevitably lead to the well known difficulties that are 
associated with (yet again) connecting the subjective mind with the objective world. If 
judgment is meant to pertain to a private intermediary, then this intermediary immediately 
problematizes our knowledge of the world, as judgment so conceived will take as its 
intentional object something not even of the (surrounding) world, let alone an item susceptible 
to truth or falsity. 
 Such thought, would be directed towards some inner object, a situation brought about 
merely by  a causal relation with an outside world, a world which itself becomes epistemically 
out of reach. This would mark a break in the cognitive relation between the perceiving subject 
and outer objects, and so would render knowledge of the world as something indirect, at best 
inferential, and thus inviting skeptical disquiet. In fact, it is difficult to see how anything so 
conceived could stand as evidence for anything at all. 
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10. ‘Intermediary as Content’ : Sensory Content  
  McDowell’s rational entitlement picture shares some of the characteristic features of an 
empiricist picture. No doubt because McDowell’s story is just that: a form of empiricism, 
albeit a ‘minimal empiricism’. Both share an epistemic picture that would have ‘experience’ 
and ‘receptivity’ as the ultimate tribunal in the justification of perceptual beliefs. However, 
McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricist’ picture is one which posits ‘sensory content’, and not 
‘sensory  object’, as warranting perceptual judgment. And this makes for the fundamental 
differences in the respective accounts. McDowell tries to make it  intelligible how experience 
could indeed function as a tribunal upon thought.
 As it  is, McDowell and Davidson share many critical evaluations of traditional 
empiricism. And McDowell is quite cognizant of the fact that empiricism, as traditionally 
conceived, invites such skeptical appraisals. However, where Davidson is quite happy  to 
accede to the more traditional model of experience as bare non-conceptual sensory 
impressions, and in turn revert to his ‘Coherentist’ picture, McDowell refuses at  the outset the 
very model of receptivity  as removed from spontaneity.  So, despite McDowell espousing an 
empiricist picture of entitlement, he himself has no need whatsoever for those traditionally 
stipulated notions of bare sensory impression, impressions which as non-conceptual could 
somehow play the evidentiary role of justifier. 
 So where Davidson buys into the dualist  model, a model in which receptivity and 
spontaneity are separate functions in perceptual judgment, the very model which characterizes 
the problematical form of empiricism, McDowell essentially seeks to dissolve the model at 
the outset. In this way McDowell sees his empiricism as giving an ‘openness to the world’, 
rather than an empiricism which steers the way towards ‘skepticism’25. 
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 So, in the context of the rational entitlement picture, a ‘minimal empiricism’ for 
McDowell, provides the last bastion, as it were, against the externally  ‘unconstrained’ 
Coherentism of Davidson. Interestingly, however, it  is not the considerable differences with 
Davidson that drive McDowell towards a version of empiricism, albeit a ‘minimal’ one, but 
rather the considerable similarities between himself and Davidson. And specifically, a 
conception of the space of reasons as confined to propositional content. 
11. The Space of Reasons 
McDowell: “ I said that perceptually based belief is linked to experience by an explanatory nexus that 
depends on the idea of the workings of rationality. The notion of rationality I mean to invoke here is the 
notion exploited in the traditional line of thought to make a special place in the animal kingdom for 
rational animals. It is a notion of responsiveness to reasons as such.”26
McDowell : “I use the idea of conceptual capacities in a way that is governed by this stipulation : 
conceptual capacities in the relevant sense belong essentially to their possessor’s rationality in the sense I 
am working with, responsiveness to reasons as such.”27
McDowell : “It is incumbent on thought to be responsive to reasons recognized as such,  and nothing can 
count as a reason for a thinking subject unless its authority as a reason can be freely acknowledged by the 
subject.” 28
 As mentioned, McDowell offers a conception of experience according to which it can be 
intelligibly  understood as conceptual, thus enabling sensory  impressions themselves to figure 
in the space of reasons. That re-configuration involves utilizing Davidson’s very own 
formulation of the space of reasons, albeit an amended one. Experience as rationally entitling 
therefore has much more in common with Davidson’s space of reasons, than the traditional 
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empiricism Davidson sees as inviting skeptical concerns. For McDowell, that which can stand 
as a reason must be propositional. 
 McDowell extols Davidson’s dictum as to the kinds of things that can be reason-
providing, viz., states with propositional content. McDowell is in agreement with Davidson 
that to extend the space of reasons beyond the propositional (at least in the Mind and World 
model), would inevitably  fall foul of the Myth of the Given. But, as already discussed, 
McDowell does not limit his own story  of propositional content to belief, he seeks to extend it 
to the posited conceptual space of ‘appearings’. McDowell accordingly wishes to extend that 
which can be taken as a reason, and be seen as reason-providing in the normative sense, to 
content which obtains outside of judgment. And so extending the space of reasons to 
propositional content outside of judgment is an essential feature of McDowell’s criticisms 
against Davidson.  
12. External Constraint 
 Of course, extending the space of reasons to something beyond the exercise of judgment 
is one of the motivations which lies behind the Myth of the Given. McDowell, in effect, 
considers that he has incorporated that motivation for external constraint within his extension 
of the space of reasons, and yet at the same time stayed within the (Davidsonian) model of 
propositional content as reason-providing. 
 Experience is reason-providing in McDowell’s picture because receptivity  is bound to 
propositional content, and as such, it  can function as a reason, yet intelligibly accommodate 
for external constraint. In this way  the visible objects in our surroundings, those objects which 
we literally perceive, can come to be rationally significant for us, that is, via the passive 
actualization of conceptual content in receptivity. 
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 According to McDowell, for Davidson to confine the space of reasons to the realm of 
judgment, or belief, as he does, thus problematizes not only  rational ‘external constraint’ on 
thought, but also the very possibility for content in the first place. Without the object itself 
rationally figuring in empirical thought, there is no such content. So for McDowell to extend 
the space of reasons to receptivity in such a way also provides the means of ensuring the 
objective purport of judgement. Because the object of perception is itself within the reach of 
reason, given that the requisite conceptual capacities are actualized in experience, it  can stand 
as the ultimate source of entitlement for a judgment that things are thus and so. 
13. No Dualism: Sensory and Intellect
McDowell: “[…] A commonly held incredulity takes this form: if  one supposes, as I do, that the content of 
our experience is conceptual, in a sense in which the conceptual is connected with rationality, one cannot 
do justice to the sensory way in which perceptual experience discloses reality to us.”29 
McDowell: “And what justification can there be for the dualism? It is taken for granted in the empiricist 
tradition, but in this dialectical context that would be an unimpressive basis for defending it. So much the 
worse for the empiricist tradition, we might say.  Resting content with a dualism of  the sensory and the 
intellectual betrays a failure of imagination about the possibilities for finding the rational intellect 
integrally involved in the phenomena of human life. We should argue in the other direction. Actualizations 
of conceptual capacities, capacities that belong to their subject’s rationality can present things in a sensory 
way, and that gives the lie to the dualism.”30  
 While McDowell buys into a Davidsonian story as to the sorts of items which can enter 
into reasons-relations, Davidson’s restriction of reasons-relations to relations between beliefs 
gives his account a problematic ‘dualism’ between the sensory  and the intellect. As Davidson 
conceives it, the sensory is beyond and distinctly separate from the conceptual (as 
propositional). So that the most that sensory impressions can do is to causally  interact with 
conceptual capacities; the sensory  can cause beliefs, cause things to ‘appear’ that things are 
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thus and so. ‘Receptivity’ does not rationally  interact with spontaneity. In this way, there is a 
(causally) functioning – but, according to McDowell – problematic dualism in Davidson’s 
picture of sense and intellect.  And as McDowell see it, any dualism between the intellect  and 
the sensory will inevitably lead one back to the Myth of the Given.
 McDowell repudiates any dualism which would separate the sensory from the intellect. In 
the Mind and World picture, this dualism is one between propositional content and the 
sensory. According to McDowell, any  such dualism necessarily situates one in the 
‘interminable oscillation’: on the side of either Davidson’s position of no rational external 
constraint upon thought, or a recoil to the Myth of the Given, if one indeed seeks to extend 
rationality all the way out to experience. McDowell thus presents a picture of experience that 
would dissolve any such dualism between the intellect and the senses, and he does this, in the 
Mind and World model, by conceiving of experience as the passive ‘actualization of 
conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness’. 
14. Thinking in the Sensory 
McDowell: “The sensory states enjoyed by a perceiver themselves already have intentional content, and 
the sense in which perceptual beliefs are grounded in sensation is that they derive their intentional content 
from the intentional content of the sensory states they are based on.”31
McDowell: “ […] the intentionality of intuitions is accounted for by the fact that in intuitions sensory 
consciousness itself  is informed by the higher faculty. The thinkings that provide for the intentionality of 
perceptual cognitions are not guided by sensory consciousness, as it were from without. They are sensory 
consciousness, suitably informed.”32
McDowell: “Here is a characteristic remark: “visual perception itself is not just a conceptualising  o f 
coloured objects within visual range — a ‘thinking about’ coloured objects in a certain context —  but, in a 
sense most difficult to analyse, a thinking in colour about  coloured objects.. In the view Sellars 
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 is trying to express in that remark, a distinctively  visual  character belongs to the thought itself (it  
 is “a thinking in colour”), not just to its aetiology.”33 
 The content of the thinking, or the sense of the thought, is such that it is immediately  
related to the very  object directly  in view in perception itself. So the intentional 
characterisation of experience and perceptual thoughts also includes the object being ‘sensibly 
present’ to the cognising subject. Hence experience does not simply cause one to have 
thought’s about the external world, such thoughts are had in the context of having directly  in 
view the circumstances in virtue of which they are true. 
 McDowell’s model of experience is such that as a conceptual episode it is not just a 
seeing, but a seeing that. So we can see that the thinkable contents of intuition and judgment 
do not just constitute a cognitive and epistemic achievement of the subject, but also constitute 
a distinctly  visual achievement also. So visual experience is a case of being under the visual 
impression that things are thus and so, with the visual aspect of experience necessary in order 
to determine the content of the thought. The content of the thought could not obtain just the 
same, if the subject lacked the capacity for visual perception, or closed their eyes from the 
world. So it is essential to McDowell’s account that ‘a distinctively  visual character belongs 
to the thought itself.’34
 Another way to conceive the point is that the propositional intentional content of 
experience is not something which is separable from the (more traditional) non-discursive 
‘object’-intentionality aspect of experience. The thinkable content of intuition and thought, its 
objective purport, and directness towards the world, is ensured only by way of the sensory 
aspect of experience. Such a picture of the intentional content of experience and thought thus 
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binds the propositional content with a shaping of sensory consciousness itself. So the 
thinkable content of intuition is bound to the sensory way external reality is revealed to us via 
perception.
 Again, this all ties into McDowell anti-dualistic stance against the sensory  and the 
intellect. As McDowell see it, the conceptual, its mode of presentation, need not be seen as 
something at odds with a sensory  mode of presentation.35 To presume as much, that is to say, a 
separation between the two modes of presentation, sets one down the slippery path towards 
the ‘interminable oscillation’, which his positing of conceptualised experience is precisely 
intended to therapeutically dissolve. 
 Now, in accordance with McDowell’s Kantian model of judgment, conceptual capacities 
are not first actualised with judgment; rather, they  are in the first instance, passively  actualised 
in experience itself. So it is that, in order for there to be a ‘thinking in the sensory’, the union 
between the content of thought and the sensory, it must first obtain in intentional intuition 
itself. Otherwise conceptual capacities would be conceived upon the problematic dualistic 
model which would posit  conceptual content figuring only as a rational response to that which 
intuition brought into view via the sensory. 
 To further explore this notion of conceptual content in experience itself, I will now 
explore McDowell’s reading of Kant. It is indeed Kant, according to McDowell, who provides 
the best possible account of intentional experience and thus a thinking in sensory 
consciousness itself.  
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15. McDowell and Kant
 McDowell: “Minimally, it must be possible to decide whether or not to judge that things are as one’s 
 experience represents them to be.  How one’s experience represents things to be is not under one’s 
 control, but it is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it.”36
 McDowell : “Kant says: “The same function which gives unity to the various representations in a 
 a judgement also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an intuition; and 
 this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the pure concept of the understanding.” 37
 In Mind and World McDowell asserts that experience represents ‘that things as thus and 
so’. In order to better grasp the representative function that McDowell’s notion of experience 
is intended to serve, the logical starting point is Kant. Indeed, McDowell supposes that no one 
has come closer to giving a better account of the intentionality of experience than Kant. 
Furthermore, due to McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricism’ – in so extending the logical space of 
reasons to the very function of Kantian intuition – it makes illuminating Kant’s own position 
on the relationship  between intuition and judgment a necessary priority. And that is precisely 
what McDowell sets out to do in his discussion of ‘The Clue’.
 McDowell’s reading of Kant is entirely  subject to the influence of McDowell’s 
‘conceptualist’ agenda. According to McDowell’s Mind and World paradigm, one which takes 
shape according to Davidson’s dictum, only  conceptual experience can provide an intelligible 
normative link between empirical thought and the empirical world. So for the purposes of this 
discussion, what is of primary relevance is illuminating McDowell’s take on Kantian intuition 
as conceptual.  
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 For McDowell, ‘The Clue’ is the surest sign that Kant intended for spontaneity to feature 
with receptivity, as not even ‘notionally separable’, in experience itself. And according to 
McDowell’s Mind and World interpretation, what  ‘The Clue’ is alluding to, is the possibility 
that experience, like judgment, has propositional content. ‘The Clue’ thus provides the means 
of giving substance to a conceptualist reading of Kantian intuition, by positing a shared 
representational unity, a shared propositional unity, between intuition and judgment. 
 As McDowell sees it, a normative relation between thought and sensible intuition is 
secured only by means of giving experience a content, a content with a logical structure which 
is understood via the propositional content of judgment. This is precisely  how experience is 
normatively reconciled with the conceptual capacities exercised in judgment. It is with the 
same such representational unity that McDowell can normatively bind the Kantian 
representational functions of both intuition and judgment.  
 McDowell thus posits the same propositional content between the passively actualised 
content of intuition and the exercised content of judgment. Although actualised in different 
ways, reflecting different dimensions of freedom yet to be discussed, the contents are bound 
by their unity. The normative link between experience and judgment is thus provided for by 
the same logical togetherness, the same unity, that the two contents share.  
 So, according to McDowell, giving the full weight to ‘The Clue’ is effected only  by 
positing a propositional content that is logically  comprised of the same concepts that  obtain in 
judgment. The importance of this is that the function of the Understanding is involved both in 
judgment and intuition, and although the latter is passively actualised and the former is 
exercised, they both have the same ‘logical togetherness’ in respect to their component 
concepts. By positing a shared propositional unity between the two ‘representing’ functions of 
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intuition and judgment, McDowell supposes that it can provide the means of rejecting the 
separation between sensory experience and the concepts exercised in judgments. 
 So the ‘logical togetherness’ of concepts in a propositionally unified content is imperative 
to McDowell’s normative picture as encompassing experience itself. As mentioned above, for 
McDowell, the rational entitlement story – normative intelligibility  – is one which depends 
upon a shared content, between intuition and judgment. Only in this way is Davidson’s ‘blind 
spot’ overcome and the rational extension of conceptual capacities to experience ensured. 
16. Model of Speech Acts and Meaning 
McDowell: “If one judges, say, that there is a red cube in front of  one, one makes a joint exercise of a 
multiplicity of  conceptual capacities, including at least a capacity that would also be exercised in judging 
that there is a red pyramid in front of one and a capacity that would also be exercised in judging that 
there is a blue cube in front of one [...] the capacities have to be exercised with the right togetherness […] 
the two capacities I have singled out have to be exercised with a togetherness that is a counterpart to the 
“logical” togetherness of “red” and “cube” in the linguistic expression of the judgment, “there is a 
red cube in front of me.”38
 McDowell exploits a model of intelligibility, so that the logical togetherness of 
conceptual capacities exercised in judgment (its propositional content) can be understood by 
way of overt linguistic expression – speech acts. So, for example, the judgment purporting 
that there is a red cube in front of one should be understood by analogical extension from its 
linguistic expression “there is a red cube in front of me”, specifically, by way of a similarity in 
the conceptual capacities and logical togetherness that holds in the overt linguistic expression. 
 This, in turn, is precisely how McDowell stipulates the logical togetherness that obtains 
in his conception of experience as a conceptual episode, precisely because, as mentioned, the 
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content of intuition is the very  same as that of the propositional content of judgment. Of 
course, that is not to say that  it  is put together in the same way  – this is the crucial difference 
between the exercise of conceptual capacities in judgment and the given propositional content 
of intuition. However, the content is in fact, given endorsement in judgment of an intuition, 
the very same. And so, as both judgment and intuition are constituted by the same content, 
certain comparisons do hold. 
 The importance of illuminating a proposition’s ‘logical togetherness’ is not  simply  an 
attempt to illuminate an aspect of judgment per se; rather, McDowell’s main preoccupation in 
elucidating the actualisation of conceptual capacities with a logical togetherness involves the 
further imputation of such togetherness to such thought as occurs in sensory consciousness 
itself – via the content passively given in experience.  
 Why is it  though, that such a unity, such logical togetherness, at the level of experience 
itself, is of such importance to McDowell? The logical unity of propositional content  is 
important in respect to meaning. Meaning and representational content go hand in hand. The 
conceptual capacities which inform and make possible any particular judgment are logically 
exercised together, so that meaning can only be found in the whole of the proposition. Indeed, 
this is the principle function and importance of unity and logical togetherness. So that, for 
example, the concepts of ‘red’ and ‘cube’ , as they combine in a particular judgement so as to 
purport the truth of a particular state of affairs, do so only as a whole unified content. 
 Because the (non-conceptual) red cube as object can only figure in thought and rational 
significances via a passively given propositional content, the sensory consciousness in which 
it figures must reflect, in its content, the same logical unity which is palpable in propositional 
judgment. So, when one looks at a red cube, and it is visually  present to one in intuition, it 
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passively  actualises a propositional content, the logical unity  of which purports that there is a 
red cube in front of one – which is how the intuited red cube comes to have rational and 
cognitive significance. 
 So, an important aspect of the giveness of content is that what is given is a thinkable 
content, and that is just to say  that it has meaning as given. One is given a sense. This is 
crucial as it allows for McDowell’s proffered model of Kantian judgment. On this model of 
judgment, one can judge that  which is given in intuition only in virtue of the fact that one 
is given a meaningful content, something which is reflectively considered in empirical 
judgment. That given cognitive significance is precisely that which is rationally reflected 
upon in judgment.  It is that given content which is judged to be so, or not so, in reflective 
judgement. 
17. Open Manifold
 Collins: “What can be said and what cannot depends upon the experience, but experience does 
 not come, as though, with subtitles. For this reason I would also say that we experience things 
 (and events) and not facts although our experience suffices for many factual claims about the 
 world.” 39
 McDowell: “ A typical judgement of experience selects from the content of the experience on  which it 
 is based; the experience that grounds the judgement that things are thus and so need not be 
 exhausted by its affording the appearance that things are thus and so.” 40
 McDowell: “A judgment of experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but simply endorses 
 the conceptual content, or some of it, that is already present by the experience on which it is 
 grounded.”41 
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 Arthur Collins is skeptical of McDowell’s notion that experience has propositional 
content because perception allows one an open-ended manifold of propositional descriptions, 
anyone of which one could assert, yet which one is not compelled to assert. Collins goes on to 
claim that it is “things (and events) and not facts” that  we experience, and experience provides 
the grounding of factual claims about the world.42And he seems to conflate McDowell’s idea 
that experience has propositional content with the idea that experience is linguistic in form, as 
if sensory experience came with ‘subtittles’.
 McDowell maintains, in response, that  experience with subtitles ”would indeed be 
disastrous”43. To say that experience has given propositional content is not the same as to 
claim that in experience we perceive propositions, or linguistic items, as if they were the 
objects of sight. Of course we experience, we perceive, objects and not facts. To claim, as 
Collins interprets McDowell as doing, that we perceive propositions, would be to confuse the 
content of experience with the object of perception. 
 Moreover, the propositional content of experience is not to be thought of as sentential - 
hence the subtitle claim. Two different speakers of different languages can express the same 
true proposition (as the content of experience) yet in different linguistic expressions or 
sentences. This will be discussed much more in the context of objectivity in McDowell. It’s 
merely important for now to clarify that in Mind and World experience is held to offer a 
‘manifold’ of linguistically expressible propositional content.
 So, in Mind and World, McDowell acknowledges the very thing which Collins himself 
desires when it comes to rational entitlement: a large and open-ended number of possible, 
justified propositional judgments. However, in order to avoid the Myth of the Given, the 
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rational entitlement to such an open-ended number of judgments requires, according to 
McDowell, a corresponding open-ended propositional content actualized in experience.  
 Because of this, the exercise of a particular judgment, the endorsement of given 
propositional content, does not  ‘exhaust’ the content of intuition. The selection of content in a 
judgment is a selection from a manifold of given content: the scene one takes in thus entitles a 
manifold of corresponding judgment. It would indeed be disastrous if experience only 
allowed one propositional content per visual perception, as if there were one propositional 
content per sensory impression. 
18. Demonstratives
McDowell: “Why not say that one is thereby equipped to embrace shades of colour within one’s 
conceptual thinking with the very same determinateness with which they are presented in one’s visual 
experience,  so that one’s concepts can capture colours no less sharply than one’s experience presents 
them?”44
McDowell :“[...] one can give linguistic expression to a concept that is exactly as fine-grained as the 
experience,  by uttering a phrase like “that shade”, in which the demonstrative exploits the presence of the 
sample.” 45
 In Mind and World McDowell considers a role for the non-conceptual in perceptual 
judgment. Such a possibility is considered given the sheer breadth of the sensory  and 
phenomenological aspects which are impressed upon us in experience. The potential 
explanatory  precedence of the non-conceptual over the conceptual thus rests upon the evident 
fact that we do not have as many  colour concepts as there are shades of colour that we can 
sensibly discriminate. And it’s an issue which again presents itself in McDowell’s later 
treatment of intuitional content, as McDowell readily  acknowledges that much that is given in 
38
44 McDowell, Mind and World,  p. 56.
45 Ibid,  p. 57.
intuition is such that  the subject has no means of making it overtly discursively explicit, that 
is, in making the appropriate predications in a judgment. 
 However, rather than adhere to the non-conceptual in this respect, McDowell supposes 
that demonstratives can fill in the gaps, so to speak, in between those more general colour 
concepts of ‘red’, ‘green’, etc., and all the shades and fine-grained aspects in between. In this 
way, via demonstratives, conceptual capacities can be seen as much more extensive than those 
concepts we at a particular point in time have predicative expressions for. 
 The essential feature of the use of such demonstratives is that they  exploit the presence of 
a particular ‘sample’, such a sample being an aspect of the sensory e.g. ‘coloured thus’. This 
is how those fine-grained sensory features can figure in the actualisation of conceptual 
capacities. So, with demonstratives, the sensory  can in fact be made overtly explicit, and so 
can feature as a predicate in a propositional claim. In this way, McDowell hopes to preclude 
an argument for a place for the non-conceptual in experience.  
 Now importantly, the conceptual content of demonstratives is reliant for its ‘sense’ upon 
its immediate relation to the sensory  features of perception. The sensory  shades of colour, for 
example, in their very sensory  form, thus inform the sense, the meaning, of that  predication in 
judgment. 
 Again, perhaps we can use the model of speech acts to illuminate what McDowell hopes 
to achieve in the context of demonstrative thought. With overt demonstrative expressions such 
as ‘that  shade of colour’, the sense, the meaning, of the utterance intended by the utterer, 
cannot be fully  determined without the relevant  visual acquaintance with the intended 
contextual circumstances. The relevant contextual factors are therefore not extraneous to the 
comprehension of the intended sense of the expressed  propositional content of the utterance; 
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rather, the sense of the utterance is precisely understood by having such a visual acquaintance 
with its intentional object of reference. Hence the importance of the contextual factors in 
ascertaining the sense of the predicative. 
19. Duration of capacity
McDowell: “We had better not think it can be exercised only when the instance that it is supposed to 
enable its possessor to embrace in thought is available for use as a sample in giving linguistic expression to 
it.”46 
 According to McDowell, such demonstratives can intelligibly amount to a conceptual 
capacity, because it  is a capacity  which can extend (in time) beyond the mere presence of the 
sample. The capacity to embrace a colour ‘in mind’, in empirical thought, can persist beyond 
the duration of the sensory intuition itself. The capacity’s persistence into the future is what 
McDowell attributes to ‘recognitional capacity’, and so is what ensures that it is indeed 
classifiable as a conceptual capacity at all.
 Importantly, the duration in time gives the thought a ‘distance’ from what would 
determine it to be true. The content of the capacity, and so the recognitional capacity, can be 
made explicit  with the further presentation of the appropriate sample, the sample which was 
present at the time the capacity was acquired. So that one gives the capacity a linguistic 
expression with the presence of the sample.
 The conceptual capacity therefore does not depend entirely upon the presence of the 
sample. The capacity  can be exploited in thoughts based upon memory. And yet the thoughts 
are not necessarily capable of being given overt  expression, so that, outside the visual 
presence of the sample and the overt expression, the content may not be fully determinate. 
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McDowell maintains that  there is no saying which conceptual capacity it is in abstraction 
from the actualising experience itself.
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B. Travis: Perception and Recognition 
Travis: “What perception provides – just as it should – is acquaintance with that non-conceptual the 
world presently provides. Now Pia, exercising (perhaps better, drawing on) her capacity to recognize what 
would and would not count as a pig being beneath that oak, recognizes something about the participation 
of a bit of  the conceptual (thus something invisible) in the instancing relation. In seeing what she does of 
things being as they are, she is able to recognize things being as they are as instancing (as a case of) a pig 
being beneath the oak. At that point she has already judged that that is how things are. Conceptual 
capacities are certainly in the picture here, but all on the response side.  They are drawn on in judging 
based on what the senses offer.” 47
Travis : “ On the story, Pia’s reason for taking it that there is a pig beneath the oak is simply that  there is 
one, or that that is how things are — such as to be a case of that.  It is perception (sight) that reveals this to 
her.” 48
1. Travis and the Myth of the Given
 Travis claims that it is not at all apparent why  conceptual capacities would need to be 
engaged in experience in order for experience to furnish us with things that we can come to 
know non-inferentially  via perception. As Travis reads McDowell, McDowell has not at all 
substantiated his progression from a (trivial) notion of the Myth of the Given – in which one 
can supposedly acquire knowledge and yet lack the capacity to get it  – to that model of 
experience and judgment that is promoted by McDowell, in which the incoherence of the 
Myth can only be avoided by way of the involvement of conceptual capacities and content 
within experience – sensibility – itself.  
 Indeed Travis, contra McDowell, does not adhere to Davidson’s perceived insight that it 
is only the content of beliefs – propositional contents – which can be taken as a reason. On 
42
47 Charles Travis ‘Unlocking the Outer World’ , p. 12.
48 Ibid, p. 12.
this point, according to Travis, the reason as to why someone may  come to take it that there is 
a pig beneath the oak, is not by virtue of some given propositional content of experience, 
expressible as ‘there is a pig beneath the oak’, but rather because, there is in fact one there, 
there is a case of a pig beneath the oak in front of one and that is precisely how things are. In 
this way, according to Travis, the non-conceptual instance of a kind serves as the reason why 
one ought to judge, and would judge correctly, that  there is such a pig. And so it is the 
function of ‘silent’ experience to provide one with that acquaintance with that non-conceptual 
instance of a kind. 
 In this way – by refusing Davidson’s insight – does Travis purport to avoid the problem 
of the Myth of the Given, and also the perceived problematic idealism of McDowell’s 
conceptualized experience. Thus Travis’s account, as set  out in what follows, can be seen as 
an attempt to present an intelligible and coherent account in respect to how the non-
conceptual object, with which we are acquainted via perception, can come to bear upon 
thought, and so provide reasons for non-inferential perceptual knowledge – with conceptual 
and rational capacities all involved upon the response side to that  which is immediately and 
directly in view in perception.
2. Travis and Perception
 According to Travis’s account, in visual perception one simply  sees things being as they 
are. The objects in the immediate surroundings are visibly  present to the perceiver, and the 
perceiver sees those objects, as they occupy their positions in those surroundings. The 
function of perception therefore is to merely afford one an awareness of those non-conceptual 
objects. 
 Up until this point, in Travis’s picture of perception, no conceptual capacities are in play 
whatsoever. Perception merely provides an acquaintance with the non-conceptual objects in 
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the surroundings.  That acquaintance is not a knowledgeable one, nor a discursively 
intentional one, rather, it is a visual one. Such visual acquaintance with the non-conceptual is 
completely outside of the rational control of the perceiving subject. 
 Once situated in that perceptual context one can then (given suitable expertise) recognize 
those perceptible objects, or features of such objects. In what Travis calls the ‘instancing-
relation’, that  which is visibly  in view ‘participates’ with a conceptual capacity, so that that 
which is visibly seen is recognized as instancing a particular conceptual capacity that one has 
and draws upon in so recognizing it. 
 It is perception which facilitates the recognition of that instancing relation; it  allows the 
conceptual to relate to the non-conceptual via this sensory visual acquaintance. Perception 
simply  (silently) puts something’s being as it is on offer for recognition by us as instancing a 
certain generality; only  thereafter, as a rational response, does one recognize that which is 
revealed as falling under concepts, concepts which are intrinsically general in form. 
 Now importantly for Travis, recognizing that which is in view in perception as an 
instance of a kind involves judging it to be so. This complements Travis’s notion that 
conceptual capacities are only engaged in the context of perception as a rational response. 
With conceptual capacities only  entering the perceptual picture with recognition and the 
instancing relation, and with recognition being so bound to judgment, to exercise conceptual 
capacities is precisely to judge things to be so. That which is judged to be an instance of a 
way for things to be is that with which we are visually acquainted.       
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3. Non-Conceptual
 Travis’s notion of recognition and the instancing relation involves a relationship between 
the conceptual and the non-conceptual, in which an object in one’s surroundings, being as it 
is, can itself come to figure in the picture of rationality. The function of recognition, as Travis 
sees it, is precisely to allow those non-conceptual objects to figure in cognitively significant 
relations. If the non-conceptual is to in any way figure in the picture of rationality, then the 
non-conceptual object requires recognition and judgment – on the side of the exercise of 
conceptual capacities – for it to so figure. 
 So what proves to be one of the defining differences between Travis and McDowell is 
that, according to Travis, while the non-conceptual requires recognition and judgment to 
figure in cognitively significant  relations in perceptual contexts, the non-conceptual 
nevertheless maintains its rational significance precisely in its non-conceptual form. It does 
not do so via McDowell’s notion of passively actualized content. 
 Although the rational significance of the non-conceptual is only made possible by 
drawing upon the relevant conceptual capacities in recognition, the intelligibility of the 
instancing relationship  does not  then in turn consign the non-conceptual as a spent source, so 
to speak, in the rational entitlement picture. 
 It is essential to Travis’s picture that the non-conceptual maintains its rational 
significance in its non-conceptual form. It is precisely the role of perception to bring non-
conceptual items directly  into view and to thus enable them, as non-conceptual, to 
normatively bear on that which we are to think.
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4. The Condition
Travis: “In any case, being liable to correctness of some sort (being, say, truth evaluable) is not, and 
cannot be, the only way of engaging with normativity. For where there is such liability there is also such a 
thing as bearing on it—e.g., making for the relevant correctness in a given case.”49
Travis: “ Something non-conceptual,  the idea is, could not impinge rationally on what one is to think. It 
could not stand in a rational relation. Hence the Condition. But, though facts belong, truistically, to the 
conceptual, and though there is a notion of perceiving on which one can sometimes see a fact (to be one), 
there precisely must be rational relations between the conceptual (what satisfies the condition) and 
something else if we are to make sense of experience bearing on what one is to think.”50
 According to Travis, McDowell accepts ‘the Condition’. The Condition is a constraint 
upon rational entitlement. According to ‘the Condition’, the logical space of reasons does not 
extend further than the space of concepts.51 In this way  rational relations must belong entirely 
within the space of concepts. Rational relations thus obtain only between things which are 
conceptually structured – of the form that things are thus and so. As Travis sees McDowell’s 
picture, because such conceptually structured content is the given of experience, such content 
is the only thing that can rationally  bear on what to think. Hence the non-conceptual does not 
bear rationally on what one is to think.  
 Travis, on the other hand, rejects ‘the Condition’. According to Travis, the objects of 
experience, the objects in one’s surroundings, which, being non-conceptual, do not meet  the 
requirements of McDowell’s ‘Condition’, do nonetheless bear upon what to think. Indeed, for 
Travis there have to be rational relations between the conceptual and the non-conceptual; 
otherwise we could not make sense of experience bearing on what one is to think. It is 
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constitutive of judgment that the non-conceptual bears upon the conceptual, so that the former 
stands in a verdictive relationship to the latter . 
5. Frege’s Line:
Frege: “But don’t we see that the sun has set? And don’t we thus also see that this is true? That the sun 
has set is no object which sends out rays that reach my eyes,  no visible thing as the sun itself is. That the 
sun has set is recognized on the basis of sensory impressions. For all that,  being true is not a perceptually 
observable property.” 52 
 Travis introduces Frege’s line as a means of distinguishing conceptual content from non-
conceptual object in perceptual judgment. In so introducing Frege’s line, Travis endeavors to 
make McDowell’s ‘Condition’ problematic in the context of rational entitlement. 
 Situated upon the left-hand side of Frege’s line are the objects of perception, the non-
conceptual items which are literally before one in the surroundings. As the perceivable 
objects, any questions of truth are inapplicable. 
 Situated upon the right-hand side are the conceptual representations of those non-
conceptual items. Conceptual representations are not the literal perceivable objects of 
perceptual judgment – they are invisible, so to speak. These representations have a 
propositional form, and as constitutive of empirical content, these contents are amenable to 
questions of truth or falsity. 
 Frege’s line in effect provides a heuristical means of separating the conceptual from the 
non-conceptual in perceptual judgment, and so imparts a dualism of a kind which holds in 
both McDowell’s and Travis’s picture. The dualism itself is not  one which is philosophically 
contentious, it is as ‘truistic’ as anything McDowell and Travis are inclined to mutually 
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acknowledge. Both philosophers offer models of perceptual judgment which are intended to 
accommodate just such a truistically functioning dualism. 
 What is a palpable point of contention, however, and the reason why Travis explicitly 
brings Frege’s line into the discussion, is how it is exactly that Frege’s line is supposed to 
harmonize with McDowell’s supposed ‘Condition’. As Travis sees it, explicitly distinguishing 
between the respective sides of Frege’s line brings into focus a problem with McDowell’s 
anti-dualist picture of experience (between the sensory and the intellect), in which conceptual 
capacities, and conceptual content, are engaged in experience itself. This picture of the 
unboundedness of the conceptual means that the conceptual content  of thought (which 
pertains to the right  hand side of Frege’s line) cannot stand in rational relations with non-
conceptual objects (items on the left hand side of Frege’s line)
 Travis’s criticisms of McDowell can be seen as a kind of two stage procedure. The first  
step is illuminating the intrinsic qualities of propositional representation, in such a way that 
‘reason’s reach’, the space of reasons, is seen to necessarily  extend beyond the conceptual 
sphere. Because of this, a normative ‘space’ must be found in perception for non-propositional 
relata with which propositional thought can enter into normative and rational relations. 
 The second aspect to Travis’s criticism (discussed below) is that there is anyway an issue 
of whether it is really the role of perception to be performing functions characteristically 
associated with the actualization of propositional content, such as occurs in recognition.
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6. General and the Instanced
Travis: “The key feature of the conceptual, on its present understanding, is that for anything conceptual 
there is a specific form of generality intrinsic to it. There is then a range that is the range of cases, or 
circumstances, which would be ones of something instancing that generality (or, again, a range of things 
not instancing it).”53
Travis: “The meat, in being as it is, instances being meat. Its so being is one thing, among indefinitely 
many, that would so count; one way of  so counting. The meat fits within a certain range of cases. If you 
judged it not to fit (it being as it is), you would be wrong. Its being as it is dictates that verdict.” 54
Travis: “ Judging is exposure to error (so, too, correctness) decidable solely by things being as they are 
[…] For a given judging, things being as they are may be their being as judged, or, again, their being 
otherwise […] Where there were no such facts there would simply be no judgement. There is a 
determinate way in which things being as they are thus matters to a judgement’s truth.”55
 As already mentioned, upon the right-hand side of Frege’s line is situated the realm of the 
conceptual. It  includes propositional representations. These representations include the 
contents of ‘seeing that’, for example, ‘seeing that the sun has set’. As propositional, the 
content is truth evaluable, and according to Travis’s account, it is determined according to the 
verdictive relation with the non-conceptual object. 
 Now according to Frege’s paradigm, these discursive representations are ‘general’ in their 
form. A concept is always of (being) such and such.56  Propositionally representing as being 
thus and so involves recognizing the particular object of perception as belonging to a range of 
cases. Via recognition, the object of perception is subsumed, so to speak, under general 
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concepts. This is how the non-conceptual comes to figure in perceptual thought via the 
generalities intrinsic to the conceptual content. The representations of the non-conceptual are 
therefore not visible, but rather the means in which the visible can meaningfully figure in 
thought.  
 Items on the left-hand side of Frege’s line (non-conceptual objects) can come to instance 
those conceptual generalities. As the literally visible items in the surroundings, they figure in 
perceptual judgment as that which the conceptual is about, that which is represented in 
propositional representation. For example, a piece of meat in one’s surroundings is not 
conceptual, and so is not amenable itself to being instanced. It is an instance of the general. As 
the non–conceptual, it has no range of cases. 
 In Travis’s picture, it is the requirements of truth, and verdictive answerability, which 
bind the left-hand side and the right-hand side of Frege’s line together in rational relations. 
Because ‘general’ conceptual representations necessarily extend beyond themselves to the 
non-conceptual objects that instance them, the means of determining the truth of those 
representations necessarily binds the conceptual with the non-conceptual in rational relations. 
The content of a conceptual representation, under a particular understanding, specifies that 
which, on the left hand side of Frege’s line, would satisfy its purported truth. So it is inherent 
to the discursive representational mode of perceptual thought that its truth turns upon that 
which, outside of itself, it asserts to be the case. In this way, on Travis’s account, reason’s 
reach, in cases of perceptual judgment, necessarily  extends beyond the conceptual content and 
form, to the very object of perception.
 So the verdicts associated with experience in Travis’s picture are provided by the left-
hand side of Frege’s line – those items which would instance the relevant generalities of the 
thought. The instances of generalities thus provide the verdicts upon the ‘error liability’ of 
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perceptual judgment. In this way also does rational entitlement stem from something 
distinctly non-conceptual.
 In Travis’s picture, the correctness of a perceptual judgment, understood as a 
conceptually structured representation, thus cannot be determined by another such conceptual 
representation. That which it purports to be the case, that which bears on its truth, cannot be 
yet another conceptual representation. The form of that upon which the truth of a judgment 
turns must be something lacking in such a general representational quality. The form of that 
normative determinant is, in Travis’s picture, necessarily non-conceptual. Hence, according to 
Travis, we must conceive of perceptual judgement as something which necessarily extends 
beyond itself, and content like it. 
 So, as Travis would have it, perceptual judgment is best conceived as a mode of rational 
response to ‘things being as they are’. As a rational response, and as intrinsically extending 
beyond its conceptual content, the truth of its purported representation therefore is 
normatively determined by the external non-conceptual relatum the judgment is a rational 
response to. Perceptual judgment is the propositional representation of how things are outside 
one’s self, outside one’s subjective exercise of conceptual capacities. To perceive is to see the 
objects in one’s surroundings, and perceptual judgment is necessarily about those verdict-
dictating non-conceptual items. 
7. Recognition and Having Directly in View
 Travis’s account of recognition involves a rational relationship between the sensible and 
the non-sensible, in which an aspect or object in one’s surroundings is brought into conceptual 
thought as an instance of a kind that one has the ‘expertise’ to recognize. Recognition as an 
aspect of the application of conceptual capacities thus involves a judgement that something is 
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the case.  Conceptual content is hence something understood as the product of a recognitional 
capacity and as a rational response. The discursive as a categorizing function, as Travis 
explains, involves recognizing a given instance under a certain generality. So to recognize is 
to categorize, and the application of a concept  is to recognize. There is no purported 
representation whatsoever without such intentional categorization of the object as an instance 
of a kind, and so there is no application of the conceptual without drawing upon a capacity for 
recognition. 
 In this way Travis offers an account of perception, the conceptual capacities involved in 
recognition, and the inherent aspects of perceptual thought, which is at odds with McDowell’s 
picture in which experience is ‘invested’ with conceptual content. For Travis, McDowell’s 
notion of conceptual content in perception itself is not something which fits with what he sees 
as the necessary function of perception, a function which provides a mere (silent) 
acquaintance with the non-conceptual, in having an object directly in view. 
8. Conceptual Representation, Recognition and Commitment
 Travis: “Where Pia can just see that there is a pig beneath the oak (by seeing the pig beneath the 
 oak), on McDowell’s story her visual experience is invested with the content things being such that a 
 pig is beneath the oak (in some role or other). It thus purports to reveal to her — and in favorable 
 cases does reveal to her — that there is a pig beneath the oak. But where experience purports to 
 be revelatory, it thus incurs commitments in one way or another.”57
 McDowell : “The relevant conceptual capacities are drawn on in receptivity. It is not that they 
 are exercised on an extra-conceptual deliverance of receptivity.  We should understand what Kant 
 calls “intuition” – experiential intake – not as a bare getting of an extra-conceptual Given, but as 
 a kind of  occurrence or state that already has conceptual content. In experience one takes in, 
 for instance sees, that things are thus and so. That is the sort of thing one can also, for instance, 
 judge.”58
52
57 Travis, ‘Unlocking the Outer World’, p. 18.
58 McDowell, Mind and World,  p. 9.
McDowell: “A judgment of  experience does not introduce a new kind of content, but simply endorses the 
conceptual content, or some of it, that is already possessed by the experience on which it is grounded.” 59
 As discussed, according to McDowell’s picture of experience, receptivity and spontaneity 
are not even notionally  separate, so that conceptual content is “already possessed by 
impressions themselves.”60  And McDowell wishes to insist, against  Davidson, that such 
propositional content is neither a judging nor a taking to be so. Experience, in Mind and 
World, involves the actualization of concepts, the same concepts that would be exercised in a 
judgment that things are thus and so. So the propositional content of experience is of the very 
same kind as that of judgment. The differences between the two, in respect to characterizing 
the content, are differences only in their actualization. How is it  that the two modes of 
actualization come about? Intuitional content is passively actualized, it is given in intuition, 
whereas the content of judgment involves the active exercise of the Understanding, which can 
take up that very content of intuition in its exercise. The conceptual content is otherwise the 
very same. 
 This raises a question in light of Travis’s model of recognition: do the differences in the 
distinct modes of conceptual actualization also include differences in respect to the 
involvement of recognitional capacities? That is, is recognition involved in the given of 
intuition or in the exercise of a judgement? If the application of concepts necessarily  involves 
recognition, as Travis would have it, then intuition as understood in McDowell’s Mind and 
World account, would indeed involve recognition.  
 According to McDowell’s account, the content of intuition is given, it does not involve a 
rational response to the object literally  in view. Rational response, the exercise of conceptual 
capacities, is the sole domain of reflective judgment. If recognition is involved in intuition 
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this would mean that recognition would have to be somehow passively involved with the 
given intuitional content, according to McDowell’s picture – thus implying that recognition 
somehow occurs as something prior to the rational exercise of thought of the perceiving 
subject. And this, indeed, is McDowell’s picture, in Mind and World. McDowell explicitly 
links intuition – in particular those intuitions which involve color concepts – with recognition 
of instances of a kind.61  Intuition, in such cases, is said to involve an actualization of our 
recognitional capacities, whereby we bring instances under general concepts. 
 Such an outcome is the result of McDowell binding the conceptual, as passively  
actualized, to the shaping of sensory consciousness itself. Binding recognition to the sensory 
in such a way would mean that recognition does not have its own space from the sensory; it 
and the sensory are, as McDowell might say, not even notionally separable. 
 That experience would involve recognition in this way also complements McDowell’s 
picture of judgment, as it is conceived in Mind and World. Experience as actualizing a 
manifold of propositional content leaves the function of judgment with very little to do in fact. 
In contrast to Travis’s picture, where concepts, recognition and judgment are all bound 
together as a rational response to the non-conceptual, McDowell, rather, separates the 
conceptual, and thus recognition, as they figure in intuition, from the exercise of judgement 
itself. This is a feature of his Kantian picture of the intentionality of intuition.
 The recognitional categorizations of instances, as instances of a kind, are taken to occur 
within intuition. Intuition thus appropriates many of the functions usually  characteristic of 
judgment. Judgment is left merely as an ‘endorsement’ of the propositional content already 
actualized in experience itself. Of course, McDowell in Mind and World wants precisely that: 
experience with propositional content which is nevertheless not a judgment. His criticism of 
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Davidson’s ‘blindspot’ is that  the propositional content of intuition acts as a constraint upon 
judgment, but as it is, it does not necessarily commit one to a particular propositional thought. 
 It is in light of this model, with experience conceived of as propositional in content, so 
usurping the function of judgment in so many  respects, that Travis queries “whether it is 
really the role of visual experience to pronounce on what it  would be pronouncing on if 
invested with such content.”62 This then brings into consideration an aspect of propositional 
representation, which Travis sees McDowell as seemingly neglecting, that being the notion of 
‘commitment’ to things being a certain way. 
 In respect to the case of Pia, Pia sees that there is a pig beneath the oak by  looking at the 
pig beneath the oak. McDowell claims that Pia’s visual experience is invested with the content 
that there is a pig beneath the oak. This is how experience purports to be revelatory: it 
purports to reveal to Pia that  there is a pig beneath the oak. However, in that  case, says Travis, 
experience incurs commitments – such as that Pia is in a position to tell whether there is a pig 
under an oak simply by looking, and that this being as things in fact are is actually to be 
counted as a case of a pig beneath the oak. 
 And such commitments, according to Travis, properly  belong on the response side – to 
the exercises of our ability to judge things to be, that is to say, to recognize them for being, 
what they  are. Propositional content within experience that  purports to be revelatory  can’t  do 
anything but commit one to a purported state of affairs. Travis thus poses the right question, 
do we really want visual sensory experience to be ‘pronouncing’ and committing us in such a 
way?  
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9. The Necessity for Content in McDowell: the Greater Incoherence 
 Of course, McDowell’s counterintuitive notion in Mind and World, that recognition is 
involved in intuition itself, is the direct consequence of his insistence upon avoiding the Myth 
of the Given (as he conceives it). According to McDowell, for Travis to hold that, in 
perception, the conceptual is limited in its operation to the exercise of a rational response (i.e. 
to judgment) is a form of the Myth. 
 So McDowell, at this point, is apparently  presented with the choice, the anomaly of 
recognition involved in experience, or the Myth of the Given? As will be discussed, 
McDowell in effect seeks to avoid both such options. To do so he posits a new stipulation of 
the conceptual. Although Travis’s notion of recognition undoubtedly informs McDowell’s 
new picture, McDowell makes the change principally in deference to Davidson’s criticisms, 
which if properly understood, complement Travis’s own – despite the fact that the two 
philosophers, as McDowell sees them, are situated upon opposing sides of the rational 
entitlement paradigm that McDowell himself seeks to dismount from.
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C. McDowell’s Revised Account of Experience 
 McDowell: “I used to assume that to conceive experience as actualizations of conceptual capacities, 
 we would need to credit experiences with propositional content,  the sort of content judgments 
 have. And I used to assume that the content of  an experience would need to  include everything the 
 experience enables its subject to know non-inferentially. But both these assumptions now strike me 
 as wrong.”63
 McDowell : “What we need is an idea of content that is not propositional but intuitional, in what I 
 take to be a Kantian sense.”64 
 McDowell: “In Travis’s picture, having things in view does not draw on conceptual capacities. 
 And if it does not draw on conceptual capacities, having things in view must be provided for by 
 sensibility alone. The trouble with this is that it is a form of the Myth of the Given.”65 
 According to McDowell’s revised account, visual experiences merely bring our 
surroundings into view. The function of experience is no longer to represent as so. Because 
experience is no longer constituted by a manifold of content that things are thus and so, 
discursive concepts are no longer reckoned to be passively  actualized in experience itself. In 
this way, at least on the face of it, McDowell’s picture of rational entitlement comes to 
resemble something very much akin to Travis’s own account of experience and perceptual 
judgment. 
 However, while McDowell’s picture of the function of experience now seems to share 
aspects of Travis’s account – viz., experience as a mere having in view – experience, on 
McDowell’s account, nevertheless retains conceptual content. So that  experience as a ‘having 
in view’, and experience as rationally entitling, still essentially turns upon experience having 
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conceptual content. So while McDowell no longer offers a propositional model, sensibility, on 
pain of the Myth of the Given, continues to be infused with rational and conceptual capacities. 
Such content however is largely disabused of those models of conceptual intelligibility which, 
as earlier discussed, came to inform McDowell’s account of experience in Mind and World.   
 As will be become apparent, the conceptual status of intuition, and the very notion of 
intuitional content, as McDowell comes to re-conceive it, is one which is for the most part 
founded upon its potential to feature in discursive activity and content. Before I present a 
discussion in respect to McDowell’s new account of rational entitlement, I first  wish to 
address the specific reasons offered for the change in McDowell’s account. Such motivations 
are of importance because they  not only illuminate the problems associated with experience 
conceived of as providing a manifold of propositional content. They also come to demarcate 
the defining limits within which McDowell must now operate in order to achieve his objective 
of conceiving of experience as involving genuine conceptual capacities (in order to avoid the 
Myth).    
1. McDowell’s Change and Davidson’s Criticism
Davidson: “McDowell talks of  our “taking in” facts, but it is entirely mysterious what this means unless it 
means that the way the world is causes us to entertain thoughts. This is the point at which our 
disagreement, at least as I understand it, emerges. McDowell holds that what is caused is not a belief,  but a 
propositional attitude for which we have no word. We then decide whether or not to transform this neutral 
attitude into a belief.”66
McDowell: “If experiences have propositional content, it is hard to deny that experiencing is taking things 
to be so, rather than what I want: a different kind of thing that entitles us to take things to be so.”67
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 Faced with Davidson’s own reply to the criticisms directed towards his account in Mind 
and World, McDowell recognizes that his propositional content  model of experience, as that 
which can rationally entitle, must be modified. 
 The Mind and World paradigm of rational entitlement was one modeled upon Davidson’s 
dictum (of rationality), one which depended upon the propositional content of beliefs, and yet 
found a way to extend rational entitlement to receptivity itself. In Mind and World McDowell 
offered an amended version of Davidson’s dictum; one which overcame the latter’s apparent 
‘blindspot’ in respect to normative relations: “nothing can count as a reason for a belief except 
something with conceptual form”68. What McDowell meant by this is that nothing can stand 
as a reason for a belief except something conceptual that is of the same form as the content of 
a belief, viz., something propositional. He thus proposed that experience had a propositional 
content – and in such cases when that content was true, the same content constituted a 
‘perceptible fact’.
 In the earlier discussion of sensory  impressions and ‘appearings’, we saw that McDowell 
desired a notion in which something could look or appear to be so but was not judged to be 
so. Experience itself thus provided a given propositional content that  was not yet a ‘taking to 
be so’. Hence the relevance of McDowell’s notion of ‘appearings’, which could rationally 
entitle, and which rationally  incorporated external constraint as receptivity, yet did so without 
being a taking things to be so. In McDowell’s new account however, he concedes to Davidson 
that it is hard to deny that experience, conceived of as something with propositional content, 
caused by the impact of our surroundings on our senses, is no less than a judgment, a no less 
than a ‘taking to be so’.69
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2. Entitlement by Experience and Inference  
 Another reason for McDowell’s shift in his picture of rational entitlement is due to his 
aversion to an ‘inferential’ model of rational entitlement  by experience. In the inferential 
conception of rational entitlement, championed by Davidson, giving a reason for a belief 
would have the content of a belief as the conclusion of an inference, with the content of 
another belief providing the premise of such a conclusion. McDowell, in Mind and World, 
proposed that experiences could also be reasons for belief, and they had the same content as 
beliefs. 
 McDowell now openly  acknowledges that it was understandable why he should be taken 
as recommending an inferential conception of the way experience entitles us to perceptual 
beliefs.  While the propositional content of experience was not a belief, its content  was still in 
a problematic sense apparently figuring in an inferential model of premise and conclusion – 
which McDowell, of course, did not want, as he wanted a picture in which ‘experience 
directly reveals things (i.e. facts) to be as they are believed to be in perceptual beliefs’70. 
 Even so, McDowell still takes issue with Davidson because of what  he sees as a picture 
which lacks rational external constraint upon thought. Hence there is the continuing 
importance of having conceptual content bound to experience and sensory receptivity itself. 
McDowell claims that in Mind and World he required, and still now requires no less in his 
new account, a rational entitlement picture in which the content of experience can function as 
rational external constraint, and so can ‘entitle’, while leaving it  a further question whether 
something is in fact taken to be so. 
 So as will be seen, along with the many changes in McDowell’s revised account of 
experience, the rational entitlement story is one which no longer reiterates his amended 
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version of Davidson’s dictum. McDowell opts for a notion of rational entitlement  which stems 
from the object  and its visible properties, made visually present via intuitional content that, 
while conceptual, is not itself propositional in form. And so the rational external constraint 
that was lacking in Davidson’s account, which was the motivation behind McDowell’s 
amended dictum in the first place, is now assumed by the role of intuitional content, now 
conceived as non-propositional and non-discursive.  
 In the new account, the way intuition entitles the perceiver to certain beliefs removes the 
temptation to see the relation between intuition and perceptual judgment on an inferential 
model. McDowell more clearly advocates a model of intuition in which it  is a mere ‘bringing 
into view’ of objects in our surroundings. With intuition more clearly in focus as a ‘bringing 
into view’, the rational entitlement picture shifts in focus from propositional content to the 
object and its properties, and the non-discursive intuitional content whereby an object is 
present to one through some of its perceivable properties. Such intuitional content is not in a 
form such that it can intelligibly stand as a premise to a conclusion, as in the discursive, 
propositional model of experience. 
 And yet, McDowell’s revised rational entitlement picture, on pain of the Myth of the 
Given, refuses to part  entirely  with what  he takes to be one of the central insights of 
Davidson’s dictum, viz., that rational entitlement fundamentally occurs between conceptual 
contents. McDowell continues to insist upon following an intelligible path between the Myth 
of the Given, and what he takes to be Davidson’s unconstrained Coherentism. So it is evident 
that, in the end, it is not  so much ‘propositional content’ which McDowell is adamant upon, 
but rather external constraint, secured by intuition with conceptual content. The question 
which remains then is: how far can McDowell stretch his picture of conceptual content within 
experience before it become unintelligible?
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3. Recognition and Entitlement
 McDowell: “On my old assumption, since my experience puts me in a position to know non-
inferentially  that what I see is a cardinal, its content would have to include a proposition in which the 
concept of a  cardinal figures: perhaps one expressible,  on the occasion, by saying “That’s a cardinal”. 
But what  seems right is this: my experience makes the bird visually present to me, and my 
recognitional capacity enables me to know non-inferentially that what I see is a cardinal. Even if  we go on 
assuming my experience has content ,  there is no need to suppose that the concept under which my 
recognitional capacity enables me to bring what I see figures in that content.”71 
 McDowell now distinguishes two ways in which intuitions enable non-inferential 
knowledgeable judgments. In what McDowell casts as the second kind of rational entitlement 
– which I shall discuss first of all – experience merely makes the object situated in the 
immediate surroundings visually  present to a subject. And it is only by drawing upon a 
recognitional capacity  that the subject can know or judge that things are thus and so. 
Importantly, the concepts under which the recognitional capacity allows the respective 
judgment are not a feature of the content as it  is given in intuition. So the entitlement does not 
stem from the fact that the concepts, or their non-discursive counterparts, are actualised in 
experience itself. 
 How then is experience rationally  entitling? Experience figures in rational entitlement via 
how it reveals things to be: it  gives perceptual access to the objects immediately in one’s 
surroundings, thereby making them available for recognition by a perceiver with suitable 
expertise.72 
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 So this is essentially  the same function for perception as Travis stipulates in his own 
account. It is no longer the function of experience to provide (propositional) reasons for 
judgment. However, while McDowell now has a notion of experience which is just  like 
Travis’s, in that it is a merely bringing into view, he retains his concern in respect to avoiding 
the Myth of the Given. The intuitions that enable recognition, given suitable expertise, and 
which ground our rational relations with the objects of perception, have a conceptual content 
of a kind. I will return to a discussion of the nature of intuitional content shortly.
‘4. Carving out’ Aspects 
McDowell : “The content of an intuition is such that its subject can analyse it into significances for 
discursive capacities, whether or not this requires introducing new discursive capacities to be associated 
with those significances. Whether by way of  introducing new discursive capacities or not,  the subject of an 
intuition is in a position to put aspects of content, the very content that is already there in the intuition, 
together in discursive performance.”73 
 According to McDowell’s first kind of rational entitlement, the exercise of a perceptual 
judgment articulates some of the aspects of intuition, the content of which is given in 
intuition. Thus the ‘carving out’ of an aspect provides one of the new means by  which the 
given intuitional content of experience can enable a manifold of entitled claims. According to 
this model, intuition as a having of the object directly in view, via the intuitional content, 
places one in a position to discursively exploit  that given content in a perceptual judgment, 
such as “that’s a red cube there”. In this way the content of intuition comes to itself ‘feature’ 
in the propositional content of judgment.
 So as McDowell would have it, the content of intuition is given in a form in which it  is 
suitable to be content associated with discursive content  – that  is, meaningful expressions. In 
Mind and World, the propositional content of intuition was understood as involving both 
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receptivity and spontaneity – the propositional content was inseparable from the sensory 
impressions. In McDowell’s new account, these ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition are 
essentially  purporting to provide the same such function – the inseparability  of intuition and 
propositional content. So that, via the means of ‘association’, aspects of (the content of) 
sensory  receptivity are intelligibly bound to the discursive content of thought. The connection, 
however, unlike the ‘appearings’ of  Mind and World, does not come as given, readymade so 
to speak – such a connection is only  made in the rational process of ‘carving out’ and 
association. 
 Only with articulation can any  real sense be given to the notion of such ‘carved out’ 
aspects figuring in rational entitlement, although they may obtain prior to judgement itself. 
This is because the relevant ‘carved out’ aspects – as they are to come to feature explicitly in 
entitlement – necessarily require being associated with meaningful expressions. Indeed, the 
aspects themselves are not given as ‘carved out’, nor can it be determined which such aspects 
feature in rational entitlement outside of their featuring in the relevant propositional content of 
judgment. So, whilst  the intuitional content is given, the aspects only  become rationally 
significant in the context of discursive articulation. 
 Furthermore, the ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition do not come to feature in empirical 
thought via the passive actualisation of the relevant ‘associated’ conceptual capacities in 
intuition, which are then taken up  and endorsed in judgment. Intuitional content is given, and 
does not involve discursive concepts. Any such shift from the given intuitional content to 
determinate ‘aspects’ that  are associated with discursive capacities implies the active 
exercise of the relevant conceptual capacities. So that for the aspects of intuition to figure in 
the rational entitlement picture requires them to feature in the judgment itself. With discursive 
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articulation comes judgment. There is no longer any sense or any role in which discursive 
content obtains in McDowell picture outside of a judgment that things are thus and so. 
 In this way, McDowell’s revised account of intuitional content comes with an alteration 
in his Mind and World picture of judgment – that is, despite the content of intuition featuring 
in the propositional content of the relevant perceptual judgment. As McDowell would have it, 
discursive content – the articulated content of thought – is only brought about via the process 
of ‘association’ with the unarticulated content of intuition. And so the manifestation of 
discursive content in the perceptual context stops nowhere short of judgment. This means that 
judgment is no longer conceived as simply endorsement of content given. Such a picture was 
apt for capturing the notion that experience was propositional, and had the very  same content 
of thought as corresponding judgment. Rather than endorsing content already given, it now 
takes ‘carving out’ and the ‘putting together’ of discursive significances so as to realise the 
discursive content of empirical judgment. 
5. Aspects and Demonstratives
 According to McDowell, the content of intuition is intelligibly conceptual because it is 
constituted in a form in which it can be associated with the thinkable content of discursive 
articulation. The intuitional content is given, it requires discursive articulation in order to 
feature in empirical thought, but all of the intuitional content given is capable of so figuring in 
discursive articulation. And yet, McDowell himself readily acknowledges that with much of 
the content of intuition, it  is not readily susceptible to such discursive articulation – given the 
apparent limitations of conceptual capacities in respect to the sheer breadth of the given 
content of intuition, pertaining to the sensory aspects of perception.  
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 In Mind and World, it  was said that  the conceptual capacities exercised in demonstratives 
exploit the presence of a ‘sample’ such that the sample is a necessary constituent of 
determining the thought’s content, its sense. There is no (fully) determining what that 
conceptual content is in abstraction from the visual presence  of the sample. 
 In McDowell’s first kind of rational entitlement story, in the revised account, perceptual 
judgement ‘redeploys’ the content of intuition: intuitional content itself ‘figures in discursive 
activity’, with the ‘carving out’ of an aspect. The ‘carved out’ intuitional content thus provides 
the analogue to the demonstrative ‘sample’. The non-discursive intuitional content is carved 
out so that an aspect of it  is associated with discursive content. ‘Having that shade of colour’, 
as the overt discursive manifestation of a conceptual capacity, has a content such that 
intuitional content figures in it: it figures in the discursive content’s specification. The 
sensible features of the object, presented via intuitional content, thereby entitle one to such 
meaningful, and truth purporting empirical judgments like: “I am visually confronted by an 
object with such-and-such features”74, or “the aspect has that shade of colour”.
 So the discursive content is dependent for its content, for the overt specification of its 
content, upon the ‘carved out’ non-discursive content of intuition. And so the ‘carved out’ 
aspect of the intuitional content is a necessary  component of the rational entitlement account. 
This is because, analogous to the use of perceptible demonstratives in Mind and World, the 
conceptual capacity involved in the discursive articulation lacks a certain sense without the 
involvement of the non-discursive content of intuition. In this way the rational entitlement 
picture is such that the visible features present to us in intuition themselves can figure in 
thought.
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6. Intuitional Content:
 How then does McDowell suppose that are we to conceive of the new form of intuitional 
content? To begin with, McDowell insists that intuitional content retains a structure and a 
unity  which reflects the involvement of the Understanding in sensory experience itself.  The 
unity  is of a kind that pertains to the having of a formal concept of an object – with the 
aspects of that  categorically unified intuitional content being expressible by  terms having to 
do with the proper and common sensibles.
 So the unity of the intuitional content is no longer understood by way of representation. 
Where once the unity of intuitional content in Mind and World was understood as 
propositional – a unity  which reflected a given thinkable sense – the new form of unity 
offered is altered so as to accommodate for intuition now reconceived as a mere having in 
view of items in one’s immediate surroundings, viz., the non-conceptual objects of perception. 
Thus intuitional content is characterized such that it can accommodate for a mere having in 
view, which is nonetheless structured by the Understanding. 
 It is via the newly posited unity of intuitional content  – as limited to the formal concept 
of an object comprising only content expressible by concepts pertaining to the proper and 
common sensibles that McDowell continues to pursue a path which can acquire rational 
external constraint by intuition, whilst avoiding the incoherence of the Myth (as he conceives 
it).
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7. McDowell’s Stipulation of the Conceptual
 McDowell : “Our relation to the world, including our perceptual relation to it, is pervasively 
 shaped by our conceptual mindedness […] if  a perceptual experience is world-disclosing […] any 
 aspect of  its content is present in a form in which it is suitable to constitute the content of a 
 conceptual capacity.” 75 
 
 McDowell : “What is important is this : if an experience is world-disclosing, which implies that it is 
 categorically unified, all its content is present in a form in which, as I put it before, it is suitable to 
 constitute contents of conceptual capacities. ” 76
 McDowell’s revised account of experience is accompanied by  a revised stipulation of 
how to grasp the conceptual as it is to inform his account of intuitional content. The newly 
revised stipulation of the conceptual is one which, yet again, takes its shape primarily in 
deference to the necessity  of avoiding the Myth of the Given. Indeed for McDowell, even 
while he is now deprived of propositional content and its more robust  models of conceptual 
intelligibility, it is essential to his picture that our rational capacities continue to infuse 
sensory  impressions, on pain of the Myth. McDowell therefore connects the necessity of the 
success of such ‘permeated mindedness’ with the new form of intuitional content now offered.
 In accordance with McDowell’s new stipulation of the conceptual, the content of 
experience need not already be the content of a conceptual capacity – which is possessed by 
the subject of the experience – in order for it  to qualify as conceptual. As McDowell would 
have it, one may indeed need to determine aspects to be the contents of a conceptual capacity, 
via ‘carving out’ and association with discursive significances. 
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 The mere fact that the content can come to be determined as the content of a conceptual 
capacity is sufficient, according to McDowell’s stipulation, for it  to be conceptual. So the 
content of intuition is conceptual because it  can potentially come to figure as the content of 
conceptual capacities – the content is discursively conceptualizable; it is in a form such that it 
could become the content of a conceptual capacity.
 Seen in this way, there are different  notions of the conceptual in play, in McDowell’s 
revised account of intuition and perceptual judgment – notions that must  be taken as 
complementary. And it  is with his new stipulation of the conceptual as it figures in 
experience, that experience remains conceptually shaped and involves our facility for 
rationality and a ‘permeated mindedness’. However, McDowell’s insistence upon such a 
stipulation, incurs a variety of changes and anomalies in his picture of experience and rational 
entitlement, when considered in the light of his guiding commitments in the Mind and World 
model.
 8. What Then is Left of the Dictum?
 Davidson’s dictum, which restricts the intelligibility of rational relations to a content’s 
exploitation in an inferential structure,77 is advocated by Davidson as a means of avoiding the 
Myth of the Given and the skepticism of empiricism. For my present purposes, it can be said 
that Davidson’s dictum was used to espouse, or inform, two relevant doctrines, which hitherto 
have been largely understood as functioning together. The first, (1) being that receptivity, as 
sensory  impression, cannot itself feature in the rational entitlement story. The second, (2) 
being that only  the content of a belief can intelligibly stand as a reason for a belief. So the 
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purpose was twofold: to acknowledge experience as beyond rational entitlement and to insist 
on rational relations as relations between the contents of beliefs. 
 Now in Mind and World, McDowell supposed he could amend Davidson’s dictum to 
‘propositional content’, and in the process he could (1) incorporate receptivity  into the 
rational entitlement picture, and accordingly (2) have the propositional content of intuition 
itself stand in rational relations to a corresponding judgment (without itself being a belief that 
things were thus and so). So McDowell’s amendations to the dictum did not extend beyond 
expanding the normative scope of the conceptual, understood as propositional content. He 
thus appropriated and amended Davidson’s dictum for the sole purpose of extending rational 
entitlement to experience itself. 
 Rational entitlement, I will argue, was and remains McDowell’s principle concern in 
respect to Davidson’s dictum, rather than the insistence upon propositional content as the kind 
of content that can enter normative relations; normative relations, at least, which are relevant 
to extending rational entitlement to intuition itself. 
 Now McDowell, in his revised account, remains committed to (1) incorporating 
receptivity within the rational entitlement picture; however he no longer remains committed 
to (2) propositions as the only kinds of content which can intelligibly stand in normative 
relations. He now allows (a) rational relations between propositional contents as reasons, and 
(b) rational relations between propositional content and intuitional content, understood as 
something less than propositional content, less than a reason itself.
 McDowell therefore has no problem with the kinds of content that can count as a reason 
for a belief, viz., the content of another belief. What McDowell does, however, insist upon is 
that rational relations can obtain between contents, which on one side are less than 
propositional, less than a ‘reason’ itself. So that understanding rational relations between 
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contents is no longer just about the relations between propositional contents: now it includes 
relations between perceptual beliefs and (sub-propositional/or non-discursive) intuitional 
content which may inform the very content of those beliefs.
 Therefore, in McDowell’s revised account, the dictum is largely  irrelevant in respect to 
the story of rational entitlement and experience. In fact, McDowell in a sense may well have 
been brought back into the fold of Davidson’s original dictum, i.e. nothing can stand as a 
reason for a belief except another belief – despite insisting upon rational entitlement 
extending to experience. This is because, as mentioned above, there is now an intelligible 
distinction to be made between those contents which can stand as a reason in normative 
relations, and the new rational entitlement story which allows rational relations between 
propositional content, and contents less than propositional, i.e. intuitional content. 
 So McDowell can give Davidson his dictum, but the dictum nevertheless remains 
insufficient in respect  to meeting the demands of experience as rationally entitling perceptual 
beliefs. Whilst the dictum may be adequate in respect to rational relations between reasons, it 
is of limited use when it  comes to intuition as rationally  entitling and externally constraining – 
which is the cornerstone of McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricism’, in which receptivity is 
ultimate in rational entitlement. Of course, in the revised account, McDowell still operates 
according to the general model or spirit  of Davidson’s dictum, on pain of the Myth. However, 
there is no succinct or pithy ‘slogan’ in which rational entitlement and rationalizing contents 
can be expressed. 
 Of paramount concern to McDowell is avoiding the Myth of the Given, hence the space 
of reasons remains commensurable with the space of the conceptual. Receptivity remains 
within the bounds of both accordingly; however, it does not do so in virtue of McDowell’s 
once preferred amended dictum. Receptivity in McDowell’s new account is understood as 
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featuring in rational entitlement because it is given in a form in which it can come to feature 
in discursive representation. So he breaks with his Mind and World amended dictum in 
respect to how receptivity  features in rational entitlement, i.e. rational entitlement now 
extends beyond propositional content. 
 There is also a break of sorts in respect to the kind of content which can stand in rational 
relations: McDowell introduces specifically intuitional content, as non-discursive content that 
can now enter normative relations of a kind with propositional content. So where we once had 
a picture in which rational entitlement from experience to perceptual judgment was explained 
as a function between propositional contents, rational entitlement is now reconfigured as a 
relation between a reason-providing content and a judgment – where the former is not itself in 
the propositional form of a reason.
 McDowell’s move away from experience with propositional content presents a 
corresponding shift in his story of warrant. His Mind and World picture of rational 
entitlement, working with Davidson’s amended dictum, was seemingly intelligible because 
experience provided reasons for reflective judgement, viz., what one takes in is that things are 
thus and so. So perceptual judgement was warranted in light of the very same content being 
given in experience. In McDowell’s revised account, the content of intuition comes to 
rationally entitle. However, not being propositional in its content, it does not entitle as a self-
constituted reason – that is, as something which can stand as a premise for a conclusion. 
Rather, the non-discursive content of intuition may, with the appropriate cognitive activity, 
yield a self-constituted reason by  way of its discursive exploitation, but it does not itself 
function as a reason for perceptual judgment. The logical space of reasons thus comes to be 
understood as incorporating potentially ‘reason-providing’ content, and not  merely  the 
propositional contents which can themselves stand as reasons and enter inferential relations. 
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 This rational innovation enables McDowell, under pressure from Travis, to bring more 
sharply into focus the idea that intuition is a merely having in view of an object, and that 
entitlement to a perceptual judgment stems from the presence of an object to the perceiving 
subject. Of course, for McDowell, unlike Travis, it is not the non-conceptual object itself 
which so entitles, but it is the intuitional content of experience. Both Travis and McDowell 
posit rational relations with the non-conceptual object of perception, so as to garner rational 
external constraint upon thought.78 So as to not fall into the Myth of the Given, McDowell, in 
his revised account, stays upon the side of Davidson’s idea that rational relations essentially 
involve relations between conceptual contents. However, this now comes at the cost of 
experience not itself furnishing the mind with fully self-constituted reasons for perceptual 
judgment.     
9. ‘Appearings’: Experience and Perceptual Judgment 
 In Mind and World , the given contents of ‘appearings’ were bound to receptivity, and so 
beyond the voluntary rational control of the perceiver. To express the content of the intuition 
was not yet to exercise one’s judgement or believe that things were that way. However, the 
‘appearing’ itself did nevertheless purport to claim things to be a certain way according to it, 
i.e. the representational contents of ‘appearings’ did in fact, even as given, warrant notions of 
truth and falsity. 
 ‘Appearings’, in McDowell’s new account however, must necessarily  go beyond the 
given content of intuition. Indeed, insofar as they involve the discursive exploitations of the 
given content, they are judgments that things are thus and so. Of course it  may be that one, 
upon reflection, comes to have reason to distrust the propositional content of an ‘appearing’, 
and comes to discount it as false. However, the propositional content once formed, by way of 
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making explicit what is given in experience is no less a judgment, or belief. In such a case, 
one is merely seemingly  rationally entitled, in light of what is given in experience, to the 
judgment one makes.
 Taking this state of affairs into consideration, Davidson and McDowell are now evidently 
reconciled in respect to ‘appearings’: we simply do not have a propositional content in 
experience – an ‘appearing’ – waiting for ‘endorsement’ in judgment. Articulating the content 
given in experience, or indeed drawing upon recognitional capacities, carries endorsement 
with it, and yields a perceptual judgment (true or false). It thus commits one to a state of 
affairs. Of course, such endorsement may come to be withdrawn upon reflection, with the 
assessment that a particular experience is misleading.
 Crucially, however, the content of ‘appearings’, so understood, is not the given of 
experience, and qualifies itself as the content of a judgment that, true or false, is thus free to 
enter the inferential reasons-relations of Davidson’s dictum. In the case of a judgment that 
does articulate the content of an intuition, it  enters into such relations with indefeasible 
warrant: viz., the presence to a subject in an intuition of an object through some of its 
perceptible properties. 
 So, with his revised account of intuitional content, just as McDowell loses his ability  to 
utilize an amended form of Davidson’s dictum, so it  is also that McDowell can no longer 
draw upon the grammar of ‘appearings’ by which to substantiate his posited notion of 
passively  given conceptual content in experience. Being deprived of the utility of such a 
model is merely the first (of many) of those forms of intelligibility which McDowell could 
formerly present in respect to successfully  conceiving experience as itself conceptually 
shaped. 
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10. Intelligibility of ‘Carved out’ Aspects
McDowell: “In discursive dealings with content, one puts significances together. This is particularly clear 
with discursive performances in the primary sense, whose content is the significance of a combination of 
meaningful expressions. But even though judging need not be conceived as an act spread out in time,  like 
making a claim, its being discursive involves a counterpart to the way one puts significance is together in 
meaningful speech.”79
McDowell: “ I mean this to be consistent with rejecting, as we should, the idea that the contents one puts 
together in discursive activity are self-standing building blocks, separately thinkable elements in the 
contents of claims or judgements. One can think significance of, say, a predicative expression only in the 
context of a thought in which that content occurs predicatively. But we can acknowledge that and still say 
that in discursive activity one puts contents together, in a way that can be modeled on stringing 
meaningful expressions together in discourse literally so called.”80 
 As already mentioned, McDowell’s revised rational entitlement story is one which shifts 
from rational relations between propositional contents, according to Davidson’s amended 
dictum, to an entitlement story between propositional contents and intuitional contents. 
Rational entitlement thus stems from intuitional content, and in respect to McDowell’s first 
entitlement picture, from its ‘carved out’ aspects. 
 Propositional content does nevertheless remain central to the rational entitlement picture. 
And yet, according to McDowell’s account, the rational entitlement story does not, indeed it 
cannot, assume propositional content at the outset. To be content at all requires rational 
external constraint. And so, according to McDowell, the constituent contents, the sub-parts, 
which inform the proposition as a whole, must rationally stem from the aspects of intuition. 
McDowell therefore offers an account of how those sub-parts are rationally  informed by 
intuition, so as to inform the propositional whole. So McDowell’s first kind of rational 
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entitlement is one which essentially relies upon an analysis of the propositional contents, such 
that the content of thought is itself bound to receptivity – the content of intuition. 
 According to McDowell, the content of intuition can itself figure in the rational 
entitlement picture because it figures in the ‘carved out’ aspects. It comes to figure in the 
perceptual thought itself, via the association of aspects with meaningful expressions. So the 
rational entitlement is due to the intuitional content itself featuring in the propositional 
thought. In this way, the rational external constraint can thus be seen as constituted in the very 
makeup of the discursive content of the thought itself. The constraint and the entitlement does 
not need to defer to something outside of itself, from without the conceptual as it  were. This is 
because the discursive significances of the propositional content are already rationally bound 
to the intuitional content. And so perceptual judgment, in the context of this particular rational 
entitlement account  of McDowell’s, need not defer to the propositional content of experience 
in order to be entitled to its claim, as in the Mind and World paradigm; rather, the judgment is 
entitled due to the constituent sub-parts and aspects of its very content. 
 Judgement itself, according to the first rational entitlement story, thus becomes something 
irrevocably  bound to the intuitional content. Now, in one respect, this can be seen as a 
drawing closer to Travis: something of a non-discursive quality  can be seen as operative as an 
external constraint in the rational justification of a propositional claim (contra Davidson). And 
yet McDowell maintains his deference towards Davidson’s insight into rationality: the ‘carved 
out’ aspects of intuition must be conceptual, if they are to feature in the space of reasons, on 
pain of the Myth of the Given. 
 That which rationally entitles is conceptual content – content that is itself understood as 
bound to receptivity. The intelligibility  of all this depends, of course, on making sense of the 
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idea that, with the ‘carving out’ of aspects, we put discursive significances together. And it  is 
precisely a picture such as this which Travis refuses (see below). 
 McDowell’s account, in respect to his first kind of rational entitlement, allows for a 
‘putting together’ of discursive significances, such that judgment itself is ‘put together’ with 
sub-parts that are bound to externally constraining content. The ‘break down’ into such 
composite parts is apparently due to a necessity  of illuminating the rational edifice upon 
which the perceptual thought and its contents are grounded.
 So, in a sense, McDowell requires a more basic unit, in respect to that which rationally  
entitles, than a whole propositional content – that being the propositional content’s sub-
propositional parts. Seen in this way, propositional thought has a composite structure, with 
each composite part bound to an aspect of intuitional content. The sub-propositional 
significances, as so bound to the intuitional content, thus provide, in their very  manifestation 
of and relation to intuition, external constraint  upon the propositional content. They do this as 
an inherent feature of their meaningful significance. 
 But how is the putting together of significances to be understood?
Travis writes:
“For Frege,  there is no intelligible task of forming the unity of a thought,  or judgement, out of things 
which,  on their own, anyway, do any less than form a unity. Thoughts,  and judgements,  are not built out of 
building blocks. Thoughts must be decomposable if they are to enter into the full panoply of logical 
relations between them. But a thought’s parts on a decomposition can do no other than add up to itself. ” 
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“Perceptual experience (auditory,  or visual, or the combination) may now force on me the view that Sid is 
snoring. But it does not (certainly need not) force this on me by forcing on me, severally, the view that Sid 
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is up to something, that someone is snoring,  and the need to put these together into the view that Sid is 
snoring.” 82
 Travis, following in the footsteps of Frege, claims to ‘put the word true to the fore’, and 
proceeds to thoughts as the things in relation to which truth can come into consideration.83 
Such a model of intelligibility means that perceptual experience may ‘force’ upon one a 
particular judgment; however, it does not force upon one the various sub-parts, with those 
parts then being put together into the judgment.   
 Travis claims that the task of a thought can indeed be broken down, decomposed, into 
‘sub-tasks’. However such parts of a thought must necessarily add up to itself.84 That is, those 
identifiable sub-tasks can only  add up to the whole task. So the sub-task is performed only  in 
the context of the performance of the whole task. Furthermore, those sub-tasks are not 
decomposed in only one way; rather, there are many  ways of decomposing the sub-tasks of 
the thought. Nevertheless, the possibility of multiple analysis nonetheless requires that the 
analysis add up to the whole. 
 Travis also maintains that  thoughts decompose into ‘generalities’, with such generalities 
being necessary  for the thought to enter into various logical relations. And yet while any such 
generality may be shared between thoughts, or figure as a constituent feature of other 
thoughts, Travis insists that this should not be confused with its being a part of a thought, 
which could just as well function in different ways and in different thoughts – as if the part 
could be put together differently  with other parts. In other words, the part does not maintain 
an independence in such a manner. Hence, the parts of a thought cannot be put together in 
different ways to form other thoughts, depending upon how the sub-parts are unified. 
78
82 Ibid, p. 20.
83 Ibid, p. 1.
84 Ibid, p. 1.
 Travis’s Fregean picture of thought is such that, there is no intelligible task of working up 
to a unified propositional whole – which he sets against  Kant’s unifying function, out of parts 
which on their own provide less than a unity. There is no such work to be done in unifying 
judgments, which fashions whole judgments, by putting together such sub-parts, conceived of 
as ‘building blocks’ of thought.  So Travis maintains that because there is no such task to be 
performed, there is no ‘psychological explanation or otherwise’ of how it is performed. 
Judgment rather, Travis maintains, is having a view of the world imposed upon one – so that 
one cannot hold an alternative view. One holds such a view in the pursuit of truth. 
 So where McDowell draws parallels between speech and thought, so as to garner an 
intelligible picture in respect to his rational entitlement picture,85 Travis rather, makes a point 
of identifying certain disanalogies between them, so as to reinforce his Fregean picture of 
thought. One of particular concern, which is related to the sub-parts of propositional content, 
is that of ‘interpretation’.  
 Travis claims that, as a point of grammar, thoughts answer questions of interpretation, so 
that such questions are applicable only  to the particular meaning of the words of speech.86 So 
the thought as a whole, and thus its sub-parts, ought not to be thought of as a ‘cognitive 
prosthetic’, such that an intention can attach to it, as it may attach to a picture or image. The 
representational function of a thought is not susceptible to multiple interpretations. Thoughts, 
Travis maintains,‘represent in the only  way they could’87: we identify a thought – we identify 
the reach of the thought – via that which in the surroundings the thought is intentionally 
directed towards. So there are two aspects here which Travis does not want to come into play 
in characterizing thought. The first being that thoughts have sub-parts which could obtain 
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independently from the whole content. The second being that thoughts are open to 
interpretation the way that speech is. 
 Now McDowell explicitly claims, in ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’ that his new model 
is not one which ought to be understood on the self-standing building blocks model, viz., 
separately  thinkable elements which are then put  together to form a whole judgment. And 
whilst McDowell claims that the putting together of significances in a judgment ought to be 
understood on the model of meaningful speech, it ought not be understood as an act which is 
spread out in time. This is important because, in not  being spread out in time, the parts of the 
thought are not each separately existing (outside of the whole) and reflectively considered. So 
this would imply that the significances are unified at once, and without intermittency. 
 McDowell denies the ‘building blocks’ model. Why then does he insist upon the 
metaphor of ‘putting together’ discursive significances on the model of meaningful 
utterances? What is it  that such an insistence is intended to achieve, in the context of 
differentiating his picture of empirical thought from that of Travis? Or Davidson, for that 
matter? As will be discussed, McDowell’s point  is one that has to do with rational 
entitlement.Yet first it is necessary  to distinguish McDowell’s account from the concerns of 
Travis. 
 To begin with, McDowell’s discursive significances, and sub-propositional parts, ought 
not to be understood as the same sub-parts as those of Travis. Travis’s sub-parts involve 
generalities of a kind, and complexity, that McDowell would not admit into his ‘carving out’ 
picture of rational entitlement. Generalities to do with Sid being up  to something, someone 
snoring, and the like. Furthermore, Travis’s sub-tasks can be broken down in multiple ways. 
This does not necessarily affect McDowell’s picture. Again, McDowell’s concern is not with 
the sub-parts of the various concepts which figure in recognition.  McDowell is concerned 
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only with those limited concepts which pertain to the aspects of the content of intuition. His 
notion of ‘putting together’ is concerned with the external rational underpinnings of 
judgments that articulate intuitional content.
 McDowell’s notion of ‘putting significances together’ is just a way of illuminating the 
sub-parts of the propositional content which relate to intuitional content itself – with those 
sub-parts acquiring their external rational entitlement from the intuitional content. So whilst 
there is a unity, and there is a rational underpinning to that unity  which occurs at a sub-
propositional level, because the putting together of the significances is not understood as an 
act spread out in time, the sub-parts of that unity are precisely not separately thinkable 
contents. McDowell merely provides a model by which we can understand the rational 
underpinnings of the content of the thought. So that the demonstrative ‘this’, for example, can 
be seen as rationally bound to an aspect of intuition – and so inform us as to how it 
contributes to the whole sense of a thought. 
 So the putting together of discursive significances need not necessarily be understood as 
McDowell positing a different structure to thought itself, say, to that of Travis’s Frege. As if 
the structure of thought which did involve drawing upon recognitonal capacities differed from 
the kind of thought which did not. Such a two tiered structure of thought would indeed be 
disastrous. The propositional structure of thought and its discursive contents need not  come to 
define the differences between McDowell and Travis. McDowell’s account pertains rather to 
illuminating certain (rational) aspects of that structure so as to accommodate entitling 
experience within the conceptual realm.  
 So the way in which the two can be distinguished, has to do with how it  is that the 
contents within the propositional structure of perceptual thought are rationally related to that 
which obtains outside of the propositional structure itself. Travis has perceptual judgement 
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operating as a whole – a whole thought rationally bound to the non-conceptual object; 
whereas McDowell breaks down the propositional whole into significances which precisely 
attain their significance in view of an aspect of intuitional content. And, according to 
McDowell, it is his own story, on this revised account, which allows him to avoid the Myth of 
the Given, in a way in which Travis’s account cannot. 
 So perhaps we can distinguish between a potential point of logic, the structure of thought 
itself, which concerns the (propositional) form content must take in order to have meaning at 
all – the logical togetherness and unity of content in respect to empirical thought; and a point 
of concern regarding rational capacities, which are operable at a sub-propositional level, and 
which enable the very content which is bound in that logically together thinkable content. So 
that determining the sense of a sub-propositional content, which operates in reference to its 
figuring in the proposition as a whole, is not the same question or task as determining from 
whence that sense was (externally) rationally derived. So McDowell can maintain that the 
contents put together in thought are not separately thinkable; however, the contents, as 
‘carved out’ and put together, are susceptible to their own rational entitlement account in the 
context of the whole thinkable propositional content.  
 McDowell’s concern is how discursive content, in a certain range of perceptual 
judgments, is bound to unarticulated intuitional content, content which stands without, as it 
were, from the thinkable contents of thought. Such content may come to ‘feature’ in 
perceptual thought, but as given, the content lacks articulation and thus lacks sense. This 
concern, of course, has its own dynamic: it is driven by McDowell’s continuing pre-
occupation with avoiding the Myth of the Given, in giving his revised account of rational 
entitlement.
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Conclusion
 In Mind and World, McDowell presented a rational entitlement picture that sought to 
dislodge itself from a way of understanding ‘experience’ that manifested what he identified as 
an ‘interminable oscillation’ between Davidson’s Coherentism and the Myth of the Given. In 
order to avoid the associated problems of each, McDowell offered a notion of experience – 
sensory  impressions – as conceptually shaped. McDowell presented a stipulated notion of the 
conceptual, as it was to be understood as actualized in experience, as having propositional 
content. That stipulated notion of conceptual experience collected its intelligibility via a series 
of models of the conceptual, foremost of which was judgement and the form of its content. In 
this way  familiar models of thought and its expression in language provided the intelligible 
characteristics which could thereby inform and substantiate his stipulated notion of 
conceptually shaped experience. 
 In respect to rational entitlement, these conceptual models accompanied McDowell’s 
extension of Davidson’s notion of the space of reasons, so as to incorporate that which he 
considered lacking in his predecessor’s picture: rational external constraint upon empirical 
thought, in the form of experience with conceptual content. This in turn required an anti-
dualist understanding of the relationship between the sensory and the intellect, the outcome of 
which was McDowell’s notion of sensory  consciousness as a conceptual mode of 
presentation, with a given ‘sensory  content’. McDowell in turn drew upon Kant’s ‘Clue’, and 
the view that the Understanding was to be (with modification) involved in experience. So 
experience was constituted by a manifold of given representational content – with a face value 
– which could be taken to be so in the exercise of deciding how things are in reflective 
judgment. 
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 McDowell’s revised account continues to maintain an allegiance to what he sees as 
Davidson’s central insight into rationality, viz., that ‘reason’s reach extends no further than 
conceptual capacities can take it’.88 This is one of the central motivations why McDowell 
continues to resist Travis’s Fregean model of experience and perceptual judgment. From his 
point of view, no matter how informative Travis’s account may  prove to be, specifically  in 
respect to the function of recognition, Travis’s account of perceptual judgment necessarily 
falls foul of the Myth of the Given, because Travis posits rational relations that extend beyond 
the bounds of conceptual.
 McDowell resists Travis’s account because of ‘higher-order’ concerns that he has, which 
pertain to the Myth. Even with his revised account, it remains essential to McDowell’s project 
that experience is ‘permeated with mindedness’,89  so to speak. Indeed, it  is critical to 
McDowell’s thinking that the possession of language informs not only our ability to rationally 
respond to the world in judgement, but that it  also conditions our sensory  experience of the 
world. Our ‘second natures’ as linguistic creatures  – our rationality   which is autonomous and 
operates in its own sphere 90 – must come to be reflected in that very medium by which we 
come to have knowledge of the world, viz., sensory experience. As McDowell would have it, 
it is a notion of experience with conceptual content that provides one of the central means via 
which we can distinguish ourselves from non-rational animals – a content which reflects our 
rationality as language users.
 According to McDowell, being initiated into a natural language is to be initiated into a 
space of reasons. This in itself need not be a contentious idea. However, in order to secure this 
idea, and with his insistence that perceptual judgment must have rational external constraint, 
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McDowell holds that sensory experience must itself have a content which reflects those items 
amenable to figuring in the space of reasons, in accordance with Davidson’s insight into 
rationality. So too, in his view, must experience have a content which reflects the prevalence 
of language in our rational dealings with the world. 
 While experience with propositional content is no longer the preferred means by  which 
this rational relationship is established, nor that which reflects our second natures in 
experience itself, the new form of intuitional content  – however minimal that may be – is such 
that it must come to reflect, or be suitably related to, these aspects of our normative and 
rational lives as linguistic creatures. So, as McDowell’s revised picture would have it, the 
stipulation of the non-discursive content of intuition as conceptual necessarily succeeds. 
 For its part, Travis’s account of perceptual judgment is one which simply rejects at  the 
outset one of the key premises from which McDowell presents his notion of experience – viz., 
that rational and conceptual capacities must necessarily be involved in experience itself. 
According to Travis, McDowell offers no substantial argument as to why experience with 
conceptual content provides the only means by which we can avoid the (trivial) problem of 
the Myth. In doing so, Travis resists what McDowell considers Davidson’s ‘central insight’ 
into rationality. On Travis’s account, the space of reasons extends beyond the realm of the 
conceptual and any involvement of our conceptual capacities in experience, such that non-
conceptual objects directly  in view themselves, outside of conceptual content, can come to 
stand in rationally significant relations to perceptual thought.
 Travis’s account of recognition influences McDowell’s change in mind about the content 
of experience as being propositional. While he did not ignore recognition in Mind and World, 
McDowell misplaced it in the function of experience itself. This misplacement strengthened 
Davidson’s criticism of the early picture that experience with propositional content did in fact 
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constitute a ‘taking to be so’. McDowell’s treatment of experience as propositional in content, 
therefore, had far too many of the characteristics of judgment. Such an outcome can be seen 
as a direct consequence of those models which he so enthusiastically employed in order to 
substantiate his stipulated notion of conceptually shaped experience – despite his various 
attempts to distinguish the modes of actualization of conceptual content in experience and 
judgment. 
 Even so, at least  in his early attempt to avoid the Myth of the Given and secure a 
permeating mindedness in experience, McDowell’s picture of experience as propositional in 
content came with what purported to be robust  models of intelligibility offered to secure the 
stipulation of the conceptual – models informed by  Sellars and Kant, and by Davidson’s 
conception of reasons-relations. The dissolution of the propositional model in McDowell’s 
revised account of intuition marks the unavailability of those models which once figured so 
prominently  in his attempt to imbue experience with intelligible, substantial conceptual 
qualities. And despite McDowell’s insistence upon an alternative stipulation of the 
conceptual, in accordance with his revised notion of intuitional content, such models are not 
lost without threatening his conceptualist agenda. 
 McDowell’s new stipulation of the conceptual as it figures in intuitional content creates 
interesting anomalies in his picture of rational entitlement, in respect to some of those 
defining features of of his account of entitlement in Mind and World. This in turn raises the 
question as to whether these anomalies are such that they impugn the intelligibility of his new 
picture of intuition as conceptual in content, and warrant a  reconsideration of his concern to 
avoid the putative  Myth of the Given.
 Gone now from McDowell’s picture is Davidson’s amended dictum in respect to rational 
entitlement, it’s utility withdrawing with the withdrawal of the model of experience as having 
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propositional content. In its place now stands a space of reasons which, whilst commensurate 
with the space of the conceptual, is limited in its expanse to a tenuous notion of intuitional 
content. Because of this, the content of experience cannot itself stand as a self-constituted 
reason. 
 Where McDowell’s amended form of Davidson’s dictum supposed rational relations 
between propositional contents, in later McDowell, rational relations involving the uptake of 
experiential content are reduced to rational relations between non-discursive intuitional 
content and the propositional content of judgment that articulates that intuitional content. 
Intuitional content now provides rational entitlement which is served (merely) by the object in 
Travis’ uniform account of perception and recognition. So, at the level of experience, 
McDowell’s notion of ‘content’ claims to succeed (with respect to avoiding the Myth) where 
Travis’s object fails. Yet the consequence of this is a space of reasons which extends to a 
content almost totally lacking in substantial conceptual characteristics, and which cannot itself 
stand as a reason.   
 Furthermore, in the context of McDowell’s revised account of intuitional content, a 
dualism between the sensory  and the functioning of the capacities of the intellect does indeed 
emerge, that is, in respect  to all the substantial aspects which inform the engagement of 
conceptual capacities. With discursive content no longer given with the newly conceived 
conceptual shaping of the sensory, it no longer can be said that there is a ‘thinking in the 
sensory’, as once was the case with McDowell’s notion of a shaping of sensory 
consciousness, understood as itself a discursive conceptual mode of presentation. We can now 
distinguish the given intuitional content from the discursive propositional content which may 
rationally stem from it in a judgment based on it. Of course, McDowell may  insist that the 
intellect and the sensory  are still bound in the intuitional content; however, because the 
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content of intuition is not discursive, this certainly would not constitute a ‘thinking in the 
sensory’, at  least as a thinking in the sensory  was once understood. ‘Thinking in the sensory’ 
seems to have no more purchase in the revised account than it does in Travis’s account of 
perception.
 One of the defining differences between Travis and McDowell is the relationship  between 
the conceptual and recognition. This is apparent in respect to intuitional content which 
entitles, both via recognition and via ‘carved out’ aspects. Where Travis unites the functions 
of recognition and conceptual content, so that there is no conceptual actualization without 
recognition in respect to empirical thought, McDowell’s notion of intuitional content 
apparently  eschews such a restrictive, mutually  inclusive relationship  between recognition and 
the conceptual. Experience is posited as remaining conceptually shaped, yet  without 
recognition, without representation, without face value, and without sense. 
 So McDowell’s notion of non-discursive conceptual content essentially  is one which is 
premised upon the notion that conceptual capacities can be passively  actualized in intuition, 
yet be divested of those aspects which intelligibly  imbue the conceptual with substantial 
qualities – qualities which figure so saliently  in his Mind and World paradigm. Where Travis 
substantiates his account of the conceptual via recognition and the content of judgment, 
McDowell is left  only with a depleted notion of intuitional content as conceptual in that it has 
a ‘potential’ to feature in the exercise of discursive rational capacities. So, in respect to 
recognition and conceptual capacities, temporarily leaving aside McDowell’s concerns for the 
Myth, it must be said that Travis’s account comes out the better, at least in respect to a 
uniform notion of the conceptual’s substantial characteristics.
 McDowell’s rational entitlement story which involves the ‘carving out of aspects’ is 
premised upon the intelligibility of distinguishing the internal logical structure of the 
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propositional content of a judgment from the rational underpinnings of the conceptual parts 
which inform the whole. And his notion of ‘putting significances together’ is a model of 
intelligibility  which rather misleading pertains to illuminating the rational connection of parts 
of the whole content with aspects of intuitional content. So McDowell can claim to maintain a 
single structure of propositional thought, albeit with two notions of rational entitlement – 
‘carving out’ and recognition – in play. 
 However, even with such a sympathetic interpretation of later McDowell, the judgments 
that articulate intuitional content are limited to a very restricted range of empirical thoughts. 
The fact that McDowell’s revised account apparently hinges upon such a potentially 
confusing notion of rational entitlement in the ‘carving out’ case, so limited in its range 
anyhow, further suggests that McDowell’s project of avoiding a relation between experience 
and the world which he sees as caught up in the Myth of the Given is in difficulty, and that 
perhaps its motivation – the preoccupation with the Myth – ought to be reconsidered.  
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   Chapter 2: Objectivity  
A. The Issue of Objectivity
1. Lack of Intelligibility: the Myth and Davidson
McDowell: “Now how should we elaborate the idea that our thinking is thus answerable  to the world? In 
addressing this question, we might restrict our attention, at least tacitly,  to thinking that is answerable to 
the empirical world; that is, answerable to how things  are in so far as how things are is empirically 
accessible. Even if we take it that answerability to how things are includes more than answerability to the 
empirical world, it nevertheless seems right to say this: since our cognitive predicament is that we confront 
the world by way of sensible intuition (to put it in Kantian terms), our reflection on the very idea of 
thought’s directedness at how things are must begin with answerability to the empirical world. And now, 
how can we understand the idea that our thinking is answerable to the empirical world, if  not by way of 
the idea that our thinking is answerable to experience? How could a verdict from the empirical world – to 
which empirical thinking must be answerable if it is to be thinking at all – be delivered, if not by way of a 
verdict from (as W.V. Quine puts it) “the tribunal of experience”?  91
McDowell: “That is what I mean by “a minimal empiricism”: the idea that experience must constitute a 
tribunal, mediating the way our thinking is answerable to how things are, as it must be if we are to make 
sense of it as thinking at all. And this is one side of a combination of plausibilities that promises to account 
for the philosophical anxieties I alluded to. The other side is a frame of mind, which I shall come to, that 
makes it hard to see how experience could function as a tribunal, delivering verdicts on our thinking.”92
 According to McDowell, one of the incoherent aspects of the Myth of the Given, is the 
idea that ‘bare sensory’ experience can intelligibly pass verdicts upon empirical judgment. So 
just as it  was unintelligible how rational entitlement could obtain from something outside of 
the realm of the conceptual, it is unintelligible how it is that ‘bare sensory’ receptivity could 
function as a ‘tribunal’ in respect to thought directed at the empirical world. As McDowell 
would have it, given that ‘reason’s reach extends no further than conceptual capacities can 
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take it’,93  extending the space of reasons beyond the conceptual, and hoping to gain 
entitlement and answerability via something like mere pointing, is simply incoherent. 
 As was discussed, Davidson, in light of the Myth of the Given, accordingly  renounces 
empiricism all together. Wary of such unintelligibility, experience according to Davidson, 
performs no such role of ‘tribunal’. Davidson’s paramount motivation for avoiding the Myth 
of the Given is a desire to avoid skepticism. As already discussed, this is in deference to what 
he sees as the inevitable epistemic intermediaries between thought and the world in the 
empiricist picture. So the rational entitlement of empirical thought, and its truth, is ensured 
not by way of its rational relationship to receptivity, but rather with its ‘coherence’ with a 
body of beliefs. 
 McDowell, as was discussed, agrees with Davidson when it comes to that which can 
rationally entitle – that which can operate in the space of reasons: it is conceptual content. 
Whilst that may be the case, as McDowell sees things, Davidson does not show us how it is 
that we can do without the empiricist picture: ‘The attractions of empiricism are not explained 
away’.94  Specifically, empirical thought, as directed towards the world, must be then 
answerable to the empirical world (and thus impressions). This in turn problematizes 
Davidson’s story of content  in respect to empirical thought. With experience outside the space 
of reasons, and with no such external constraint upon the exercise of spontaneity, empirical 
thought is left ‘spinning in the void’. How is thought itself then intelligibly about the world? 
Again the notion of answerability and the possibility for the content  of thought are inexorably 
bound together. To dispose of one is to problematize the other. 
 McDowell is thus critical of Davidson’s Coherentist picture because it simply  takes for 
granted that our thoughts can get things right or wrong, or in other words, Davidson assumes 
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that they have ‘objective purport’. The Myth of the Given, whilst incoherent, at  least 
attempted to inform conceptual capacities from without as it were, so that external constraint 
upon conceptual capacities put them in touch with some form of objectivity. 
 With no rational external constraint upon thought, empirical thought in Davidson’s 
picture is the mere semblance of just that. With no rational connection with receptivity, 
(receptivity being the means via which we are put into touch with the objective empirical 
world), the exercise of spontaneity  thus cannot intelligibly  be seen as ‘directed towards’ the 
objective world at all.
 McDowell’s primary concern in respect to the Myth of the Given is not with avoiding 
skepticism, but rather ensuring the empirical content of those thoughts in the first place. For 
McDowell, the reassurance, the rational entitlement, which is required when utilising 
concepts in the exercise of judgment, is constraint from outside our acts of thinking. If 
empirical judgment is to recognizably  bear upon reality at all, there must be such external 
constraint. Therefore, there must be a role for receptivity as well as spontaneity – not just in 
respect to the rational justification of empirical judgement, as directed at the world, but also 
for those empirical judgments to have empirical content in the first place. 
2. Answerability to The World as Fact; Facts and Objects
McDowell: “In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what one takes in is that things are thus 
and so.  That things are thus and so is the content of the experience, and it can also be the content of a 
judgment: it becomes the content of  a judgment if the subject decides to take the experience at face value. 
So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also,  if one is not misled, an aspect of the 
layout of the world: it is how things are.  Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity 
puts us in a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. Experience enables the 
layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks” .95
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 McDowell: “Impressions can fit in the logical space of reasons because impressions can be 
 actualisations of  conceptual capacities” 96
 I will begin my account of McDowell’s picture of ‘objectivity’ in respect to his Mind and 
World shift in how to make sense of ‘verdictive answerability’. Faced with the dilemma of 
being (necessarily) answerable to the empirical world, yet without a conception of experience 
which makes it possible to so function as a tribunal, McDowell with diagnosis and cure in 
mind, seeks to transform the very  picture of intelligibility in respect to both experience and 
verdictive answerability. So that McDowell’s notion of the answerability  of empirical thought 
to the empirical world becomes answerability  to content, ‘perceptible facts’, and hence 
precisely not to the non-conceptual – be it object or the sensory, which is situated outside the 
conceptual (Myth) – nor to a coherent body  of beliefs without rational external constraint 
(spinning in the void). In doing so, McDowell hopes to explain away  the attractions of 
supposing that sensory impressions are not the kinds of things to which we are answerable.97 
 McDowell’s notion of empirical thought and verdictive answerability, in accordance with 
his rational entitlement picture, is one which obtains between conceptual contents only. A 
judgment, whose content is that things are thus and so, is a posture which is correctly  or 
incorrectly adopted, in accord with whether or not things are indeed thus and so.98 Perceptual 
judgment which is directed towards the empirical world is answerable to the world as fact, to 
how things are, for whether or not it is correctly  executed. Such a judgement is intelligibly 
answerable to the world, because ‘how things are’ is constituted by  conceptual content to the 
effect that that things are thus and so. This is how the world can come to exert its normative 
determination upon empirical thought. 
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 So a paradox of sorts emerges, which incurs much potential confusion. Although our 
perceptual thoughts are directed towards the empirical world, the realm of non-conceptual 
objects, the fact that such thoughts are answerable to it does not transpire merely  by  way  of 
that intentional relation between thought and the non-conceptual object. Rather, such 
answerability occurs by way of verdictive answerability to propositional facts. 
 As the discussion below of Travis and McDowell unfolds in respect to answerability, this 
indeed becomes a central defining factor. Where both accounts hold that we are answerable to 
the objects of experience, Travis supposes that this is so because the objects are necessarily 
situated outside of conceptual content. Whereas McDowell supposes that  we are answerable 
to the non-conceptual object only via its already figuring in conceptual content.   
 In order to offer a more illuminating account of this notion of verdictive answerability, I 
now turn to a discussion of McDowell’s notions of ‘how things are’ and ‘the world of fact’.
3. ‘How Things Are’ and the ‘World as Facts’ – Fregean Sense 
McDowell: “This joint involvement of receptivity and spontaneity allows us to say that in experience one 
can take in how things are.  How things are is independent of  one’s thinking (except,  of course, in the 
special case in which how things are is that one thinks such-and-such). By being taken in in experience, 
how things anyway are becomes available to exert the required rational control, originating outside one’s 
thinking, on one’s exercises of spontaneity”99
McDowell: “But that things are thus and so is also, if  one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the 
world : it is how things are.” 100
McDowell: “The Sinn expressed in an assertoric utterance is what one says in making the utterance. What 
one says is, schematically, that things are thus-and-so, and that things are thus-and-so is what is the case, 
if  one's assertion is true. And something that is the case is, in a quite intuitive way of speaking, a state of 
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affairs. So an intuitive notion of  states of affairs is perfectly available to Frege, but at the level of Sinn 
rather than Bedeutung.”101
 McDowell, like Travis, speaks of and posits a notion of ‘how things are’. For both 
McDowell and Travis, this notion can be seen as a grammatical remark intended to situate 
‘verdictive answerability’ – that which normatively  determines the truth or falsity of 
perceptual judgment – in the model of such judgements. And as seen in the discussion of 
rational entitlement, each ultimately  differs in respect to which side of Frege’s line how things 
are and verdictive answerability are to be situated. 
 According to McDowell, in referring to how things are, he is referring to conceptual 
content, propositional content which is understood as how things can be truly said to be. How 
things are can constitute the given manifold of experience, whether or not taken up in thought, 
and it can also obtain independently  of what is so represented in intuition. So despite 
potentially constituting the content of thought and experience, as will be discussed, how 
things are does indeed obtain, independently from one’s exercise of thought, or what is given 
in the intuition.
 How things are therefore has an objective independent status, outside of one’s subjective 
representing function of intuition and empirical thought. Now this would seem to be 
analogous to the non-conceptual object. And whilst that may  be the case, with McDowell’s 
shift in how to make sense of verdictive answerability, there is accordingly a shift  in respect to 
which side of Frege’s line verdictive answerability is situated. McDowell places how things 
are decisively  upon the right-hand side of Frege’s line – the side of Sinn and propositional 
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content. As McDowell would have it, such a shift  is warranted so as to avoid the Myth of the 
Given. 
 Even so, the verdictive answerability of propositional content to how things objectively  
are does not obtain outside of the external constraint of the non-conceptual – the left  hand side 
of Frege’s line. McDowell maintains that his picture of perception does not deny rational 
relations with the non-conceptual, nor reason’s reach extending to the left-hand side of 
Frege’s line. How things are – understood  as how things are truly sayable to be – includes 
those instances of a kind which Travis refers to. The non-conceptual object as instantiating 
conceptual content is thus included in the specification of how things are. To explore this 
further, I will now address McDowell’s notion of ‘perceptible facts’ and ‘the world as 
everything that is the case’.
 Following Wittgenstein, McDowell embraces it as a ‘truism’ to assert that the world is the 
totality of facts, in contrast  to the totality of objects. McDowell, in deference to that ‘truism’, 
offers a model of verdictive answerability  that treats the world as the totality of facts 
(understood as true propositions). Via that  ‘truism’, McDowell supposes that the incoherence 
of the Myth of the Given in respect to experience passing verdicts upon thought is overcome. 
It is overcome by the intelligibility of (veridical) experience, conceived of as factual in 
content, normatively informing empirical thought. 
 In the context of verdictive answerability and rational entitlement, there is nothing 
outside or beyond the world as the totality of facts. While we are perfectly able to 
acknowledge the ontology of the non-conceptual, that domain does not constitute the realm of 
the objective, as if facts were somehow further answerable to that non-conceptual realm. As 
will be seen, McDowell’s world of facts incorporates that  non-conceptual domain within its 
very determination. In this way also, the bounds of objectivity are commensurate with the 
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bounds of facts. McDowell’s picture of objectivity  thus extends no further than reason’s reach 
and the realm of Sinn (thought and thinkable content.)
4. No Outer Boundary and No Gap 
McDowell: “A gap threatens to open between us and what we would like to conceive ourselves as knowing 
about, and it then seems to be a task for philosophy to show us ways to bridge the gulf. It is this threat of 
inaccessibility on the part of the world that we need to dislodge.”102
McDowell: “But I am trying to describe a way of maintaining that in experience the world exerts a 
rational influence on our thinking. And that requires us to delete the outer boundary from the picture. The 
impressions on our senses that keep the dynamic system in motion are already equipped with conceptual 
content. The facts that are made manifest to us in those impressions, or at least seem to be, are not beyond 
an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere, and the impingements of the world on our 
sensibility are not inward crossings such a boundary. My point is to insist that we can effect this deletion 
of the outer boundary without falling into idealism, without slighting the independence of reality.”103
McDowell: “This image of openness to reality is at our disposal because how we place the reality that 
makes its impression on a subject in experience. Although reality is independent of  our thinking, it is not 
to be pictured as outside an outer boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere. “That things are thus and 
so is the conceptual content of an experience, but if the subject of the experience is not misled, that very 
same thing, that things are thus and so, is also a perceptible fact, an aspect of the perceptible world.”104
 According to the traditional empiricist picture, there is, assumed throughout, and indeed 
motivating the explanatory paradigm, a ‘gap’ between mind and world. It  is precisely the task 
of sensory  experience to close that supposed gap. However, rather than provide an 
unmediated ‘openness to’, or a ‘directness with’, external reality, experience in the traditional 
picture provides us with evidence of such a reality. Experience, understood as evidentiary, 
thus provides an intermediary  ‘object’ of thought. Experience does not provide us, either in 
sensory  perception, or in thought, with unmediated contact with external reality. The gap is 
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supposedly closed rather with a mediating object. Such a picture consequently  gives rise to 
persuasive sceptical concerns. Rather than successfully closing the gap between thought and 
the world, and opening us to external reality, traditional empiricism simply  cut us off from the 
world entirely. Traditional empiricism thus makes thought with content, and answerability to 
the world, entirely impossible. 
 In Mind and World, McDowell maintains that there is no gap between thought and the 
world. McDowell refuses the traditional empiricist paradigm which assumed the gap at the 
outset, posited a role for receptivity without spontaneity, and so ultimately  offered nothing but 
the incoherence of the Myth of the Given. However, that is not because his account is put 
forward to show us how, figuratively  as it  were, to close the gap. Rather McDowell’s 
preferred therapeutic account never allows such an opening of a gap in the first place. 
 As McDowell sees it, by positing propositional content in experience itself, we dissolve 
the apparent gap  between mind and world from the very  beginning, so that there are no such 
misplaced obligations to once again attempt to re-close it. As will be discussed, that gap does 
not even get an opening precisely because the thinkable world as fact, and external reality as 
that which is visibly perceived, are both accounted for in McDowell’s picture of the 
unboundedness of the conceptual. In this way, just as he prevents a gap opening between mind 
and world (understood as what is the case), he at the same time averts a problematic idealism 
which fails to recognise the independence of external reality  (understood as the realm of 
objects) from the exercise of thought.     
 McDowell’s account of ‘the world as fact’ connects with his account of 
‘appearings’ (which was discussed in Chapter 1).  As discussed, the content of ‘appearings’ 
was understood as the content of experience (sensory impression) itself. Importantly, 
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‘appearings’ were precisely  not aligned with beliefs - they  could entitle a ‘taking to be so’ 
without yet being a ‘taking to be so’.
 So ‘appearings’ provided a kind of epistemic intermediary, things could appear to one to 
be thus and so, but  McDowell did not wish to equate that with believing that things are thus 
and so. This opened the possibility  then that the content of experience could misrepresent, it 
could mislead one as to the true nature of ‘how things are’. That however, was the extent of 
the epistemic intermediary aspect of appearing. When things appeared to be thus and so, and 
that actually  was how things are, there was no disparity, no gap, between the appearance and 
the reality. 
 It is at this point that we can see the union of the content of ‘appearings’ – the content of 
experience - with ‘perceptible facts’. If the appearing does not mislead, if it is veridical, then 
the content of that appearing, constitutes a perceptible fact. An ‘ostensible seeing’ is an actual 
seeing precisely where its content is a perceptible fact. The content of experience, if true, and 
the facts are therefore one and the same, according to McDowell’s ‘no gap’ picture. (I will 
return to a discussion of the shared sense between thought and facts later on in the 
discussion). Just  as the content of experience is distinctly bound to the sensory impressions of 
experience, so too are perceptible facts, as McDowell conceives them. 
 This brings into consideration the notion of ‘external reality’ (the realm of objects) as 
providing external constraint upon thought, and therefore the constraint  informing 
‘perceptible facts’.
5. Ordinary Objects of Perception and no Sideways On Perspective 
McDowell: “We find ourselves always already engaging with the world in conceptual activity within such 
a dynamic system. Any understanding of this condition that it makes sense to hope for must be from 
within the system. It cannot be a matter of picturing the system’s adjustments to the world from sideways 
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on: that is, with the system circumscribed within the boundary, and the world outside it. That is exactly 
the shape our picture must not take.”105
 McDowell does, of course, in his discussion of Sellars, concern himself with illuminating 
a kind of transcendental account in respect to external constraint and the ‘objective purport’ of 
intuitional content and judgment – that is, an account aimed at ensuring that the propositional 
content of intuition, and thus judgment, is in fact bound to its purported subject matter, viz., 
the external object. 
 In Sellars’s picture – utilising his own reading of Kant – for thought to be about objective 
reality, for thought to have objective purport, requires that the conceptual actualisations of 
experience are ‘guided from without’, that is, by ‘sheer receptivity’. While the contents of 
perception ‘make claims’ in experience, there is a transcendental concern, according to 
Sellars, that those ‘claims’ may lack external constraint: hence those conceptual 
representations must be transcendentally guided by ‘sheer receptivity’.106  
 So, according to Sellars’s reading of Kant there are two appeals to sensibility. The first is 
as intuitions (as they figure in the Clue), in which sensibility  is shaped by the Understanding. 
And secondly, there is also the transcendental role of sensibility, in which sensibility, 
functioning independently of the Understanding, ‘guides’ the Understanding in the respective 
conceptual shaping. 
 This is because, according to Sellars, the objects which are present to sensory 
consciousness are not real. They are a mere ‘manifest image’ of reality. As mere appearances, 
the ordinary objects of perception are therefore insufficient to meet the demands of external 
constraint from an external reality – external reality conceived of as the ‘scientific image’ of 
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the world. So, in Sellars’s picture, there obtains a reality  external to our cognitive activity, a 
reality  which must obtain if we are to make sense of empirical cognition, directed towards an 
independent objective reality. Hence external constraint functions outside of the operations of 
the Understanding.
 This account, according to McDowell, would then require an impossible sideways on 
viewpoint of how our empirical concepts, and thoughts, are related to the objects as they are 
situated in external reality. McDowell, unlike Sellars, precisely does not come to associate 
external reality with the transcendental, nor does he posit a role for sheer receptivity, 
something which he sees as, somewhat ironically in Sellars, a version of the Myth of the 
Given. McDowell supposes that we must reject Kant’s transcendental story and ‘restrict 
ourselves to the standpoint of experience itself’.107 
 However, claims McDowell, we do in fact  find in Kant an account in which ‘reality is not 
located outside a boundary that  encloses the conceptual sphere’.108  This reality, the reality 
which can provide the necessary external constraint upon thought, consists in the ordinary 
objects of perception, objects which, unlike Sellers’s transcendental constraint without the 
Understanding, McDowell maintains to be within the bounds of our conceptual capacities.
 So it is important to McDowell’s picture that external constraint is performed by the 
ordinary  objects of perception themselves, those objects which are visually  present in 
intuition. In this way is the very  visual subject matter of the conceptual actualisation within 
experience externally constraining thought. The content cannot be understood, or actualised in 
the way McDowell stipulates, without the relation to the ostensible object of sight. Objects are 
visually in view as actualisations of conceptual capacities, those actualisations that occur in 
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sensory  consciousness. And the concepts which figure in corresponding perceptual judgment 
are dependent upon those objects as they are visibly present in intuition.  
6. External Reality: Conceptual Content 
McDowell: “We seem to need rational constraints on thinking and judging, from a reality external to 
them, if we are to make sense of them as bearing on a reality outside of thought at all.”109
McDowell: “When we try to acknowledge the need for external rational constraint, we can find ourselves 
supposing there must be relations of ultimate grounding that reach outside the conceptual realm 
altogether. That idea is the Myth of the Given, and of course the conception I have described makes no 
concession to it.”110
 McDowell’s acknowledgement of an ‘external reality’ which rationally and externally  
constrains thought ought to be understood as complementing his notion (discussed in the 
previous Chapter) of how it is that the non-conceptual object figures in rational relations with 
perceptual thought. In that  context of rational entitlement, it was explained how McDowell’s 
positing of conceptual content in experience itself should not be construed as denying a 
rational role for the non-conceptual to play in relation to empirical thought (as Travis’s 
Condition would suppose).  And so in the same way, ‘external reality’ – ‘perceptible reality’ – 
as the domain of the non-conceptual should not be taken as excluded from participating in 
verdictive relations with empirical thought. 
 A notion which is however excluded from McDowell’s picture is that  ‘external reality’, 
constituted by those non-conceptual objects of perception, can participate in such rational 
relations without, or outside of, conceptual capacities. The picture of intelligibility which 
McDowell specifically  wishes to break with is that ‘external reality’ constitutes the (sole) 
domain of the objective – in respect  to verdictive answerability. A picture which supposes that 
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the non-conceptual object is that relatum which, in itself and outside conceptual capacities, 
can normatively  determine the correctness of perceptual judgment. That, for McDowell, 
would be to fall into the Myth of the Given. 
 As McDowell’s account would have it, capacities that belong to reason, to our rationality, 
must be drawn upon in the subject’s being so related to the non-conceptual object. The 
perceptible ‘external reality’ does not exert rational constraint upon our thought, nor can we 
be thus ‘open to reality’, without  the passively actualised conceptual content of experience. 
So, in order for ‘external reality’ to rationally bear upon thought, it must do so via the 
passively  actualised content of intuition. And so, alternatively conceived, that which 
fundamentally determines the truth of our perceptual thoughts is, for McDowell, ‘perceptible 
facts’. 
7. Conceptual and Non-Conceptual  – The Interrelationship between the Two Layouts: Layout 
of Reality and Layout of The World 
McDowell: “But that things are thus and so is also, if  one is not misled, an aspect of the layout of the 
world : it is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of receptivity puts us into 
a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. Experience enables the layout of 
reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks” 111
McDowell: “ [...] Travis suggests that my condition, which as I have explained he conflates with the 
Condition, commits me to something akin to that conflation of two conceptions of layouts […] If  someone 
sees that there is a red cube in front of her, that there is a red cube in front of  her is, as I understand 
things, a direct articulation of (some of) the content of  her visual experience, not, as in the conception 
Travis foists on me, an object of her experiential awareness. That there is a red cube in front of  her is not 
something she sees in anything like the sense in which she sees the red cube.” 112
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 McDowell’s picture of empirical thought and answerability  has two respective ‘layouts’ 
operating. The first is what we may  call the ‘layout of the world’, the conceptual layout, 
which is understood as the world of fact – everything that is the case – and so its aspects are 
constituted by propositional contents. The complementing layout is the ‘layout of reality’. It is 
the non-conceptual layout, and its aspects are constituted by non-conceptual objects. Both 
such layouts are understood as rationally informing perceptual thought.
 However, whilst  the non-conceptual ‘layout of reality’ does indeed provide external 
constraint upon empirical thinking, it does not  provide such external constraint outside of the 
conceptual content of experience. So understood, the ‘layout of (external) reality’ can only 
come to rationally inform perceptual thought via the layout that it complements, the ‘layout of 
the world’. In other words, the ‘layout of reality’ can only come to exert a rational influence 
upon empirical thought via perceptible facts.
 So, whilst McDowell is adamant that his picture be seen as not conflating the two notions 
of ‘layout’, there are, according to his account, significant associations operating between the 
two layouts. Both layouts, in a sense, operate together, so that rational external constraint is 
provided for in empirical thought. While we certainly must be careful so as not to conflate the 
two respective layouts, and thus the object and content distinction, it  is, however, essential to 
McDowell’s account that the two layouts are seen as operating in unison in the context of 
external constraint upon thought. Openness to one is ensured only by openness to aspects of 
the other. 
 In order to avoid unnecessary  confusion between the two layouts, it is necessary  to come 
to terms with the palpable metaphors and literal aspects of McDowell’s account. This involves 
providing an account of McDowell’s ‘perceptible facts’.
104
8. External Reality, ‘Perceptible Facts’, and the Objects of Sight
McDowell: “The thinkable contents that are ultimate in the order of  justification are contents of 
experience,  and in enjoying an experience one is open to manifest facts, facts that obtain anyway and 
impress themselves on one's sensibility” 113
McDowell: “It would indeed slight the independence of reality if we equated facts in general with exercises 
of conceptual capacities – acts of  thinking – or represented facts as reflections of  such things; or if  we 
equated perceptible facts in particular with states or occurrences in which conceptual capacities are 
drawn into operation in sensibility – experiences – or represented them as reflections of such things. But it 
is not idealistic, as that would be, to say that perceptible facts are essentially capable of impressing 
themselves on perceivers in states or occurrences of the latter sort; and that facts in general are essentially 
capable of being embraced in thoughts in exercises of spontaneity, occurrences of the former sort” 114
McDowell: “On my conception, to enjoy an experience in which all goes well is simply to have a fact 
available to one, so that it can be normatively behind a judgment one might make” 115
 To begin with, McDowell’s Mind and World account certainly does not  make the 
distinction between external reality and perceptible/manifest facts as explicit as it perhaps 
ought to. Much confusion potentially surrounds McDowell’s notion of ‘perceptible facts’. It is 
precisely in this context that  it is essential to maintain the distinction between the two layouts, 
the layout of the world of facts and the layout of the external reality of objects.
 A fact, or that such and such is the case, ought not to be conceived as true propositional 
content in a sense removed from the object that it refers to, as if ‘facts’ and ‘objects’ were 
ontologically separable. The idea of a ‘perceptible fact’ – the perceiving aspect – is a means of 
reinforcing the incorporation of the very object in the thinkable contents of experience. We 
see that such and such is the case. So the contents of our thoughts, in such cases, are not 
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merely a cognitive achievement; the empirical contents are also bound to a visual 
achievement. 
 The non-conceptual object  is not a fact, nor does it  itself constitute a state of affairs. 
However the object as perceived can come to inform the facts and the thoughts which are 
directed towards it. Indeed the visible object so featuring is precisely what makes the content 
of an intuition a ‘perceptible fact’. Whilst  we do not see the content of intuition, nor the 
content of thought, the object that  is literally  visible in having something in view does come 
to rationally inform, and can be exploited to make explicit, the content of our empirical 
thought. In this way, in coming to think in the sensory in conceptually shaped intuition, we at 
the same time enjoy ‘perceptible facts’.   
 As discussed above, ‘external reality’, according to McDowell’s account, can in fact 
rationally constrain empirical thought; however, it can only  provide such constraint via the 
conceptual content of experience. That passively actualised content of experience can also 
constitute what McDowell calls ‘perceptible facts’. The content of experience, a purported 
‘perceptible fact’, is indeed such a fact, on the provision that the object that it  is purportedly 
about is related to the content of experience precisely in the right way. That is, the object is 
there in the subject’s surroundings and is how the content purports it  to be. So, McDowell’s 
notion of external reality  (as object) is in a sense, subsumed by, or a constituent feature of, his 
notion of perceptible facts.
9. ‘Impress’?
 That McDowell supposes that facts ‘impress’ themselves upon us, upon our sensibility, is 
perhaps McDowell at his most metaphorical. The idea that in perception objects (not content) 
‘impress’ themselves upon sensibility is, to be sure, already  metaphorical. Unproblematically 
so, as in ordinary everyday  language, objects are certainly said to ‘impress’ upon us in the 
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visual context. However the notion that facts, conceived as conceptual content, ‘impress’ 
themselves upon sensibility goes above and beyond the ordinary conceptions of the 
intelligibility  of ‘impress’. The use of such metaphors by McDowell does indeed contribute 
much to the idealistic confusion surrounding his account of perceptible facts. 
 So given that objects unproblematically impress themselves upon us in experience, the 
idea that facts ‘impress’ themselves upon us should not lead us to conclude that facts, like 
objects, obtain in the layout of external reality. McDowell’s use of the term ‘impress’ in this 
context can mean nothing other than a further metaphorical amplification of the notion that  in 
experience, conceptual content is given, and the given content is bound to receptivity – indeed 
to sensibility.
 So to maintain, as McDowell does, that the content of experience is a ‘perceptible fact’, 
and that facts ‘impress’ themselves upon sensibility, does not mean that we literally see the 
manifest/perceptible facts.116 ‘Perceptible facts’ are not literally in our surroundings, situated 
in the domain of objects. We do not enter a causal relationship with facts, like we do the 
objects of sight. In (veridical) perception we literally see the objects in our surroundings and 
have experiences that take the facts about aspects of visual objects as their contents. This 
leads us then to the notion of ‘openness to reality’.
 As discussed, the image of ‘openness to reality’ is intended to capture the notion that in 
perception we literally  perceive, via the operations of receptivity, a reality  which obtains 
independently from our activity of thinking, viz,. the realm of the non-conceptual. However, 
even though it maintains such independence, as McDowell would have it, this external reality 
which we literally perceive is not independent from the content of thought. Visible reality, the 
visible ‘layout of reality’, presented to mind via the sensory, can itself come to feature in the 
107
116 This is not to deny that seeing a ‘perceptible fact’ includes a literal aspect, viz,. we literally see the objects immediately in view, 
and such a seeing is necessary for a fact to count as a ‘perceptible fact’.  
determination of the content of thought. So external reality, as the realm of objects, stands 
independent from our exercise of thinking; however, it is not situated outside of an outer 
boundary to what is thinkable. It comes to figure in our thinking via McDowell’s notion of 
perceptible or manifest facts. So, in the context of rational external constraint  upon thought, 
we are open to reality, the reality  of objects that are independent of our thinking about them, 
because we are open to such facts in perception. The ‘openness’ aspect of the phrasing is a 
metaphor meant to capture the notion that we are involuntarily  given conceptual content in 
experience.  
 To reiterate, we do not literally see perceptible or manifest facts, as we literally  see the 
objects of external reality. That would conflate the object  and content of perception. Such 
facts manifest themselves only with the requisite conceptual articulation – be it  in the context 
of thought or in overt  speech.  Hence the contents of such facts are expressible, they are not 
the literal object of external reality. And yet perceptible or manifest facts are only available to 
cognition if one is actually  perceptually related to the literal objects of sight via receptivity. 
Understood in this way, being ‘open to facts’, also constitutes being ‘open to reality’. The 
literal perception of reality, the objects in our surroundings, is incorporated within 
McDowell’s notion of being ‘open to manifest facts’ in experience. The use of ‘openness’ 
illuminates the inseparable association between the two layouts – the layout of reality and the 
layout of the world as fact – and thus the object / content relationship  in experience as 
McDowell understands it. 
 As mentioned, if all goes well, the content of experience and the content of judgment may 
well amount to a fact and so constitute an aspect of the world – as McDowell says: ‘when one 
thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the case’.117  McDowell maintains, however, that it 
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would ‘slight the independence of reality’,118 if we were to equate facts with such exercises of 
thinking or sensible impressions. 
 Facts, for McDowell, have an independence which obtains beyond the mere particular 
exercise of thought, or how things may be impressed upon us and represented as so in passive 
experience. McDowell’s notion of facts which ‘obtain anyway’ therefore ought to understood 
as a reaction to an unacceptable idealism – a reaction that  insists upon the independence of 
facts, as they relate to perceptual thought.
 And yet the ‘reality’ McDowell is referring to above, the one potentially ‘slighted’, is 
indeed the non-conceptual realm of objects. Which, as discussed, is to be distinguished from 
the layout of perceptible facts. So McDowell is somewhat equivocal in his expressions in this 
context. That is, when insisting upon the ‘independence of reality’ – a reality which 
‘impresses’ itself upon us in experience – McDowell does not speak of the independence of 
‘objects’, rather, he speaks of the independence of ‘facts’. Such equivocalness, without a 
doubt, facilities certain idealist  interpretations of McDowell, viz., that facts constitute the 
literal objects of sight. 
 For McDowell, in fact, independence obtains at the level of both object, in respect to 
external reality, and also content, in respect to facts. That is to say, the layout of both the 
world and external reality obtains independently  from how it is represented to be in intuition, 
empirical thought, or overtly said to be. We can dissolve such potentially  problematic 
equivocations, as mentioned above, by  an analysis of how independent external reality  itself 
comes to inform, externally constrain, propositional facts themselves. So that the 
independence of perceptible facts is accounted for (in part) in virtue of the fact that literally 
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visible external reality is independent from our thinking – and so perceptible facts ‘obtain 
anyway’ because the literal objects of perception obtain anyway, outside of our thinking.  
 Certainly, the independence of objects goes some way in accounting for the idea that 
facts ‘obtain anyway’. However, this does not  provide the entire account of that 
independence. And for this we must return to the notion of ‘how things are’, defined as ‘how 
things can truly be said to be’, and the content and normativity provided by social norms.
10. Independence of Facts as the Content of Social Norms 
McDowell: “I have been talking in terms of thought subjecting itself  to the authority of objects. And the 
suggestion I want to consider is about how to understand this concession of authority to objects. The 
concession is dictated by the norms that constitute the content of concepts, empirical concepts in 
particular. Those norms are what give determinate shape to the ways in which we take it to be correct to 
let our thinking be controlled by its subject matter.  So – the proposal goes – we need to inquire into the 
source of the normative authority of concepts. And now, first, the self-determination idea requires that we 
take those norms to be laws we make for ourselves. And, second, we cannot spell out that image in terms 
of single individuals giving themselves the law. We can understand the authoritativeness of conceptual 
norms only as instituted by communal activity” 119
McDowell: “The norms that constitute the content of empirical concepts are determinations,  responsive to 
the specifics of the world as it presents itself to us,  of norms that are internal to thinking as such.   So the 
external constraint I have been talking about,  constraint by objects, is authorised from within the practice 
of thinking, by norms that are constitutive of the practice […] Fundamental norms for thinking cannot be 
seen as instituted by thinkers; as soon as one is a thinker, one is already subject to such norms.” 120
 Objectivity in empirical thought, that is, thought that is answerable to the empirical 
world, is for McDowell not simply dictated by  the non-conceptual object. Rather, the very 
function of verdictive answerability can be seen as dependent upon the content of social 
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norms. Social norms that not only make empirical thought possible in the first place, but 
which are constitutive of the very practice of thought itself. 
 This in essence comprises an aspect to empirical thought which could be labelled the 
‘self-determined objectivity’ of empirical thinking. This similarly ensures the independence of 
facts from a particular exercise of thought, and yet it does not put the source of objectivity out 
of reason’s reach. Rather, and as will be discussed, this self-determined objectivity is a very 
constituent of rationality itself, such that truth itself, as it relates to verdictive answerability, is 
determined by the social practices which themselves make thought possible in the first place.  
 That McDowell associates ‘how things are’ with ‘how things can be truly sayable to be’ is 
only given its full significance in the context of the content of social norms. The wider picture 
of facts ‘obtaining anyway’ incorporates these more self-determined aspects of empirical 
thought, located at the level of the communal and social aspects of language and practices. 
While coming to define the rational self-determining capacities of all language users, the 
content of such social norms is also inherent in the very idea of objectivity in thought.  
 Of course, we are not answerable to the world of empirical facts, and then somehow 
answerable to something else, something further removed, like the content of social norms. 
Rather, as McDowell would have it, in making ourselves answerable to the world, to manifest 
facts, we are at the same time making ourselves answerable to the content of social norms.  
 In fact, as McDowell would have it, the very authority of objects over our thinking is to 
be understood as made possible by  the content of social norms. Such norms dictate the 
content of our concepts – content  which is understood as the manifestation of a rational 
response to those non-conceptual objects. And so with empirical thought understood as 
having a content constituted by such social norms, thought is unavoidably  answerable to those 
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very norms. To exploit such content in thought is indeed to make oneself answerable for the 
correctness of the use of the relevant concepts, according to the social norms.
 Because the content of social norms is inherent in the very practice of thinking, and in the 
content of thought itself, such normative practices are therefore operative in shaping the 
content of facts themselves. There is no understanding how things can be truly said to be  – 
states of affairs – without such norms informing exactly  what it is that is being asserted in the 
first place. 
 Social norms therefore provide an inherent aspect to the objectivity  of thought – an 
aspect of the normative constraint upon empirical thought. Such practices can inform the truth 
or falsity  of a propositional thought, because those practices determine whether or not the 
content of a thought can indeed be reckoned to constitute things as they are truly said to be.  
 Social norms thus inform all of the subject’s background practices and the very  
possibility of any rational relation whatsoever to any object of perception. One is not 
answerable to one’s own purported norms, inherently private to the individual. The truth or 
falsity of the content of experience, and empirical thought, thus ought to be understood as 
making oneself answerable to the content of those social practices. With the passive 
actualisation of the content of experience, and the factual content it may  provide, we thus 
immediately and unavoidably make ourselves answerable to those self-legislated laws of 
normativity.  
 Their normative authority over thought, again what we might  call the self-determined 
objectivity provided by social norms, therefore obtains anyway, that is, independent from a 
particular subject’s thought. So the authority  which those norms have over one’s thinking, 
McDowell claims, is not a creature of one’s recognition.121  Indeed, the content  of social 
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norms, the authority it so constitutes, is inherent in the very practice of thinking itself. As 
McDowell maintains, ‘as soon as one is a thinker, one is already subject to such norms’.122  So 
whilst the authority provided by social norms ought to be understood as in a sense self-
legislated, the self-legislation occurs in a communal context, and so is instituted and inherited 
by communal activity.123 
 So, certainly facts are independent from the exercise of thought. One aspect of this 
independence is due to the fact that ‘perceptible facts’ pertain to the external reality of literally 
visible objects in our immediate surroundings. However, that empirical facts obtain anyway 
can now also be understood via the notion of social norms, norms which are laws we make for 
ourselves. Such normative laws provide their own contribution to the picture of verdictive 
answerability and the overall picture of objectivity in McDowell. 
11. Different Facts Available 
 In any  particular perceptual context, the world as fact, as it functions as an external 
constraint upon perceptual thought, is indeed bound to the particular ‘world view’ and 
conceptual capacities of the individual perceiver. The available facts on offer, in any given 
intuition, which can be taken up in thought, are restricted to those that the particular perceiver 
is in fact capable of exercising in conceptual capacities, viz., judgment. If the relevant 
capacities are not in place, and so do not constitute a conceptual capacity of the subject, then 
there obtains no ability to take them up in thought, in which case they are not passively 
actualised in experience. So openness to the world, via the facts given in intuition, is only as 
extensive as the ‘world view’ in place to actualise it. 
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 Because we are ‘open to the world’ in experience with propositional content, and the 
world, as stipulated by  McDowell is precisely this propositional content, one’s ‘world view’ 
will determine just how ‘open’ one is to the manifest facts. This variance in respect to 
objective constraint, as I will discuss later, merely reflects the different capacities for 
judgment and thus freedom – different capacities for being ‘open to the world’ – which hold 
between subjects, given their respective ‘world views’.
 So characterising the ‘objective’ as propositional thinkables also informs another critical 
aspect of McDowell’s ‘idealism’. McDowell’s position is idealist  in the sense that the 
objective constraint operating upon the rational entitlement of each respective subject may 
differ according to the respective conceptual capacities capable of being exercised in 
judgment. And yet, although there may obtain this conceptual capacity variance at the 
individual level, this does not threaten the objective footing of ‘the world’. Objectivity as fact 
obtains anyway, independently of how we take, say or see the facts to be.
12. Unboundedness and Objective Purport
McDowell: “We can formulate the point in a style Wittgenstein would have been uncomfortable with: 
there is no ontological gap between the sort of thing one can mean, or generally the sort of thing one can 
think, and the sort of  thing that can be the case. When one thinks truly, what one thinks is what is the 
case. So since the world is everything that is the case, there is no gap between thought, as such, and the 
world.”124 Of course thought can be distanced from the world by being false, but there is no distance from 
the world implicit in the very idea of thought.”125
 With McDowell’s proffered reading of Kant the conceptual realm has no ‘outside’, there 
is no outer boundary to the conceptual, nor an outer boundary to thought. Perceptual judgment 
does not have to ‘break outside’ of the conceptual in order to make contact with the 
particulars, the objects in the surroundings, viz., the layout of external reality.
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 McDowell’s account of how there is no such outer boundary to the conceptual is given via 
the passively actualised content of experience. As discussed, this given content, if true, is also 
a perceptible fact. So because the world is understood as everything that is the case, and 
sensory  experience has propositional content, McDowell thus maintains that there is no gap 
between thought and the world. 
 This however, as I will now discuss, is only  one aspect to the ‘no gap’, no ‘outer 
boundary’, picture of McDowell’s. Once again the point concerns the connection McDowell 
makes in Mind and World between the very content of thought and being answerable to 
experience. 
 Even with no gap  between thought and what can be the case, there still potentially remain 
problematic idealist  concerns. With no outer boundary to the conceptual, due to the given 
propositional content of experience, and McDowell’s insistence upon conceiving of the world 
as everything that is the case, which again is propositional content, together these two notions 
may nevertheless culminate in a problematic idealism – in which the independent existence of 
external reality (the realm of objects) is indeed slighted. 
 This requires further examination of McDowell notion of content, specifically the sense 
of empirical thought. I’ll begin with a discussion in respect to objective purport, and how 
empirical thought does not get its bearing upon the world from without, or from sideways on. 
Its objective purport, its world-directness, is rather a constituent feature of the content itself. 
And so this quickly brings us to Frege.
McDowell: “But in disallowing the question what those conceptual capacities are exercised on, I do not 
disallow the question what the conceptual content that are passively received in experience bear on, or are 
about. And the obvious answer, if the question is asked in general form, is: they are about the world, as it 
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appears or makes itself  manifest to the experiencing subject, or at least seems to do so. That ought not to 
activate a phobia of idealism.”126
McDowell: “A thought is already to the effect that things are thus-and-so. It does not acquire its bearing 
on the world when someone affirms it inwardly in judgement or outwardly in assertion. And when we do 
focus on singular terms, it needs no detail of interpretation to see that for Frege having an object in mind 
can only be entertaining a thought partly determined by a singular Sinn. There is no need for a further 
step — advancing from a thought to a truth-value — in order to arrive at a position in which one's mind is 
directed towards the associated Bedeutung. One's mind is already directed towards the associated 
Bedeutung just by virtue of  entertaining a thought determined by the relevant Sinn. But the point 
becomes especially vivid with Evans's insight that,  consistently with Frege's basic principles,  a singular 
Sinn can actually be object-dependent. Evans's version of Fregean thinking makes it especially clear that a 
move from Bedeutung to Sinn is not a withdrawal from directedness at extra-mental reality”.127
 According to McDowell, the passively  actualised content of experience – as discussed in 
the context of ‘appearings’ and ‘perceptible facts’ – is distinctly already bound to the sensory 
impressions of experience. And yet, McDowell insists that even with such inseparability of 
receptivity and spontaneity in experience, this ought not to prevent the idea that the passively 
actualised conceptual content of intuition nevertheless bears upon the world – the world here 
understood as the external reality of the non-conceptual. Again the point here is to mitigate 
against a problematic idealism.  
 With McDowell’s model of judgment and intuitional content, we do not begin with, or 
assume from the outset, the very  content of empirical judgment, and thereafter undertake the 
task of then ensuring that it is connected with the reality  outside of itself. Such an account of 
objective purport would, in a sense, begin at a juncture too late. 
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Rather, judgement in McDowell’s model is the endorsement of content which is already, as 
given, directed towards the world. And so with the necessary  endorsement, the content of 
empirical thought becomes one and the same with the given content of intuition – thus 
thought itself comes to ‘bear upon’ the world.
 McDowell claims that such content is about the world as it appears to the experiencing 
subject. This should not be confused with the propositional ‘appearings’ which were discussed 
earlier. Nor should McDowell’s mention of the world as it makes itself manifest be 
understood as perceptible/manifest facts. The world, as it ‘appears’ to the subject, is the layout 
of external reality, its aspects constituted by the non-conceptual objects. This is what the 
propositional ‘appearings’ bear upon – the non-conceptual objects visibly in view via 
experience. 
 The content of thought bears upon the objects which are visibly before the experiencing 
subject. The content of intuition, as passively actualised in receptivity, thus already bears upon 
the world. It does this as given, no cognitive/intentional activity  makes it do so. So we do not 
start with propositional content that is not  world-directed, and move to a stance which 
subsequently  becomes world-directed. The thought does not acquire a bearing upon the world 
when it is affirmed in judgment. 
 Now, although McDowell utilises Kant’s ‘Clue’ in the context of rational entitlement and 
the form of verdictive answerability, for what he sees as the necessary purpose of avoiding of 
the Myth of the Given, the idea that the content of intuition and judgment is intrinsically 
world-directed is a notion which McDowell appropriates from Frege’s model of judgment. 
Specifically, the content of thought, its sense, is, according to McDowell’s reading of Frege, 
dependent upon the object of reference, as it is visibly in view. 
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 So it is from McDowell’s particular exploitation of the ideas of Frege that we can come 
to fully appreciate McDowell’s notion of the ‘unboundedness’ of the conceptual sphere. 
Indeed, McDowell makes it clear in Mind and World (and elsewhere) that the conceptual 
sphere is not to be associated with the predicative but rather with the Fregean realm of sense. 
So again, as McDowell makes clear in the Introduction to Mind and World, we can see how 
the questions of experience passing verdicts and the possibility of thought are bound together.
13. Content, Facts, Sense and Objects
McDowell: “The Sinn expressed in an assertoric utterance is what one says in making the utterance. What 
one says is, schematically, that things are thus-and-so, and that things are thus-and-so is what is the case, 
if  one's assertion is true. And something that is the case is, in a quite intuitive way of speaking, a state of 
affairs.”128
McDowell: “Something that is the case, a fact, is something that can be truly said, or thought, to be the 
case. A fact is a true thought, in the sense in which a thought is the Sinn expressible by a sentence, perhaps 
on an occasion.”129
 McDowell’s picture of objectivity proceeds like so: he closes the gap between (true) 
judgment and facts, he closes the gap  between a (true) thought’s sense and facts, he then in 
turn closes the gap between sense/facts and the realm of reference and  external reality.
 As discussed previously, McDowell situates how things are and states of affairs upon the 
right hand side of Frege’s line, that is, upon the side of sense. This is indeed how his change 
in the picture of intelligibility takes shape. With this change, facts as propositional contents 
thereby constitute the relevant aspects of the right hand side layout of the world.  This 
therefore implies that determinate states of affairs, facts, are associated with thinkable 
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contents. So in closing the gap between thought and facts, McDowell also closes a gap 
between sense and facts. 
 Thoughts are senses which are expressible by whole sentences. The sense of an utterance, 
of an overt expression, is what one says with that utterance. What one says is that things are 
thus-and-so. Now in the context of Wittgenstein’s truism, that very same thing, provided that 
that which is said is indeed true, can be what is the case, a perceptible fact even. So, in this 
way the sense of a thought can be the very same thing as that which is the case – or, otherwise 
conceived, a state of affairs. Therefore, according to McDowell, there is no gap between sense 
and fact. A fact is simply a true thought.
 So closing the gap  between (true) thoughts and facts is enabled by closing the gap 
between facts and the sense of a (true) thought. As McDowell says in the context of his 
reference to Wittgenstein: there is no gap between what one (truly) says and what  is the case. 
Because content and facts are so aligned, McDowell can claim that meaning stops nowhere 
short of facts. The point becomes tautological, but it reveals an important aspect  to 
McDowell’s picture. We can see that the story  of meaning, thought and fact all go together. 
Again we can see answerability and the story of content going hand in hand.  
 Moreover, in McDowell’s picture, because facts and sense can be one and the same, the 
very object of reference comes to be incorporated into the content of thought as well as 
perceptible facts. I will now discuss this.
McDowell: “What we find in Kant is precisely the picture I have been recommending: a picture in which 
reality is not located outside a boundary that encloses the conceptual sphere."130 
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“McDowell: “If we want to identify the conceptual realm with the realm of thought, the right gloss on 
“conceptual” is not “predicative” but “belonging to the realm of Fregean sense.”"/> 
“McDowell: “Evans's Frege enables a synthesis between acknowledging that contextual relations between 
subjects and objects matter for determining the contents of thoughts, on the one hand, and giving full 
weight to the idea that thinking is an exercise of rationality, on the other. This can be seen as a substantial 
contribution to a project that goes back at least to Kant,  and that is beset with difficulties in the 
intellectual environment of modern philosophy: integrating our rational powers with our natural 
situatedness in the world.”131
 As already noted, McDowell’s model of the relationship between judgment and the world 
(as propositional fact) was such that the world and what was judged to be so were one and the 
same if the judgment were in fact true. So the first point to be made, and indeed the more 
obvious point, is that there is no distinct ontology between the world and (true) thought given 
their common propositional content. To assert no ontological gap in this respect is tautological 
given that McDowell conceives the world as the totality of propositional facts.
 However, while there may  be no ‘gap’ in this respect between thought and the world as 
fact, McDowell’s stipulation of the world (as fact) may then be susceptible to the criticism 
that, via mere semantics and word play, he has simply displaced the problem of thought and 
external reality elsewhere, that is, to the relationship between objects and thought. 
 So if indeed the full significance of McDowell’s purpose in respect to ‘no ontological 
gap’ were to be left  there, that is, merely  between facts and intentional thought, its greater, 
indeed its much deeper significance, would indeed be lost. If facts are to be understood as true 
propositions about external reality, a reality which obtains outside our own thinking minds, 
then this may yet again signify a ‘gap’, so to speak, between the content of empirical 
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judgment (and facts) and its (non-conceptual) intentional object. So for McDowell to simply 
posit the world as the totality of facts, does not, in itself, foreclose the possibility  of an ‘outer’ 
boundary to the conceptual – if those facts, as contents of intentional states, remain removed, 
or ontologically distinct, from their intentional objects.
 The objects of external reality, which we literally perceive in perception, certainly exist 
despite the engagement of our subjective cognitive capacities. This is precisely  why  they 
(traditionally  and commonsensically at least) constitute the realm of the objective, as the 
objects which our words and thoughts refer to.  
 McDowell’s intention in positing no gap between thought and that which is the case is in 
fact to accommodate for there being no ontological gap between mind and empirical external 
reality  – understood as that  which is made up of the very  objects of reference. McDowell’s 
world as fact  is not constituted by propositional contents that are ontologically removed from 
the (non-conceptual) objects they are about. And this is precisely  what is required in 
McDowell’s account of the objective, if his picture is not to be seen as simply shifting the 
problem of mind and world relations elsewhere. That is to say, he needs a picture in which 
propositional contents can both bear, and be dependent for their very sense, upon the 
empirical realm of objects. 
 This then requires a consideration of the very constitution of the content of perceptible 
facts and empirical thoughts, in order to appreciate how McDowell’s no gap requirement is 
not secured from without as it were, but rather via the internal aspects of a proposition’s sense 
itself. This is indeed where McDowell’s reference to Wittgenstein’s singular demonstrative 
phrases attain their full significance.
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 It is at this juncture, therefore, that we can come to appreciate the limits of the 
predicative. In order to close, or prevent, any such ontological gap, between thought and the 
world as inhabited by non-conceptual objects, something else is required on McDowell’s part, 
that is, something which goes beyond the predicative, and which can bind thinkable 
propositional content to the non-conceptual object itself, in a way which goes beyond mere 
intentionality (directedness). 
 It is this additional aspect of thought and thinkable contents which is precisely the reason 
why McDowell does not come to associate the realm of the conceptual with the realm of the 
predicative. McDowell rather, associates the realm of the conceptual with the realm of sense. 
And, according to him, the realm of sense is (ontologically) dependent upon the very objects 
of Fregean reference.  
 As McDowell would have it, in order to think the world, the realm of the conceptual must 
be more extensive than the discursively  explicit predicate of a judgement – even though the 
reach of the conceptual is only made possible provided that there is such predicative content 
in the first place. 
 Whilst a distinction can indeed be maintained between the conceptual and the non-
conceptual, McDowell’s picture seeks to dissolve a separation between thought and object, as 
if propositional thought could intelligibly exist and obtain independently of the ontology of 
objects and how that ontology reveals itself to us, viz,. in receptivity. So, when McDowell 
claims that there is no ‘gap’ between thought and the world, the much deeper point is made by 
way of McDowell’s account of meaning itself. And this immediately  brings into consideration 
the Fregean notions of sense and reference.  
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McDowell: “Consider uses of  demonstrative expressions that single out objects by exploiting their salient 
availability to perception. Describing the topic like this brings out how the determinate directedness at 
objects of  the thoughts that can be expressed with the help of such expressions depends on contextual, and 
partly causal, relations between subjects and objects  [...] Demonstrative senses can be fully Fregean 
senses that, precisely because they are partly constituted by real relations to actual objects,  reach all the 
way to the objects.”133 
McDowell : “ Again, in connection with 'yesterday' and 'today',  and 'here' and 'there', he (Frege) writes: 
In all such cases the mere wording,  as it can be preserved in writing, is not the complete expression of the 
thought; the knowledge of certain conditions accompanying the utterance,  which are used as means of 
expressing the thought, is needed for us to grasp the thought correctly.”134
McDowell: “Such de re modes of presentation would be parts or aspects of  content,  not vehicles for it; no 
means of mental representation could determine the content in question by itself, without benefit of 
context, but that does not establish any good sense in which the content is not fully conceptualised.” 135
 According to McDowell’s reading of Frege, there is no ‘gap’ between meaning, the 
content of what one thinks, and the object that the thought is intentionally  about – what the 
thought bears upon. McDowell’s take on meaning, (interchangeable with) the content of 
thought, is such that, that which can be truly said to be the case, is bound, by  way  of its 
meaning, to the very objects it  is demonstratively  about. It is in this way that McDowell 
supposes that the realm of the conceptual, and hence the realm of thought, is not somehow 
self-contained or ontologically removed from external reality and the realm of objects. 
 McDowell, following his take on Frege, secures the very ‘meaning’ of the conceptual 
contents, the concepts which are actualised in intuition and thought, to those objects of 
external reality which are visibly  afforded to us in perception. In this way the determinate 
sense of empirical thought is secured by way of the externally situated objects of reference. 
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So it is that McDowell claims that it  is external reality, as presented to one in receptivity, 
which provides the ‘final thinkable contents’ of empirical thought.136
 The realm of the conceptual extends in this way beyond the mere predicative. This brings 
into consideration particular ‘contextual’ factors. Just as contextual factors are necessary  so as 
to determine the meaning of an utterance, so also do they put into place the final thinkable 
contents of the thought itself. Just as McDowell posited ‘samples’ as providing such a role in 
the case of demonstratives, so as to thwart the possibility of a role for the non-conceptual, 
McDowell’s ‘minimal empiricism’ can be seen as resting upon a wider, general, application of 
such contextual factors in informing and determining the sense of an ostensible empirical 
thought.   
 McDowell, by way of utilising singular demonstrative terms, sought to intelligibly  
incorporate the sheer breadth of sensible/sensory features of perception into conceptual 
capacities. He did this by supposing that the particular sense of those demonstrative 
expressions was bound to their particular contextual situation, such that the sensible 
properties themselves came to inform the sense of those words and predicates which can be 
overtly expressed. McDowell thus uses the same operandi, that is, the contextual factors, in 
order to accommodate for the very  object of perception into his account of meaning, thought 
and thinkable contents. 
 In having an object in mind, the thought about it is already partly  determined by a 
singular sense. The singular sense is indeed object dependent. The thought is already  directed 
towards the associated object of reference. And so the world-directedness of thought is not 
merely a notion which pertains to issues of answerability, it is also relevant to the very sense, 
the meaning of the intentional stance, as itself dependent upon the objects of reference. So 
124
136 McDowell, Mind and World,  p. 29.
that just as meaning doesn’t stop anywhere short of the fact, meaning is itself dependent upon 
the external reality that it bears upon.  
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B. Objectivity in Travis
1. Judgement and ‘Things Being As They Are’
Travis: “Judging is exposure to error (so, too,  correctness) decidable solely by things being as they are […] 
For a given judging, things being as they are may be their being as judged, or, again, their being otherwise 
[...].” 137
Travis: “That truth can depend on how things are in that way — in the way how things are settles 
whether there is meat on the rug, e.g. — is also part of  the unfolding of the concept truth: of  what it is and 
may be. Yet it is not laws of logic which settle that,  or when, this is so. Nor do they touch on the relevant 
relata. Things being such as to make it true to say that there is meat on the rug is not a relation between 
one conceptual item and another — though, of course, if they are such, then it is so that there is meat on 
the rug. This is just, once again, the lesson of Frege’s line. 
 So reason’s reach is not the same as logic’s reach; and could not be if logic is to have any reach at all. 
The assumption crucial to the idea of a myth is not so justified […]”138
Travis: “But the non-conceptual — things being as they are, or a thing being as it is — can settle our 
questions what to think only if we can appreciate, grasp, its bearing on what is so.”139
 Travis employs the notion of ‘things being as they are’, much like McDowell, to 
grammatical situate that to which we are normatively answerable in perceptual judgment. 
Travis, however, in accordance with his rational entitlement picture, posits things being as 
they  are decisively  upon the left-hand side of Frege’s line, with non-conceptual objects. 
Hence, things being as they  are becomes associated with the non-conceptual layout of the 
reality, and not the layout of the world as fact. 
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 Travis conceives conceptual representations as only manifesting with judgment, via 
recognition and as a rational response to the non-conceptual. That which normatively 
determines the correctness of such representations are precisely  the non-conceptual objects. 
Reason’s reach, in the context of perceptual judgment, necessarily extends outside of itself 
and to the non-conceptual, and so beyond the internal logical relations of propositional 
contents. 
 So, while the function of experience may facilitate the normative determination of the 
judgment, that function operates via a mere bringing into view of the non-conceptual object. 
Travis has that which is visibly in view as what normatively determines the correctness of 
judgment: it  can pass verdicts as it is visually present – in the form of the sensible alone, 
outside of the conceptual domain. It does not pass verdicts as something in propositional 
form, and nor do the verdict-dictating objects ‘speak to us’. In this way  Travis situates things 
being as they are as constituting the realm of the objective, with the verdict-dictating non-
conceptual objects immediately in view in perception.      
 Propositional thought is thus answerable, according to Travis, to that which obtains 
outside thinkable content. So there is in fact a boundary to the conceptual in Travis’s picture, 
and beyond that boundary, lies a space for objectivity  in empirical thought. Travis thinks that 
in providing for a picture of perception, for sensibility, in which it is a mere having in view, he 
has at the same time provided for ‘objectivity’ in thought – as that which is (silently) brought 
into view by perception. 
 However, as will be discussed, Travis’s placing of the objective in perceptual judgment 
beyond the boundary of the conceptual is perhaps not as obviously  problematic as McDowell 
would suppose. Indeed, there is a mutual interdependence between the subjective and the 
objective, so that each can come to function as they do. Indeed, things being as they  are can 
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settle a question for oneself in respect to what to think, only if the relevant conceptual 
capacity is in place, so that one can appreciate its bearing upon thought. Such mutual 
interdependence is a characteristic which will be explored in the following discussion, and 
furthermore in Chapter 3 in respect to self-determining capacities.
2. Frege’s Line: and Recognition 
 To reiterate material already  discussed in Chapter 1, the Fregean division between the 
conceptual and the non-conceptual is not itself an issue in dispute between Travis and 
McDowell. Nor is there disagreement between distinguishing propositional content, as being 
general in form, and the non-conceptual object  of perception, as an instance of the conceptual. 
However, Travis and McDowell do differ as to which side of Frege’s line provides the 
normative ‘verdicts’ for perceptual judgments.  
 As discussed, McDowell supposes, on the pain of the Myth of the Given, that only 
conceptual content can intelligibly provide such ‘verdicts’, i.e. the truth status of a perceptual 
judgement is determined by conceptual content, perceptible facts, which for him are situated 
upon the right hand side of Frege’s line – the side of sense. 
 By contrast, Travis maintains that only  the non-conceptual can perform the verdictive 
role. The particular instance, situated upon the left-hand side of Frege’s line, provides the 
normative verdicts upon perceptual judgment. This is due to Travis’s account of the 
conceptual and recognition in such cases. Conceptual actualisation with propositional content 
is manifest only in an exercise of recognition, and recognising a certain instance, as an 
instance of a kind, is necessarily to judge something to be the case. To draw upon capacities 
for recognition, and so to judge something to be thus and so, is to expose oneself to error. 
Since to judge is to ‘commit’ oneself to a state of affairs, to things being a certain way. 
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So, for Travis, it  is only with the recognition of instancing relations, and the notion of 
commitment, that questions of truth and falsity emerge. The recognition of such instancing 
relations is also representative of the objective-subjective dynamics in perceptual thought. 
 As discussed, the propositional content of perceptual judgment necessarily extends 
beyond itself – due to the instancing relation. This again is part of Travis’s account of reason’s 
reach extending beyond the conceptual. It  extends outside of itself in the sense in which 
empirical thought is necessarily intentionally  about, or directed towards, the object of 
perception. Because propositional content always extends beyond itself, and manifests itself 
in the first place only with the recognition of that which it purports to reach to, propositional 
content itself cannot give the required verdictive answerability that judgment so requires. 
 Given that the conceptual is only  engaged with recognitional capacities, and the content 
is understood as general in form, Travis supposes that only something which lacks such 
generality, that which is recognised as an instance of a kind, and which is beyond the powers 
of the mind to shape and determine, can assume the mantle of the objective. Verdictive 
answerability  is hence situated, not only beyond the subjective committed propositional 
attitude of the perceiver, but beyond propositional content per se. There is no role whatsoever 
for the perceptible facts of McDowell.
3. Perception, Non-conceptual Objects, and Verdicts 
 Travis’s notion of the ‘silence of the senses’ supposes that the role, or the function of 
experience, is merely to bring the immediate surroundings into view.  Perception provides us 
visual acquaintance with the non-conceptual. This is the only function required of experience. 
 As Travis would have it, it is not the function of experience itself to recognise or 
‘commit’ oneself, nor is it to expose oneself to error, as drawing upon recognition necessarily 
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does. The task of perception is merely to bring into view the non-conceptual objects in our 
surroundings. Perception thus cannot misrepresent states of affairs, rather, this is something 
which only perceptual judgment can do. In merely  perceiving objects, no questions of truth 
are applicable. Questions of truth are only  applicable to conceptual representation. The 
objects which we perceive – and to which our judgments are answerable – are simply  there. 
Perception reveals how things are by  affording us visual acquaintance with them, thus making 
them available for recognition. As Travis sees things, that which is brought into view by 
perception, the particular instances of conceptual representation, are also what provide the 
‘verdicts’ upon the relevant perceptual judgements. 
 So in the context of recognition and the instancing relation, perception of the non-
conceptual facilitates such verdicts, simply by  having the non-conceptual object in view, that 
is, the particular object towards which a perceptual judgment is intentionally directed. The 
object itself supplies those verdicts, from outside the realm of the conceptual and thinkable 
content. In this way do the surroundings hold sway upon thought. 
 So in the same way that Travis extends the space of reasons to those non-conceptual 
objects which stand outside the conceptual, Travis has made a cognitively  significant space 
for that which is not amenable to questions of veracity. The non-conceptual instances, as 
outside the error prone exercises of conceptual capacities, thus assume the position of 
‘objectivity’ in Travis’s picture. The objective is that which is immediately in view in 
perception. The visible objects of sight, as they  are, in themselves outside of conceptual 
representation, assume the epistemic status of the objective.
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4. Social Aspects of Verdictive Answerability 
Travis: “Thought’s social nature means: I think things to be some given way only where some extendible 
range of thinkers would agree (and agree with me) sufficiently as to what would count as things being that 
way; only where, so to speak, there is a (potential) community of agreement (or of agreers) [...]”140
 McDowell maintained that answerability to objects was to be understood via the content 
of social norms. This is what I called the self-determined objectivity which was operable in 
verdictive answerability. As a background capacity, the content of such norms was understood 
as a (communal) rational response to the world which presented itself through experience. 
Conceptual content constituted by these norms was the actualised content of experience, and 
if on occasion true, it  was the very content to which judgment was verdictively  answerable, 
and the content which would be endorsed in judgment.  
 Now, according to Travis’s picture of perception, only with recognition, and the 
actualisation of conceptual capacities in judgment, in respect to the particular instance in 
view, can one enter the realm of the normative, and only thus does verdictive answerability 
become applicable. However, the complete story  of verdictive answerability is not limited 
merely to the non-conceptual object as it obtains outside of propositional thought. Indeed, 
more can be said in respect to how the non-conceptual comes to bear upon perceptual thought 
– and specifically, in respect to the social norms which feature so prominently in McDowell’s 
picture of answerability. 
 So it is necessary to illuminate the connection between an instance of a kind, located on 
the left-hand side of Frege’s line, with a community’s capacity  to determine the sense of that 
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which would count as an instance of a kind. What emerges, in Travis’s account, is that to have 
a conceptual capacity is to have a sense as to what would count as an instance of a way  for 
things to be. It is that sense which also comes to characterise a community. And it is also that 
sense which makes possible the capacity for empirical judgment which aims at truth. 
 In judgment, conceptual capacities are drawn upon in recognising and committing to that 
which is visibly in view as an instance of a kind, that is, as belonging to a certain range of 
cases. To purportedly recognise an instance, as a way for things to be, is not  only to commit 
oneself to how things are, in respect to the particular instance in view, but it is at the same 
time, by  way of the use of concepts, to submit oneself to the correct use of those concepts. So 
that upon that recognition one enters a normative space. 
 However, it is a normative space which is not limited to propositional content  – to how 
things are represented to be. It incorporates and extends to the instance, which stands 
independently from the content brought about  via recognition, and it  does this via the shared 
‘sense’ of a community. This notion therefore complements Travis’s extension of the space of 
reasons to the non-conceptual object, situated outside of his posited realm of the conceptual. 
 Now, according to Travis, that which is within our self-determining power to determine, 
what our minds can shape and influence, is the articulation of the non-conceptual. What we 
articulate in perceptual judgment is a ‘way for things to be’. And yet, in so articulating the 
non-conceptual via recognition, the correct use of those concepts in judgment is not 
individually self-determined. Indeed, those concepts have content, and a reach to a particular 
range of cases, which is determined outside of one’s self, and outside of how they are applied 
in a particular contextual setting to an immediate object of perception. 
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 Travis maintains that ‘a way  for things to be’ is only possible where a community of 
thinkers can agree as to what would count as things being that way. With the community 
defined as sharing an ability to think the thing in question. So conceptual capacities are 
acquired in a communal setting, they  depend upon shared practices, and in order to 
intelligibly  align conceptual content – the ways in which we speak – with the world – the way 
things are – conceptual capacities depend upon a shared sense of agreement  on how the two 
sides of the sensible and non-sensible (non-conceptual and conceptual) are rationally bound.
 So, the social nature of propositional thought, as something which is intrinsically general 
and sharable, is also complemented by the fact that that which counts as a particular instance 
of such a thought is a matter determined by social practices also. To recognise something as 
an instance of a kind is to immediately engage a conceptual capacity, whose correctness of 
use is determined by an (actual or hypothetical) collective group who share a sense as to 
whether the particular purported instance would indeed qualify as counting as such.141
 So, via this notion of sense, and community, we can see that, in Travis’s picture, by 
drawing upon recognitional capacities in judgment, both sides of the instancing relation 
become normatively significant  in determining the truth of a particular perceptual judgment. 
Both the articulation of a way for things to be and the way things are in themselves. 
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C. Later McDowell
1. McDowell’s Revised Account of Intuition and Objectivity
 McDowell’s new account of conceptual experience is one which yet again attempts to 
navigate a course in between Davidson and Travis. In spirit with Davidson, McDowell, so as 
to avoid the Myth of the GIven, works with a notion of rational entitlement according to 
which ‘reason’s reach extends no further than conceptual capacities can take it’. And under 
pressure form Travis, he offers an account of intuitional content  that more perspicuously 
captures the idea that intuition is a having in view of the object. 
 However, there are some interesting anomalies in McDowell’s revised picture of 
experience and objectivity. Whilst rational entitlement stems from the object presented via 
intuitional content, and so gives external constraint upon thought, that content itself is not that 
to which we are verdictively answerable. 
 So, where McDowell’s picture of verdictive answerability was such that  experience could 
intelligibly  pass verdicts upon thought because it (1) incorporated the object of perception and 
(2) encompassed content constituted by social norms, his picture is now such that there is a 
break between verdictive answerability and external constraint upon thought. 
 The content of intuition provides the external constraint upon thought, and is the content 
from which rational entitlement stems in the two kinds of rational entitlement; however, the 
content itself does not in itself provide for verdictive answerability. Indeed, the conceptual 
content constituted by social norms, that in the Mind and World paradigm allowed for 
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answerability  to objects under those norms, now only enters the picture at the level of 
judgment and recognition. 
2. Experience, Recognition and Answerability 
 While McDowell draws closer to Travis’s notion of recognition with perception as a mere 
‘bringing into view’, he remains steadfast in his commitment to avoiding the Myth of the 
Given. Indeed, avoiding the Myth of the Given is no less a requirement of McDowell’s 
picture of ‘objectivity’ in empirical thought, than it is in the rational entitlement picture. While 
it may be that McDowell no longer supposes that experience has propositional content, 
experience nevertheless remains conceptual, with distinctively  intuitional content posited as 
the new means of avoiding the Myth.
  The upshot of this, however, is that, all things considered, even with such intuitional 
content, McDowell requires no less than a picture of the objective in which verdictive 
relations obtain only  between propositional contents. Nothing in McDowell’s revised account 
would imply  that perceptual judgment is no longer ultimately  answerable to how things are – 
which, on McDowell’s account, is the world as propositional fact, with facts having contents 
constituted by social norms. So perceptual judgment is determined true on account of how 
things can be truly said to be, and not merely the given content of intuition. 
 Now Travis’s model of recognition posits a relation between the conceptual and the non-
conceptual, which in turn demarcates the divide between the objective and the subjective. 
McDowell, for his part, can accommodate Travis’s instancing relation. Yet McDowell remains 
adamant, in order to avoid the Myth of the Given, in the context  of answerability, that the 
non-conceptual, situated outside the conceptual, cannot dictate verdicts upon thought. 
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 As a consequence, McDowell’s model of experience and recognition does not give the 
non-conceptual object the role of normatively determining perceptual judgment, as does 
Travis’s model. So, while rational entitlement stems from intuitional content, which brings 
into view the non-conceptual object of perception, thought nevertheless remains answerable 
to propositional facts, which precisely  do not constitute the content of experience itself. These 
are facts that intuition puts us in a position to recognise, given suitable expertise. 
 So, in the context of recognition and the instancing relation, we are verdictively  
answerable to the factual propositional content which is actualised in recognising an 
instancing relation, and not to the non-conceptual instance recognised, as Travis would have 
it. Of course, in this way  are we also answerable to the non-conceptual object, but only via the 
conceptual, propositional content which involves concepts drawn upon in recognition.  And 
we are not verdictively answerable to the non-discursive intuitional content, outside of the 
propositional content.
3. ‘Experience and Revelation 
McDowell: “[...] I think experience directly reveals things to be as they are believed to be in perceptual 
beliefs, or at least seems to do that. But it is hard to make that cohere with supposing experiences have the 
same kind of content as beliefs”142 
McDowell: “It would be right to say I am unlike this other person in that I see that the bird is a cardinal; 
my experience reveals to me that it is a cardinal. But that is no problem for what I am proposing.  Such 
locutions — ‘I see that ...’, ‘My experience reveals to me that ...’ — accept, in their ‘that ...’ clauses, 
specifications of things one’s experience puts one in a position to know noninferentially. That can include 
knowledge that experience makes available by bringing something into view for someone who has a 
suitable recognitional capacity.”143
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 In the context of clarifying his revised account of rational entitlement McDowell claims 
that experience reveals things to be the way they would be judged to be in judgments. That 
experience is revelatory  in this way  is relevant to both kinds of rational entitlement, both that 
which involves the drawing upon recognitional capacities and the ‘carving out’ of aspects of 
intuition.
 In respect to McDowell’s revised account which involves recognition, the non-conceptual 
object – which does not as of yet draw upon the recognitional capacities of the perceiver – is 
merely ‘visually present’. We can see this in respect to the two subjects who are afforded the 
very same visual experience, yet who differ in respect to certain conceptual capacities. As 
McDowell claims in the context of the cardinal example: experiences may indeed be much the 
same in that the bird is in a sense ‘visually present’ to both. However, in the case of the 
subject with the relevant conceptual capacity, which involves drawing upon capacities of 
recognition, that the particular instance in view falls under, experience (directly) reveals to the 
subject that the thing in view is a cardinal.
 In the context of this notion of revelation, McDowell’s revised rational entitlement 
picture, offers an account of experience, just  like Travis, as a merely having in view; and in 
respect to experience as (directly) revealing, a merely having in view of the particular 
(recognised) instance. Importantly, however, as McDowell would have it, such revelation 
occurs via intuitional content. It is only by way of the given intuitional content that experience 
(given suitable expertise) can so reveal particular non-conceptual objects of perception to be 
instances of a certain kind. So it is only through the content of intuition that  the non-
conceptual instance – that which is immediately  revealed in experience – can come to have 
the rational significance that it does. 
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 Furthermore, and what remains an important distinction between Travis’s account and 
McDowell’s revised account, is that how things are, according to McDowell, is not (as Travis 
would have it) associated with the particular instance directly in view (something on the left 
hand side of Frege’s line). McDowell refuses to allow the non-conceptual objects, as so 
revealed via intuitional content, to assume the objective role of how things are. 
 Travis maintains that the instancing-relation of recognition brings into being a verdictive 
relationship  between thought and the non-conceptual object. McDowell’s picture, in contrast, 
supposes that drawing upon recognitional capacities, only facilitates an entry, so to speak, into 
a normative domain wherein the relevant contents of social norms and that which can truly be 
said to be the case normatively determine the veracity of the purported judgment. So, even 
with McDowell’s account of recognitional entitlement, we remain answerable to factual 
propositional content, rather than the non-conceptual instance which stands revealed. 
 Whilst the relevant object, recognised in a perceptual judgment as an instance of a kind, 
does indeed have a rational significance which makes possible experience as revelatory, the 
object does not then acquire the verdict-dictating status that it does in Travis’s picture. The 
object, as revealed in experience, only has its rational significance as it is incorporated in the 
propositional content. So that, that which is revealed itself only enters into the space of 
reasons as incorporated within the specification of that which is claimed to be true in relation 
to it. 
 In sum, McDowell accommodates for Travis’s insistence that perception is a mere having 
in view, however, he maintains that experience only reveals via his posited notion of 
intuitional content, and that the non-conceptual object which is directly revealed in experience 
to be the instance of a kind is not that to which we stand in verdictive relations. Despite the 
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changes in McDowell’s picture of experience and perceptual judgement – an outcome of 
certain pressures from Travis – the notion of how things are, as that to which we are 
verdictively answerable, remains bound to true propositional contents viz., to facts.   
4. Forgotten Aspects
 With the change in McDowell’s account of intuitional content, some significant aspects 
of focus in Mind and World, and the associated vocabulary, go missing. No longer is there 
reference to ‘perceptible facts’, nor to experience as passing ‘verdicts’ upon thought. In 
Avoiding the Myth of the Given, McDowell only refers to the Myth in the context of the 
necessity for conceptual content in respect to rational entitlement, he does not refer explicitly 
to ‘the world as fact’ nor to answerability  to experience – notions which lent intelligibility  to 
his navigating a path through the Myth and Davidson’s unconstrained Coherentism, invoking 
conceptual content bound to receptivity.
 Of course the picture of entitlement is bound to the picture of objectivity. Changes in the 
former unavoidably alter the picture of the latter. With the introduction of intuitional content 
and the two notions of rational entitlement, recognition and ‘carving out’, rational relations 
between judgement and the world as the content of experience do not figure as such in the 
revised story. Indeed, the disparity in respect to the content of judgment and facts as true 
propositional content, and the given content of intuition – despite McDowell insisting upon 
their common conceptual status – is one which creates incongruities in the picture of 
objectivity, as McDowell conceived it in Mind and World. So that strictly speaking, we are not 
verdictively answerable to the content of experience.   
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5. Verdicts
 In Mind and World, McDowell supposed that experience could intelligibly pass verdicts 
upon empirical thought, because the content of experience was propositional. In so binding 
the world and verdictive answerability to that  which could be truly said, it was therefore not 
such a difficult task to suppose that the content of experience, as the world, could pass such 
verdicts upon reflective judgement. The content  of experience was that things are thus and so, 
and if the experience was veridical, that content was factual – it revealed how things are by 
way of its truth purporting content.  
 That discursive content, in veridical cases, was understood as factual and itself the 
furthermost limit  of objectivity  – because the facts themselves incorporated external reality. 
How things are was associated with how things can truly said to be, and being discursive in 
kind, ‘verdicts’ came to be utilised as an appropriate metaphor – given that the content of 
experience in a sense ‘spoke’ to you and ‘told’ you how things are,144  according to such 
conceptual capacities as were in place in your case. 
 In the new picture however, the metaphor of experience as passing verdicts is strictly  
speaking, no longer relevant. This is because, as has been previously discussed, intuitional 
content, to be right in letter, is strictly  speaking, as the given, non-discursive content. As a 
consequence, McDowell’s metaphor of experience as passing verdicts is really no longer 
adequate to capture the function of intuition as he would now have it . 
 Even if we grant McDowell the intelligibility of ‘putting together’ discursive 
significances in thought, he himself acknowledges that  those significances are not separately 
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144 McDowell says : “I do not picture objects as speaking to us in the world’s own language. Objects speak to us, in the metaphor that  
fits the position I am urging, only because we have learned a human language [..] the point is that objects come into view for us only 
in actualisations of conceptual capacities that are ours.”  - McDowell,  ‘The Logical Form of an Intuition’, in Having the World in 
View: Essays on Kant, Hegel, and Sellars, p. 43.
thinkable. They obtain their significances only in the context of featuring predicatively in a 
whole propositional content. Moreover, with thought and sense understood as bound to the 
whole propositional unit, questions of answerability and truth aptness are similarly only 
applicable at the level of whole propositional contents. They do not  arise at  a sub-
propositional level. So in this way we can see that, even with the content of intuition ‘carved 
out’ and associated with discursive expressions, the content of intuition itself is not that which 
can pass verdicts upon empirical thought, nor can it be that to which we are answerable.    
 As will be shown, intuitional content no doubt figures in the picture of answerability; 
however, we are not answerable to it, outside of discursive articulation, and its ‘association’ 
with propositional units. 
6. Intelligibility of Normativity 
 McDowell’s picture of normativity  in Mind and World was such that  experience and 
judgement were normatively  related because the content of experience was of the same kind 
as that of judgment, with the contents becoming one and the same with the respective 
endorsement. Experience could thus intelligibly  participate in such normative relations with 
thought because receptivity was inextricably bound to conceptual content.
 It made sense to intelligibly  extend normative relationships to experience itself because 
receptivity was afforded a space in which it was configured with the content provided by 
social norms. McDowell’s Sellarsian empiricism had one’s ‘world view’ as implicated in 
experience itself, and as discussed, this included the actualisation of content enabled by norms 
and practices belonging to a community of language users. The picture of normativity was 
thus assisted in its intelligibility  via these social norms – indeed, normative relations were 
understood as the rational relations between contents constituted by social norms. 
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McDowell’s move was to incorporate into receptivity content which those norms provided, so 
as to integrate the very object of thought – that which provided external constraint – into the 
normative picture. In this way  the concepts were intelligibly bound to their subject matter, and 
the use of those concepts was normatively determined by their purported subject matter. 
Again, the questions of empirical content and answerability were bound together. 
 As discussed, McDowell does of course insist upon a notion of ‘answerability’ in which 
we are answerable to the objects of perception. We are answerable to the objects because we 
experience the objects via sensory intuition, and in intuition, the objects as perceived, 
passively  actualise our conceptual capacities. The object is intelligibly  authoritative in 
empirical thought, because the object, as it can figure in cognition, does so via propositional 
content. So the authority of objects is bound to the conceptual content of experience.
 In McDowell’s picture, the social norms of thought make possible that very  content of 
intuition. Objects have authority  over empirical thought because the norms which constitute 
the content of concepts dictate that authoritative position. This is how empirical thought is 
intelligibly  informed by  the subject matter of experience. The source of the normative 
authority of concepts is understood as those norms which specify the content of those very 
concepts. Such norms specify  what counts as a reason for what, i.e. what content can serve as 
a reason for what. So, when McDowell speaks of the concepts which are passively actualised 
in experience, those concepts are given the content which they have by those norms. In this 
way the norms of thought  are intelligibly implicated in the very content of experience, and 
hence, answerability to the objects of perception is implicated in that content. 
 These norms are determinative of the content of concepts and are internally constitutive 
of the practice of thinking. As McDowell says, to be a thinker is to be subject to such norms. 
To draw upon and exercise the content of those norms, norms which are constitutive of 
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thought, is to make oneself immediately answerable to their appropriate exercise (correctness 
is determined by the norms – it is internal to them). As discussed, to be answerable in thought 
is to be answerable to such norms. So we are answerable to the objects of perception, as that 
which externally constrains thought, because the authority of that constraint is made possible 
from within the practice of thinking, because the norms are constitutive of the practice of 
thought.145
 Whilst the object is externally constraining (upon judgement), the norms of thought are 
not externally constraining with respect to thinkable content; they rather, are inherent to 
thought and thinkable content itself. Those norms which are implicated in the passively 
actualized content of experience thus determine the correctness of perceptual judgment, not as 
an external aspect to thinkable content, but rather, they serve as an internal authority which 
informs both the very possibility of thought and the correctness of use of concepts.   
 This chimes well with the idea of there being no boundary to the conceptual and to 
thought in McDowell’s picture. Thus we can see how McDowell’s picture of objectivity is 
very much integrated with social norms. The bounds of thought are commensurable with the 
social norms internal to thinkable content. Those norms make the content of experience 
possible in the first place. 
 Answerability, although to objects themselves, is nevertheless answerability to communal 
norms. The capacity to recognise the requirements of reason is acquired by  initiation into 
communal practices. The authority of the norms is not individually self-instituted. So we get 
in McDowell a notion of objectivity, in which that which can truly  be said to be the case, in 
the context of those norms of thought, is also necessarily a communal activity. 
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 So, in McDowell’s Mind and World account, we were presented with two aspects to the 
picture of objectivity in thought – that is, to verdictive answerability, viz., the self-determined 
objectivity provided by the content of social norms, and also, the object of perception itself. 
As will be discussed, with the shift in McDowell’s account of intuitional content, we can now 
see a separation of sorts between these two aspects of verdictive answerability, that is, as they 
come to figure in McDowell’s picture of  intuition and perceptual judgment. 
 Intuition as a mere having in view of the object does not involve the content constituted 
by social norms. Only with discursive articulation, and recognition, do we now get such 
propositional content.  So there is a ‘fracturing’ of sorts in McDowell’s new picture. 
McDowell’s picture of objectivity in perceptual thought is left with the counterintuitive 
position that we are no longer verdictively answerable to the content of experience itself.
7. The Fracturing of Objectivity
 McDowell’s Mind and World picture of objectivity  centred around the idea of 
answerability  to the content of experience, content which was made available by communal 
practices and social norms, inherent to thought. Now, however, propositional content 
(standing as a reason and in normative relations with judgement) is removed from intuition 
itself. The manifestation of discursive content is now displaced to the function of the exercise 
of judgement, according to the two respective rational entitlement pictures put forward by 
McDowell. The exclusion of propositional content thereby entails the removal of content 
constituted by  the social norms of thought  from intuition itself – and hence the relevance of 
answerability to those norms at the level of intuitional content.
 So the way in which I wish to further explore this ‘fracturing’ of McDowell’s picture of 
objectivity is by exploiting a distinction between the norms of thought, as providing the 
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content of thought, as dictated by communal practice – and sensory intuition, which in 
McDowell’s revised account, is understood as a mere having in view, lacking in discursive 
content. This in effect marks a break between that which provides ‘external constraint’ (and 
rational entitlement), now conceived as the object as it is present in intuition, and McDowell’s 
picture of verdictive answerability. 
 With this distinction between the exercise of concepts in judgment, and intuition as 
providing the requisite non-discursive acquaintance with what those concepts are about, 
McDowell’s revised picture is one such that the content  of intuition whereby an object in our 
surroundings comes to be directly in view is not that to which we are verdictively answerable 
to. Rather, we remain answerable to facts about those objects made available by the social 
norms posited in the Mind and World paradigm – facts that ‘go beyond’ the content of 
experience as given. This is despite the fact that the acquaintance with objects which 
perception supplies us with is nevertheless a necessary constituent of the revised normative 
picture involving articulation and recognition
8. New Picture of Answerability: Answerability Only With the Discursive 
 In Mind and World, McDowell assumed that, in perception, the content of experience 
gave propositional content, yet without endorsement. And yet the manifold of content given 
was nevertheless subject to determinations of truth or falsity. As discussed, that is because that 
which was given was meaningful content, a sense. Still, however, the given thinkable content 
of experience in no way  committed one to a state of affairs, a factual assertion of how things 
are. 
 Now, Davidson claimed that the problem with propositional content in experience was 
that it  supposed that content could obtain which had no ‘subjective probability’ – a 
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propositional attitude for which we have no word (a neutral attitude). And in a similar vein of 
thought, Travis himself, made much of the fact that for propositional content to be subject to 
truth or falsity, required commitment,146 so that only commitments are right or wrong. 
 So McDowell’s Mind and World paradigm either fell into the trap of asserting a kind of 
incoherent unendorsed uncommitted propositional attitude, or it agreed that  experience with 
propositional content was in fact a ‘taking to be’, i.e. it  was something that committed one to 
something. McDowell in fact took the latter course. In Avoiding the Myth of the Given, 
McDowell readily admits that if experience has such propositional content, it  is hard to deny 
that experiencing is a taking things to be so.
  In McDowell’s revised rational entitlement picture, with the articulation of intuitional 
content into propositional content, and recognition with propositional content, you get 
endorsement for free, so to speak. So it is not the role of judgment merely to endorse a given 
content of intuition, endorsement and judgement come with discursive articulation, and with 
the recognition of that which is visibly in view. Commitment comes with thinkable 
propositional content in one’s rational response to intuition (sensory impressions).
 With the discursive articulation of the intuitional given, or in recognition, one is therefore 
immediately making oneself ‘answerable’ to social norms. Answerability is an intrinsic aspect 
to the use of concepts and their content, and hence the utilisation of those norms which are 
engaged in discursively  articulating that  given in intuition, or in recognising something on the 
basis of that given in intuition. 
 Before any  such engagement of norms, as intrinsic to thought itself, intuition in itself, 
does not, however, purport anything to be true or false. It does not commit oneself, in the way 
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of a judgment. There is no discursive conceptual content, no involvement of norms, which are 
to be determined as correctly  or incorrectly applied. Intuition as a merely bringing into view 
means that as such, there is nothing to think, nothing thought, and nothing which is purported 
to be the case. As lacking truth or falsity in this way, there is in fact nothing to be shared – 
nothing which is itself in a communicable form – and nothing which is communal in nature. 
In respect to the empirical world, only that content which can be true or false is something 
which is communal, and accordingly  has a distinct social quality. The content of intuition 
does, however, provide the necessary ‘external constraint’ upon thought. 
9. External Constraint
 McDowell, in Mind and World, made much of the fact that empirical thought required 
‘external constraint’, constraint which was understood as a function of receptivity. 
Nevertheless, the form in which that constraint operated upon empirical judgment was 
conceptual, propositional content. As I discussed, this then gave a dimension to external 
constraint which was not only receptive in character, but also constituted by social norms. 
Now, of course, external constraint was primarily  concerned about incorporating receptivity 
into the entitlement picture, the motivation was the same as avoiding the Myth; however, in 
deference to the requirements of the intelligibly normative, that external constraint had to 
operate via the given propositional content. In a sense, receptivity as external constraint was 
reconciled with the social norms of normativity. They both operated in one and the same 
given content of experience.    
 However, McDowell’s requirement for external constraint only required the rational 
integration of receptivity into the picture of entitlement. The fact that the basic unit of 
conceptual content was propositional was a (seeming) necessity coming from normativity – 
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Davidson’s amended dictum. Importantly, it was not a pressure emanating from the external 
constraint aspect.  
 In McDowell’s new picture, however, the social norms which once made possible the 
intelligibility  of incorporating external constraint within normativity are such that they do not 
figure in the given content itself, but rather, merely in the actualisation of discursive 
conceptual content in the process of judgment. Whilst the intuitional content can figure in that 
process, as external constraint, questions in respect to the correctness of the application of 
those norms only arise at the level of judgment. 
 So now at the level of the passively actualised content of receptivity, the aspect of 
normativity is such that the given content does in a sense determine the judgments which are 
to be made, but that does not coincide with determining their normative status as true of false. 
Verdictive answerability has thus expanded beyond the given content of experience, beyond 
the function of external constraint. 
 So normative constraint upon judgment, rather than external constraint, is not a story  
which can simply appeal to the actualised content of experience. The story of normative 
constraint upon judgement extends to the content of norms which obtain outside the content 
actualised in intuition itself. Of course those norms were accommodated for in Mind and 
World by  the content of intuition itself. Now those norms are accounted for outside the 
external constraint  of receptivity. The world view of the subject is something which informs 
the judgment, and it informs it outside of the function of intuitional content. So receptivity, 
operating as a normative constraint upon thought, is much diminished in McDowell’s new 
account.  
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 Normative constraint, as verdictive answerability upon empirical thought, is something 
which necessarily  exceeds the ‘external constraint’ function as provided by the content of 
experience. The actualized content of intuition, bound to receptivity, is surpassed by that 
which can truly be said to be the case. In this way the normative constraint upon judgment 
and the external constraint upon judgment are not functionally commensurable, that is, they 
are not acting as one and the same function. We can see this as an aspect of McDowell’s 
change of models, under pressure from Travis.   
10. External Constraint by Intuition as not Constraint by the Facts
 McDowell’s shift  from propositional content to intuitional content also implies that 
perceptible facts are no longer operating as the means via which external constraint applies to 
perceptual judgement, at  least not  as external constraint is given. This is because the 
perceptible facts, as with judgement, come to figure in the account only with discursive 
articulation or recognition. Facts are not the given content of experience. So external 
constraint upon judgement there may  be, in the form of intuitional content, but, as such, that 
unarticulated constraint is not constraint by the facts. 
 Where receptivity  was once inseparable from the propositional content of intuition, 
content which was no less than a fact, receptivity now in itself has less than factual 
content. Hence normative constraint upon judgment necessarily extends beyond the 
(intuitional) content given by  mere receptivity, despite its remaining within the realm of the 
conceptual. 
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11. Shift to a Focus upon the Object 
McDowell: “Intuitions as I have explained them directly bring objects into view through bringing their 
perceptible properties into view. Intuitions do that precisely by having the kind of content they have.” 147  
McDowell: “The entitlement derives from the presence to one of the object itself, not from a premise for 
an inference, at one’s disposal by being the content of one’s experience.”148
 McDowell remarks that  his new picture is one in which rational entitlement stems from 
the object and its properties. Indeed he is eager to note that there is very much a shift of 
emphasis in this respect, compared to his Mind and World paradigm. It was not that the object 
of perception did not feature in the earlier account; rather, what McDowell has now moved 
away from is how that object entitled, viz., by way of propositional content.
 Now of course, as discussed, Travis himself has a picture in which rational entitlement 
stems from the non-conceptual object itself, and to that object we are answerable in our 
judgments. So, in both respective pictures of objectivity, the object was intended to provide 
external constraint  upon thought, and so was normatively  bear upon it. For Travis it  did this 
outside of propositional content, whereas for McDowell it did this within the passively 
actualised content of experience. 
 In order to avoid the Myth of the Given, McDowell insisted upon the fact that the object 
only functioned as external constraint via verdict-dictating content situated upon the side of 
Fregean sense. As McDowell saw it, those, such as Travis, who espoused a notion of rational 
entitlement and answerability which went beyond propositional content, and thus the content 
of social norms, inevitably fall foul of the Myth of the Given. 
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 Now I have remarked on the problems faced by McDowell in investing experience with 
propositional content. So, in his revised account, McDowell breaks down the function of 
external constraint, as the intuited object in view, and normativity, as that to which we are 
verdictively answerable. In this way, he situates rational entitlement outside propositional 
content, and acquires external constraint upon judgment from the object in view via 
distinctively intuitional content, without at the same time falling foul of the Myth. 
 So, the visible object  is accommodated for in, McDowell’s revised account, as externally  
constraining via intuitional content – a non-discursive content to which we are not 
verdictively answerable, as such. The object externally  constrains and it may figure in 
entitlement. However, in order to become answerable to a verdict-dictating content that 
incorporates the object as it  is visibly present, we must rationally exercise conceptual 
capacities so as to enter a normative space constituted by  social norms. So, the anomaly which 
presents itself, on the new account, is that we are thus not answerable to experience itself, but 
rather, we are verdictively answerable to that propositional content which constitutes that 
which can be truly said about that which is visibly present in experience.
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Conclusion
 In Mind and World McDowell aligned two problems in respect to the theme of 
‘objectivity’ in empirical thinking. The first  was how a model of perceptual judgment and 
experience must be conceived so that we can in fact be intelligibly answerable to the 
empirical world. This focused into an issue concerning how it is that object-directed 
experience can come to pass ‘verdicts’ upon the truth or falsity of judgement. The second 
concern pertained to ensuring that such perceptual thought had content in the first place – part 
of which was making certain that thought had as its subject matter the objects of the empirical 
world itself. So the story of answerability was bound to the story of content, which 
collectively we can refer to as the problems of objectivity in empirical thought.  
 Now, according to McDowell, experience, conceived of as a ‘bare sensory’ impression, 
makes it  entirely impossible how to conceive that experience can intelligibly act as a 
‘tribunal’ upon thought, or how we could be answerable to it or the world. Such a lack of 
intelligibility   besets the Myth of the Given. And, whilst Davidson offered the right model (in 
spirit) for rational entitlement, according to McDowell, Davidson’s ‘Coherentism’ spurns the 
perfectly  legitimate motivation of being answerable to the empirical world, the realm of 
objects, via experience. 
 McDowell therefore comes to offer his models of experience as conceptually shaped: a 
conception of experience such that it can in fact provide for the necessary answerability to the 
empirical world and pass verdicts upon perceptual judgment. So McDowell hoped to maintain 
rational external constraint (a concern which motivated the Myth) while remaining within the 
proper structure of rational intelligibility provided by an extension of Davidson’s own rational 
entitlement picture. Experience could thus pass verdicts upon thought, because the literally 
visible objects, in a sense, ‘spoke to you’ via propositional experience. Indeed, this was how 
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the Myth of the Given could be avoided, whilst appealing to sensory experience for rational 
entitlement.  
 So, accompanying McDowell’s account of propositional experience, as discussed, was a 
decisive shift in respect to the particular ‘layout’ which could in fact intelligibly pass verdicts 
upon thought. According to McDowell, the layout which settles issues of truth in relation to 
perceptual judgements is the ‘layout of the world’ as fact – the realm of sense – and precisely 
not the non-conceptual objects themselves which pertain to the ‘layout of external reality’. 
This account, of course, included rational relations and answerability to the non-conceptual 
object; however, this occurred via verdict-dictating propositional content. In this way, the 
notion of ‘how things are’ became aligned with the notion of ‘how things can be truly said to 
be’. So that  verdictive answerability became a function of (so to speak) ‘perceptible facts’, 
which could also constitute the very content of experience itself.  
 As discussed, two primary aspects thereby come to inform McDowell’s picture of 
verdictive answerability, and the world as fact – as it comes to normatively constrain 
perceptual judgment: the non-conceptual object and the content of social norms. Indeed, it  is 
via the content of such social norms, according to McDowell, that we are to understand our 
being answerable to objects. So, in Mind and World, McDowell essentially combined the 
function of external constraint with the propositional content (facts) which normatively 
determined the truth or falsity  of empirical judgment. It was in the service of this union of 
function – external constraint and verdictive answerability  – that McDowell’s models of 
experience as intelligibly conceptually shaped, so as to overcome the incoherence of the Myth 
of the Given.  
 As discussed, Travis’s account of recognition and the function of perception as a merely 
having in view contributes to the breakdown, the ‘fracturing’, between these two functions of 
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external constraint and verdictive answerability, as they  come to figure in McDowell’s revised 
account of experience. 
  As was the case in the context of rational entitlement, Travis refuses McDowell’s notion 
of the Myth of the Given at the very outset. He in turn posits a rational relationship between 
the conceptual and the non-conceptual such that in respect to verdictive answerability: the 
non-conceptual object itself comes to normatively  determine the truth or falsity of 
propositional perceptual judgment. Indeed, Travis supposes that  he offers a rich enough 
account of what it is to have a conceptual capacity – aspects of which create a mutual 
interdependent function between the conceptual and the non-conceptual – so that any 
supposed ‘incoherence’ of objects normatively determining the truth status of a thought 
simply recedes, along with concern about the supposed Myth.
 According to Travis, the non-conceptual object can (intelligibly) normatively dictate the 
truth-status of an empirical judgment, because indeed part of having the relevant conceptual 
capacity in the first place – the ability to make the judgement with the content that it has – 
requires one to be able to identify those instances which would count as that judgment being 
true. Travis’s notion of ‘sense’ (‘counts as’) is presented as a notion which, so to speak, 
traverses the conceptual and non-conceptual divide (Frege’s line), bringing the latter (the 
objective) within the reach of the former (the subjective), and so into a verdictive relation 
with it. 
 Just as McDowell combines the two concerns of answerability and ensuring the content 
of thought, Travis’s notion of ‘sense’ can be viewed as performing a similar task.  Indeed the 
notion of ‘sense’ is offered as being fundamental to identifying the very thought in the first 
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place – so that empirical thought is not conceived of as a mere ‘cognitive prosthetic’ in 
respect to mind and world relations. 
  Travis’s notion of ‘sense’, as something which is shared within a community, also marks 
out a social dimension to having a conceptual capacity in the first place. However, where 
McDowell posits the concept-constituting content of social norms as that by  which we are to 
understand answerability  to the non-conceptual object – so that a persistent self-determined 
aspect continues to inform our rational relations with external reality within the content of 
propositional experience – Travis’s notion of ‘sense’ is, rather, merely a social and self-
determined facilitator of sorts, such that the non-conceptual object, as it stands immediately 
before one in perception, can come to be that which we are verdictively  answerable to in our 
judgments. 
 As discussed, Travis thus attempts to place things being as they are – understood as 
constituted by  non-conceptual objects – as those items to which we stand in verdictive 
relations. So that  ‘things being as they are’ (seen as pertaining to the left  hand side of Frege’s 
line) is a characterisation quite distinct from ‘how things can truly be said to be’ (seen as 
pertaining to the right hand side of Frege’s line). And yet these two aspects, both of which are 
necessary  for perceptual judgement, are bound together in rational relations, in his picture, via 
his notion of our exercising in recognition our sense of what counts as an instance of what.
 According to McDowell’s revised account of experience, one which is informed by 
Travis’s notion of recognition, the ‘bounds’ of propositional content, so to speak, are no 
longer what  they once were: propositional content no longer constitutes the given content of 
intuition itself. The unboundedness of the conceptual in this respect is performed rather by 
intuitional content, itself divested of discursive content and fully constituted ‘perceptible 
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facts’. This change, once again, creates interesting anomalies in McDowell’s account of the 
objective in empirical thought.
  McDowell, in Mind and World, supposed that experience must constitute a verdict-
dictating tribunal – mediating the way our thinking is answerable to objects in our 
surroundings. And yet it was declared at the outset that a non-conceptual conception of 
experience – as a ‘bare sensory’ impression – made it entirely unintelligible how experience 
could function as a tribunal, how it could pass verdicts upon thought. And so it was that, as a 
remedy, McDowell came to offer models of intelligibility  for a stipulated conception of 
intuition in which it takes propositional facts – aspects of the layout of the world – as its 
content. 
 And yet, in McDowell’s revised account of intuitional content, intuitional content as such 
is not in a form suitable to act  as a tribunal and pass verdicts on thought. Whilst intuitional 
content mediates our rational relations with external reality, it is, however, no better at 
functioning as a tribunal and dictating verdicts itself than ‘bare sensory’ experience, or, for 
that matter, Travis’s ‘silent’ having in view.
 In McDowell’s new picture, intuitional content, via which an object is visibly present to 
us in experience, can come to rationally  entitle perceptual judgment, and yet we are not 
verdictively answerable to that passively given content of experience itself. One of the central 
and guiding ideas in Mind and World appears to fall by the wayside with the new stipulation 
of conceptual intuition. 
 What seemingly remains in place, however, is that we remain standing in verdictive 
relations to that which can be truly said to be the case, and so to facts. This then presents the 
anomaly in McDowell’s account of objectivity: McDowell’s revised account of experience 
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suggests that we are no longer answerable to the content of experience itself, but rather to that 
content (arrived at by articulation or recognition) which constitutes that which can be truly 
said to be the case about that which is directly in view via the unarticulated intuitional 
content. So intuitional content merely  provides the rational starting point, as it were, the 
external constraint dimension of verdictive answerability, from which one can then access 
facts about  objects directly  in view, and in so doing, draw upon content-constituting social 
norms.
 With the apparent breakdown between the function of the content of intuition – via which 
the object is directly in view (external constraint) – and verdictive answerability – which 
enters the frame only  with discursive content – McDowell’s new picture, at least in the case of 
straight-out recognition149, does in a sense, come to acquire the separation in respect  to the 
functions of perception and judgment, that Travis insists upon between the object (as it 
rationally informs thought outside of propositional content) and the propositional 
representation of it in corresponding perceptual judgment. And yet, unlike Travis, the object 
as it is in itself does not normatively determine the correctness of a judgment, nor does it itself 
independently of the conceptual content of perception, figure in one’s rational entitlement to 
perceptual judgments about it. 
 So, while McDowell may insist upon a rational entitlement picture that ‘stems’ (via 
intuitional content) from the object as it is visibly present in experience, this does in fact  only 
provide only one side, so to speak, of the revised picture of verdictive answerability. 
 A subject, in the end, is only fully  entitled to a perceptual judgment they make about an 
object directly in view if the content of that judgment (arrived at from what is given in 
experience by articulation or recognition) is a fact about that  object: something that can be 
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truly  said about it. And this fact, which marks the judgment out as correctly  made, in either 
case, ‘goes beyond’ what is given in experience. 
 In McDowell’s Mind and World picture, verdictive answerability was informed by both 
the object in view and the content of social norms. Now there is a ‘fracturing’ such that 
external constraint is provided for by the object via the content of experience itself, and 
answerability, as sanctioned by content-constituting social norms, only becomes relevant 
given conceptual judgement arrived at by articulation or recognition. The function of 
experience is now no longer to pass verdicts. Rather, the function of experience is to provide 
rational external constraint upon thought – which is, of course, a necessary aspect of 
verdictive answerability, but in itself insufficient for experience to qualify as a tribunal for our 
judgments about the empirical world. 
 Pressure from Travis certainly contributes to the dissolution of McDowell’s ability to 
claim that the content of experience has verdictive authority over thought. However 
McDowell, differentiating himself from Travis, remains committed to associating how things 
are with how things are truly sayable to be. McDowell’s idealism in this respect – such that 
the world (as fact) which provides verdicts upon perceptual judgement has the very same 
form as that of judgment – remains in place. This holds despite McDowell’s accommodation, 
in his revised account, of Travis’s notion of recognition and of experience as a merely 
bringing into view. 
 It is with this idealism remaining in place that McDowell in turn loses his ability to claim 
that we stand in verdictive relations to the content of experience itself. McDowell may well 
claim that Travis ‘rides roughshod’ over a grammatical point in treating things being as they 
are as items on the left hand side of Frege’s line to which we stand in verdictive relations. Yet 
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McDowell’s revised account of experience means that experience loses some of the critical 
features that defined its significance in Mind and World – features which motivated the 
change to conceiving of experience as conceptual in the first place.
159
   Chapter 3: Self-Determination 
A. Self-Determination in Mind and World  
1. Idealism and Common Sense 
McDowell: “Any idealism with a chance of being credible must aspire to being such that,  if thought 
through, it stands revealed as fully cohering with the realism of common sense.  Kant, for instance, has that 
aspiration for his transcendental idealism. This shows in his claim that it coincides with empirical realism. 
However, because of the way he treats the forms of our sensibility, he fails to entitle himself to that claim. 
In his picture, the world as we experience it seems, in respect of its apparent spatial and temporal 
organisation, to be a mere reflection of self-standing features of our subjectivity. So the aim at a 
coincidence with realism fails.” 150 
 In Mind and World McDowell seeks to change the mode of discourse in respect to 
experience to a normative one, and so avoid what he sees as the pitfalls of the Myth of the 
Given. In doing so, it  is essential that his notion of experience, as propositional, should be 
seen as an intelligible normative counterpart to ‘common sense’. 
 Mind and World’s notion of experience as passively  actualising a manifold of 
propositional content  – so as to accommodate an intelligible mode of normativity and an 
amended version of Davidson’s dictum – is not intended to exclude the ordinary-everyday 
‘common sense’ notion of experience, according to which, in perception, we literally and 
directly  perceive objects – indeed, the perception of them is constitutive of the very idea of 
what it is to perceive. So in essence, McDowell’s picture of experience with propositional 
content must be able to accommodate the visible objects of perception – the objects which in 
a common sense understanding externally obtain independently  of our exercise of conceptual 
capacities, that is, our empirical thinking. 
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 McDowell explicitly asserts that his ‘minimal empiricism’, which can be said to 
constitute his own particular form of ‘idealism’, is intended to cohere with a kind of ‘common 
sense realism’. So what is entailed in reconciling, or ameliorating any perceived conflict 
between, a minimal empiricism on one hand, in which propositional contents are ultimate in 
normative justification, with a kind of common sense object realism, comprised of such 
common sense notions as those mentioned above?
 As already discussed, McDowell is critical of Davidson’s ‘Coherentism’ because it leaves 
empirical thought without rational external constraint. Davidson’s space of reasons, as 
McDowell sees it, is problematically  confined to beliefs. Indeed Davidson’s ‘blindspot’ 
overlooks the possibility that experience itself can provide reasons for thought. This is where 
McDowell’s amended dictum is intended to provide external constraint  upon thought while 
remaining within the rational bounds provided by Davidson’s insight into rationality, viz., that 
reasons-relations hold only between conceptual items. It is at this very juncture that we can 
situate a central aspect of McDowell’s ‘idealism’ – the notion of the ‘unboundedness’ of the 
conceptual, which accompanies the extension of the space of reasons to, and a conceptualised 
picture, of experience itself. 
 McDowell’s extending the space of reason in the way that he does – extending 
Davidson’s dictum – immediately brings into consideration Kantian intuition. As discussed, 
McDowell hopes to gain traction in respect to his higher-order concerns, namely avoiding the 
Myth of the Given, via a conceptualist reading of Kantian intuition, specifically, a functional 
role for spontaneity in intuition itself. Now although McDowell offers such a conceptualist 
take on Kantian intuition, it is essential to his project that it can intelligibly distinguish itself 
from that of Kant’s, when the need arises. Foremost of importance, is avoiding Kant’s 
problematic form of idealism. 
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McDowell writes: 
“In my Mind and World, I argue that the conceptual content of a perceptual experience can be, and if  all 
goes well is, something that is the case, an element in the world. We can see experience as directly taking in 
part of the world, because the world, understood as everything that is the case, is not outside the sphere of 
the conceptual. I remark that this can seem to be “a sort of idealism, in the sense in which to call a position 
‘idealism’ is to protest that it does not genuinely acknowledge how reality is independent of our 
thinking” (pg 26). But I work to dislodge such an appearance.” 151
 McDowell’s picture is idealist in the sense that  that which is ultimate in the rational 
entitlement picture is conceptual content, content which is intelligibly self-determined. This 
complements his notion that there is no outer boundary to the conceptual. In this way, that 
upon which empirical judgment is grounded is itself not outside thinkable content. 
Furthermore, the content which rationally entitles is dependent upon the subject’s own 
conceptual capacities. That  which can feature in and ground empirical thought extends no 
further than one’s capacity  to think it. So the bounds of normative external constraint (as 
content), in any  given perceptual judgment, coincide with the bounds of thought, and thus the 
conceptual capacities that the perceiving subject finds himself with at that particular moment 
in time. To move beyond those conceptual capacities in the story of rational entitlement is to 
fall into the Myth of the Given. In this way also we can see McDowell’s idealism as bound to 
the idea that the logical space of reasons is commensurate with the space of the conceptual.
 While McDowell’s idealism indeed has such self-determining characteristics, as will be 
discussed in further detail, his idealism nonetheless provides rational external constraint upon 
thought – external constraint which, on a certain understanding, he finds lacking in Kant’s 
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own idealist account of sensible intuition. So that while experience provides self-determined 
propositional content, such content may also constitute perceptible facts, and thus an aspect of 
the layout of the world. 
 In this Chapter I wish to explore McDowell’s idealism via the self-determining capacities 
which inform that conceptual content.152 However, given that  receptivity is just as much an 
aspect of the passive actualisation of the content, I first  wish to address the necessity of 
accommodating for the visible object of perception. This is to address and accommodate for 
the notion of ‘object  as external constraint’, and similarly, the common sense notion of the 
visible object. Of course, it is not the object as it is outside the conceptual which rationally 
entitles, but rather the object via the given passively  actualised content. The common sense 
object must be accommodated for in that very given content. So the common sense notion of 
the visible object must be accommodated for in McDowell’s idealism.
McDowell comments:
“Reworked on these lines, a Kantian conception of intuitions combines subjective self-determination with 
objective constraint, and now in a way that does not require us to qualify the sense in which what exercises 
the constraint is objective reality. On these lines we can begin to make sense, in the context of empirical 
cognition, of  Hegelian talk about a liberation from the opposition of consciousness. The objects of intuition 
are now conceived as fully objective even in respect to their spatial and temporal organization.  But their 
otherness to consciousness, at any rate perceptual consciousness, is aufgehoben; not abolished, but 
situated in a larger story so that it no longer seems to threaten the self-determining rationality of the 
subject.”153 
 McDowell’s positing of discursive propositional content as that which rationally  entitles, 
and of the world as everything that is the case, should not be taken to be displacing the visible 
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objects of empirical thought to a place outside his normative picture. McDowell maintains 
that in visual perception we experience, we directly perceive, objects and their properties. 
(Albeit this is an emphasis which comes later on in his philosophy, but something nonetheless 
always available to him, that is, in his Mind and World paradigm.) This aspect is crucial to an 
idealism which is intended to lead to realism, if properly thought out.154 
 But, of course, that is not to say that the common sense object of perception will play the 
same common sense role in the normative picture. As McDowell sees it, a picture of 
perception and perceptual judgment in which content rationally entitles is the only picture 
which can be ultimately reconciled with common sense – without such content McDowell 
claims, one is left with nothing but the Myth of the Given.
 Without  distinguishing between object and content, McDowell’s idealism could hardly be 
said to be reconciled with the commonsensical. Indeed, on McDowell’s account, we do not 
experience the world as if with subtitles, or in propositional form. Our means of experiencing 
the world and reality is via the sensory-visual. We externally see the objects in our 
surroundings. However, the contents of our experience, and our judgments about those objects 
which are visibly present, are expressed as propositions. The two notions of object and 
content are (intended at  least  as) complementary. Such a complementary  understanding of 
content and object in perception allows for a model of experience as having propositional 
content, which does not subvert ordinary notions of the visual perception of objects.
 The models that McDowell finds so useful in explicating his account of experience as a 
conceptually shaped occurrence, the ‘discursive’ models discussed previously, give expression 
to the very kind of philosophy McDowell sees himself engaged in: the therapeutic kind. This 
is set out in the introduction to Mind and World, where he speaks of a philosophy which is 
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‘diagnostic in spirit’. With diagnoses and therapy in mind, McDowell’s minimal empiricism 
does not  offer a reconfiguration of the intentional object that the discursive is related to in 
perception, as in the ‘traditional’ forms of empiricism. Such pictures do in fact slight the 
common sense notion of the visible object.
 Just as Wittgenstein analogises a ‘picture’ as holding us captive, McDowell speaks of 
‘illusions gripping us’,155  which in turn involve ‘misplaced obligations’. According to 
McDowell, only by positing passively  actualised conceptual content in intuition itself can 
there be thought with content at all. Only  then can we lay claim to the common sense: that we 
visually perceive objects, we can think of them and we are answerable to them in our 
judgments. These, for McDowell, are the common sense notions of thought and the empirical 
world which philosophical paradigms hitherto, such as Davidson’s, and those which espouse 
the Myth of the Given, have made a ‘mystery’ about.
 So as McDowell would have it, dismounting from the oscillating see-saw which he 
identifies in Mind and World, requires coming to terms with the relationship between external 
constraint and self-determining capacities, as they function in perceptual judgment. It is only 
by positing such a satisfactory dynamic that we can indeed lay claim to common sense, and 
ensure that the content and answerability  of our thought is connected with the empirical 
world. According to McDowell, it is only in virtue of positing the actualisation of self-
determining capacities in experience itself that this can be achieved. In this way, McDowell’s 
purported idealism is intended to lead to a kind of common sense realism. 
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2. Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint 
McDowell: “If a conception expressible in such terms is to fit subjective engagement with objective reality, 
the free self realisation of the concept had better itself  embody a responsiveness to constraints that are in 
some sense external. Rather than disappear from the scene, the external constraint that figures in a more 
ordinary conception of objectivity must be incorporated within what we are supposed to be shown how 
to conceive as self-determination.” 156
McDowell: “Nevertheless, reflection about the temptation to appeal to givenness in connection with 
acquiring knowledge through experience is a good context in which to begin to think through the 
prospects for combining an idealistic affirmation of self-determination with making room for an idea of 
external constraint.” 157
 On either side of McDowell’s ‘interminable oscillation’, the functions of external 
constraint and self-determination are conceived as two independent functions which are 
intended to inform and make possible empirical judgment. The independence of function is 
reflected in a dualistically  conceived receptivity and spontaneity – on one side the sensory, 
and upon the other, conceptual judgment. Receptivity  is stipulated as the sensory means by 
which the objective empirical world is presented or impressed in perception – beyond our 
cognitive powers to determine, this is the domain of external constraint. Conceptual or 
discursive representation therefore provides the intellectual or cognitive means by which that 
‘objective’ sensible impression can come to feature in rational representational thought. 
 As McDowell sees it, it is just such a separation between external constraint and self-
determination which makes one liable to be caught up in the ‘interminable oscillation’ he 
purports to have identified in Mind and World. Indeed, as McDowell would have it, the 
fundamental problem with positing such a dualism between receptivity as external constraint, 
166
156 McDowell, ‘Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint’, p. 93.
157 Ibid. p. 91. 
and conceptual capacities as self-determined judgment, manifests itself in the rational 
entitlement picture – the space of reasons. Whichever side of the dualism one ultimately 
comes down on in grounding one’s empirical judgment one inevitably faces palpable 
difficulties. On the side of external constraint there is the Myth of the Given, and on the side 
of self-determination, a potential frictionless ‘spinning in the void’ (or Kantian idealism). 
 McDowell’s project in effect involves therapeutically dissolving the dualism between 
external constraint as receptivity and self-determination as the realm of judgment. Indeed, 
McDowell’s picture of experience and judgment encompasses positing external constraint 
within the function of something recognisably self-determining itself. Again McDowell aims 
to do this via his notion of a passively actualised content that is given in intuition. 
 McDowell’s notion of intuitional content involves a unification of sorts between the two 
seemingly irreconcilable notions of understanding cognitive phenomena – and again, 
understood such that functions of receptivity  and spontaneity are not even notionally 
separable. So McDowell’s picture can purport to maintain that the problematic gap between 
external constraint and self-determination which sustains the oscillation is now closed with 
his notion of conceptual experience and its passively actualised propositional content. 
 For McDowell, this occurs by way of positing his own notion of how external constraint 
comes to function in thought, and his own, at least in emphases, notion of self-determination – 
both of which are understood as operating within conceptual content. So external constraint, 
and the relevant aspect of self-determination, are intelligibly configured so that they are 
jointly manifest in the given content of experience. 
 In this way, McDowell appropriates what  he sees as the positive insights of the traditional 
conceptions of receptivity, viz., that there must be external constraint upon thought; however, 
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in order to avoid the Myth of the Given that constraint  is seen as provided through conceptual 
content. And McDowell correspondingly posits a ‘secondary’ aspect of self-determining 
capacities which is itself also involved in that same very content (an aspect other than the 
exercise of those capacities in judgment).  So both receptivity and spontaneity  inform the 
possibility of that conceptual content actualised in experience.   
 In McDowell’s model, judgment, as the paradigmatic form of self-determination, does 
not stand in a verdictive relation to the externally constraining object of perception. 
Perceptual judgment, indeed, stands instead in a verdictive relation to the object-dependent 
passively  actualised content of intuition. It is precisely such a content – that is given passively 
in intuition – in which McDowell posits ‘secondary’ self-determining functions. 
3. Freedom Within the Discursive 
McDowell: “The space of concepts is at least a part of what Wilfed Sellars calls “the space of reasons”. 
When Kant describes the understanding as a faculty of spontaneity, that reflects his view of the relation 
between reason and freedom: rational necessitation is not just compatible with freedom but constitutive of 
it. In a slogan, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom.” 158
McDowell: “But if our freedom in empirical thinking is total, in particular if  it is not constrained from 
outside the conceptual sphere, that can seem to threaten the very possibility that judgements of experience 
might be grounded in a way that relates them to a reality external to thought.” 159
 Self-determination as it is relevant in the context of perceptual judgement is (distinctly) 
freedom with respect to the actualisation of propositional content. As will be discussed, self-
determination is therefore bound to an ability  to judge things to be thus and so. Similarly is it 
constitutive of taking something as a reason – to take something be thus and so. For 
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McDowell, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom. The capacity for freedom is thus 
bound to (discursive) rationality – understood as a capacity to be responsive to reasons. 
 In the Kantian mould, McDowell’s paradigmatic kind of freedom is that which is 
manifest in judging. Judging is freely responsible cognitive activity, a ‘making up one’s mind 
about how things are’.160  It involves a rational reflective position in which the truth of a 
propositional content is ascertained and determined to be the case. 
 In Mind and World the propositional content in consideration in judgment is that which is 
passively  given in experience. Thus, judgment is characterised as an endorsement of, or a 
refusal to endorse, the propositional given. In perceptual judgment one decides whether or not 
to judge that things are how experience represents them to be;161one accepts or rejects the 
appearance – the given face value (as the given propositional content).
 So McDowell’s model of perceptual judgment is the approval or disapproval of those 
actualised concepts already given in experience. The conceptual capacities which belong to 
spontaneity are already  operative in receptivity  – judgment does not work upon something 
independently supplied by receptivity. Freedom in the context of judgment, thus lies, not in 
the categorisation or abstraction of that  given purely by  receptivity, but rather, in the capacity 
to determine the correctness of concepts which are already passively applied in intuition.  
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4. Kant and Sellars
McDowell: “Exploiting Sellars and Kant, I have put in place the outline of a picture that promises to 
combine finding a place even in empirical cognition for the self-determining rationality of the cognitive 
subject - the spontaneity of the understanding – with acknowledging a sense in which empirical cognition 
is constrained by objects themselves, presenting themselves to consciousness in intuition.”162
 McDowell’s model of intelligibility in respect to freedom and judgment is one which 
incorporates aspects from both Kant and Sellars. So it is in accordance with this that I will 
structure my discussion of McDowell’s second gloss on self-determination. Starting with Kant 
and his ‘Clue’, McDowell supposes that intuitions have a content and a logical togetherness 
the very same as judgment. McDowell, in turn, is critical of Kant’s idealism, and in turn 
distinguishes between the passive and the active exercise of conceptual capacities. Then in 
respect to Sellars, McDowell posits that one’s world view is implicated in the passively 
actualised content of intuition itself, and so it is via the self-determining capacities which 
inform one’s world view that McDowell supposes we ought to characterise the function of 
spontaneity and self-determination in experience. 
(i) Kantian Idealism
 McDowell: “It is a mistake to think Kant’s “Clue” implies that the unity of an intuition is itself brought 
about by free cognitive activity.  Judging, one of the exemplifiers of the sorts of unity the ‘clue’ concerns, is 
free cognitive activity, but enjoying intuitions, the other field for those sorts of unity, is not.   The point is 
just that the sorts of unity that unite intuitions are the same as the sorts of unity that unite judgments. It 
must be intelligible that the representational capacities that are involuntarily drawn into operation in 
intuitions are susceptible of  joint actualization with that kind of  unity, and that is secured by their being 
capacities that can also be freely exercised in judging. This suffices to put in place the kinship Kant insists 
on between the objective purport of  intuitions and the objective purport of judgments. He does not need to 
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suggest that the forming of  intuitions is itself an exercise of freedom, let alone one that takes place behind 
our backs.”163
 Whilst McDowell utilises ‘The Clue’ so that intuition itself is modelled upon 
propositional judgment, McDowell is (one of many) critical of Kant’s perceived idealism. Of 
particular focus in this discussion, however, is not so much the subjective form of sensibility 
in Kant, viz., space and time, but rather the idealism in Kant in respect to the content of 
intuition: the perceived problematic idealism which takes its shape in the context of rational 
entitlement and normative answerability.
 McDowell’s criticisms of Kantian intuition are bound to the involvement of the 
Understanding in sensible intuition – specifically  the discursive character of intuitional 
content. Now the particular form of idealism McDowell finds problematic pertains not so 
much to the (discursive/propositional) content per se, but rather, to the way in which that 
propositional content is actualised in intuition. The problem lies, not with that which can be 
taken as a reason (discursive/propositional content), but rather with how it comes to be that 
that discursive content becomes actualised. This relates to the particular characterisation of 
the self-determining capacities of the Understanding. So, it is by way of distinguishing the 
way in which the Understanding is involved in the actualising of propositional content in 
intuition that McDowell distinguishes his ‘minimal empiricist’ idealism from Kant’s 
problematic idealism.   
 The problematic idealism that McDowell finds in Kant is that intuitional content involves 
the active exercise of the Understanding. Although ‘The Clue’ provides the discursive model 
by which to understand intuitional content as propositional, if the intelligibility of intuition 
and its content is constrained too strictly within the Kantian model of judgment, intuitional 
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content can in turn be assigned too many of the qualities of judgment. Specifically, again as 
McDowell reads Kant, the propositional content of intuition, on the problematic 
understanding, involves the active exercise of the Understanding. Conceptual capacities in 
experience are thus engaged in the same way as they would be in the exercise of a judgment.  
 For judgement to take up and rationally reflect upon a propositional content actualised in 
intuition – which the Understanding has already  ‘put together’ in an analogous way to the 
exercise of judgment itself – would thereby entail that empirical thought, as Kant must 
necessarily conceive it, could not reach beyond that content which the Understanding has not 
already itself actively exercised and put together. The involvement of the Understanding in 
this way – exercising its conceptual capacities in intuition itself – has the problematic upshot 
that the content of experience, and that which can have rational and cognitive significance, is 
something of the perceiver’s own subjective (although unconscious) putting together. 
 In effect, this puts the world, objective reality, and the objects of common sense 
perception beyond the intentional and cognitive capacities of perceptual thought – and so 
outside that which is knowable. So, while McDowell’s Kant posits intuitional content as 
actualising conceptual capacities, and so intelligibly  cohabits, with judgement, the logical 
space of reasons, the active exercise of the Understanding, leaves Kant’s picture 
problematically ‘idealist’.  
 As will be discussed, according to McDowell, the key to disengaging from Kant’s 
problematic idealism requires distinguishing between the two aspects of self-determination 
which characterise our conceptual capacities as linguistic creatures. The freedom involved in 
judgment, as the active exercise of the Understanding, is precisely not the kind of freedom to 
be exploited in attributing conceptual content to intuition itself.
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5. McDowell’s Involuntary Actualisation of Self-Determining Capacities 
McDowell: “Capacities of the sort one wants to see as freely exercised, in what one wants to be entitled to 
see as judgement, are also actualised in sensory consciousness; these actualisations in sensory 
consciousness are occurrences of a kind that can be understood, partly by virtue of the involvement in 
them of  capacities that are also freely exercised in judgement, as cases of having objective reality directly 
in view. This way, we enable ourselves to make sense of a consciousness that is capable of both being 
intuitionally in touch with objective reality and making judgements about it.  We make sense of a 
consciousness as having each of those capacities only because we see it as also having the other.”164 
McDowell: “Once one has determined such things as the direction of one’s gaze,  it is not under one’s 
control how one’s experience purports to reveal things to be [...] But perceptual experience can bring facts 
into plain view. And when that is the appropriate thing to say, it would be absurd to talk of deciding what 
to think, as if one exercised an option.  One does not choose to accept that things are the way one’s 
experience plainly reveals that they are.”165
McDowell: “One does not sacrifice one’s freedom if  one acquiesces in the authority of what one recognises 
as compelling reasons. Recognising reasons as compelling is itself an exercise of one’s capacities for 
rational self-determination.” 166
 Now I have already discussed how McDowell proposes to amend Davidson’s dictum and 
thereby extend the space of reasons to experience itself. McDowell’s notion of the passively 
actualised content  of experience is posited so as to overcome Davidson’s ‘blind spot’. As has 
also been discussed previously, McDowell makes use of Kant’s ‘Clue’, so that both intuitions 
and judgments share a logical unity  and propositional content. This is intended to provide an 
intelligible structure to McDowell’s normative picture in which intuitional content is within 
the space of reasons and in a form such that it itself can be taken up and endorsed in the 
exercise of a judgment. 
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 However, important distinctions must be made in respect to how it is that those capacities 
are drawn upon – distinctions which can avoid Kant’s idealism. The first place I wish to 
begin, then, is distinguishing the content of intuition and the content of judgment via their 
‘voluntary’ representational actualisation, or lack thereof.  Something which McDowell 
supposes Kant himself failed to do.
 So McDowell takes his own point of departure from Kant’s notion that  intuitional content 
itself is an exercise of the Understanding. McDowell insists that the content of intuition is 
involuntarily given, and so is not an act or exercise of the Understanding. The way in which 
McDowell’s picture improves upon the problematic picture of Kant is by positing a new 
means of intelligibly  comprehending intuitional content as discursive – one premised upon 
intelligibly  distinguishing between the ‘active’ exercise, and the ‘passive’ actualisation of 
propositional content. McDowell thus posits passively  actualised propositional content in 
intuition in order to avoid Kant’s discursive idealism. 
 In this way conceptual capacities can figure in intuition, yet without the active exercise of 
the Understanding that would prevent an openness to the empirical world – or rational 
acknowledgement of the external reality  beyond the function of the active exercise of 
conceptual capacities. Of principle concern to McDowell is that the propositional content of 
intuition is given. The given content of intuition can provide the external constraint upon 
judgment, which is precisely that which went missing in Kant. This constraint upon thought at 
the same time ‘opens the world’, the world as fact, to the perceiving subject.
 McDowell’s overarching concern, is to avoid the Myth of the Given, that is, a picture of 
sensory  receptivity which does not involve the function of spontaneity. So McDowell’s notion 
of a given content, involves receptivity, just  as it does spontaneity. One way, therefore, in 
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which we can understand the giveness of the content of experience, certainly in the context of 
voluntariness, is in relation to its sensory mode of actualisation – something which is 
furthermost from one’s doxastic control. The given intuitional content, as extending the space 
of reasons, is a passive actualisation of conceptual capacities in sensory consciousness itself.
 McDowell’s positing of self-determining capacities in experience itself is of such 
significance because it is bound to the reason-providing function of sensory intuition itself. 
And yet it  is only via McDowell’s second gloss on self-determination that  we can come to 
understand that which can be taken as a reason in sensory intuition itself as intelligibly self-
determined, while at  the same time given (and not an instance of the free cognitive activity of 
the Understanding.) 
 So, in McDowell’s picture, the space of freedom comes to inhabit that very space against 
which freedom is conventionally juxtaposed, viz., the space of sensory impressions. This is a 
feature of McDowell’s Sellarsian empiricism which stands in opposition to the form of a 
traditional empiricism which assumes a dualism between the conceptual and the sensory. 
6. Community of Language Users and World View
McDowell: “Sellars rejects the immediacy that traditional empiricism attributes to the knowledge yielded 
by perception, and replaces it with a mediation by acquired conceptual capacities and world knowledge, 
knowledge that must be already in place for the perceptual knowledge that is in one sense fundamental to 
be so much as available to us”167 
McDowell:“This shifts the weight to the second of those two glosses on the invocation of freedom. In the 
thick of  experience, the conceptual capacities we currently have are drawn into operation in a way that is 
not up to us.  But for them to be intelligibly conceptual capacities in the relevant sense, capacities that 
belong to the spontaneity of the understanding,  it must be that in having them drawn into operation we 
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find ourselves answerable to the authority of  norms for thought that constitute the content of  the 
capacities. And this subjection to authority comes within the scope of the self-determination idea. So, 
though our experience at any time is determined, outside our control, by concepts we find ourselves with 
at the time, we have a responsibility over time to ensure our acquiescence in the concepts we find ourselves 
with is not a matter of subjecting ourselves to an alien authority, exercised by dogma or tradition”. 168
McDowell:“The norms that constitute the content of empirical concepts are determinations, responsive to 
the specifics of the world as it presents itself  to us, of norms that are internal to thinking as such. So the 
external constraint I have been talking about,  constraint by objects, is authorised from within the practice 
of thinking, by norms that are constitutive of the practice”.169
 McDowell’s secondary invocation of freedom in intuition is one that is intended to 
complement, and not displace, his Kantian, and more paradigmatic, notion of freedom in 
judgment. In fact the capacities which are drawn upon in conceptual intuition are the same as 
those drawn upon in judgment. And, as McDowell would have it, such a secondary invocation 
of self-determination in intuition itself is necessary for there to be empirical judgment at all – 
at least in the terms he conceives of judgment in Mind and World. 
 This second aspect of self-determining capacities is situated within the actualised content 
of intuition, and so comes to characterise the extended space of reasons and the normative 
source of the authority  of those reasons. McDowell seeks to give an account of how such self-
determining capacities are implicated in the given reason for judgment that intuition provides; 
of how such capacities are implicated on the receptive side of rational entitlement. 
 Two respective notions inform McDowell’s account of how the secondary aspect of self-
determination is involved in the passively actualised content of experience. The first is the 
self-determination which obtains at the level of the communal, and the acquisition of 
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language in a social context. The second concerns one’s ability  to revise one’s conceptual 
capacities and one’s world view as an individual agent. I will address the social aspect of 
thought to begin with, and then I shall address the revision of one’s world view and thereby 
one’s rational relations with the external world. 
(i) Community of Language Users
McDowell : “And now, first, the self-determination idea requires that we take those norms to be laws we 
make for ourselves. And, second, we cannot spell out that image in terms of  single individuals giving 
themselves the law. We can understand the authoritativeness of conceptual norms only as instituted by 
communal activity”. 170
 According to McDowell, we are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents by 
being initiated into a natural language. Language also, McDowell claims, serves as a 
repository  for a tradition, a tradition in respect to what is a reason for what.171 So in the same 
way we are initiated into language, we are introduced into the layout of the space of reasons. 
And although it is possible to revise and reflect upon that space of reasons, one needs to be 
initiated into a tradition as it stands. 
 This is important in the context of external constraint and extending the space of reasons 
so as to incorporate objects themselves. McDowell supposes that we are to intelligibly 
understand the authoritative position of objects in our thinking via the content of social norms 
– norms which we have in an intelligible sense self-determined, as a tradition is understood as 
self-determined. Indeed, McDowell insists that it  is only  with our introduction into language, 
and its space of reasons, that objects come to ‘speak to us’ – in the form of propositional 
content within intuition that provides rational external constraint upon our empirical thoughts. 
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Objects thus speak to us in our own language, our own inherited tradition, and not rather, in 
the world’s own language, whatever that  may be. In this way our rational relations with 
objects are mediated by self-determining aspects intrinsic to the acquisition and use of a 
natural language.   
 What then comes into focus with so aligning initiation into a community of language 
users with being immersed into a space of reasons is that that  which can stand as a reason for 
a judgment does so in a form no less than that which can be intelligibly understood as content 
constituted by social norms – content which is determined by a community of language users. 
 Understanding the space of reasons as a social space, which is inclusive of experience, is 
also a means of evading charges of scepticism, such as attach to forms of traditional 
empiricism, and which Davidson is so critical of. McDowell’s given content of experience – 
given in a form which is thinkable and which comes to rationally  entitle – is content which is 
distinctly  social in nature. Indeed the content is of cognitive significance only insofar as that 
content fits into an on-going conception of a communal space of reasons.  
 According to McDowell’s picture, just as we share a communal space of reasons with a 
community  of language users, we share a capacity to judge something to be thus and so – and 
thereby do we share a capacity for taking up in judgment the passively  actualised content of 
experience as a reason. So the content understood as a given reason, which is constituted  as it 
is by  social norms, is also something which is shared – or sharable – in a linguistic 
community  so to speak. The content is in such a form that it is recognisably a reason for 
others.  
 So rational and cognitive significances, in the form of propositional content, are distinctly  
social in their nature. This is just one aspect of McDowell’s notion of intuition involving 
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intelligible and recognisable conceptual capacities. If the conceptual space of experience, and 
hence the extended space of reasons, is understood as only having its sense as something 
distinctly  and intrinsically private and first personal, then this would indeed amount to mere 
lip  service to the conceptual capacities in play. However, by emphasising the social nature of 
thought, and thus the passively  actualised given, we can avoid those sceptical concerns of 
traditional empiricism – and accommodate for, in experience itself,  a communal and self-
determined realm which is externally constrained by a reality outside of thought itself. 
(ii)World View
McDowell: “[...]the intentionality,  the objective purport, of  perceptual experience in general –whether 
potentially knowledge yielding or not – depends, in that logical dimension, on having the world in view, in 
a sense which goes beyond the glimpses of the here and now. It would not be intelligible that the relevant 
episodes present themselves as glimpses of the here and now apart from their being related to a wider 
world view in the logical dimension Sellars adds.”172
McDowell: “Active empirical thinking takes place under a standing obligation to reflect about the 
credentials of the putatively rational linkages that govern it.  There must be a standing willingness to 
refashion concepts and conceptions if that is what reflections recommends.”173
McDowell: “In “outer experience”, a subject is passively saddled with conceptual contents, drawing into 
operation capacities seamlessly integrated into a conceptual repertoire that she employs in the continuing 
activity of adjusting her world view, so as to enable it to pass a scrutiny of its rational credentials. ”174
 We can characterise one’s ‘world view’ as referring compendiously to the conceptual 
capacities that a particular subject finds themselves with at any particular point in time – the 
world view makes up this background of conceptual capacities.  One’s world view constitutes 
the possible conceptual capacities which can be exercised in empirical thinking – one’s 
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capacity to judge something about  the empirical world to be the case. The freedom evident 
in exercising one’s conceptual capacities in judgment, and one’s responsiveness to reasons, is 
thus informed and made possible by one’s world view. 
 McDowell appropriates from Sellars, according to his dynamic form of empiricism, the 
idea that one’s world view is implicated in a fully conceptualised notion of experience itself. 
So, in accordance with McDowell’s own Sellarsian empiricism, one’s world view is operative 
not merely in judgment, but  it  is also implicated in the intuitional content itself. It is precisely 
in the context of the world view, as so implicated in intuition, that McDowell comes to situate 
his second aspect of self-determination, which is a constituent aspect of the propositional 
given itself.         
 Judging, says McDowell, is the paradigmatic mode of actualisation of conceptual 
capacities. In accordance with a Sellarsian empiricism, to be able to judge that things are thus 
and so, requires capacities which go beyond the glimpses of the ‘here and now’. Judgment 
thus draws upon conceptual capacities which are constituents of the back ground of (rational) 
capacities of a language user.  
 Because of McDowell’s picture of perceptual judgment as endorsement of the passively  
actualised content of intuition – that world view which Sellars speaks of must also be 
implicated in intuition, as it is in judgment. As already discussed, it  is a feature of Kant’s 
‘Clue’ that  the same logical togetherness and propositional content bind intuition and 
judgment. So McDowell’s Sellarsian empiricism has any particular subject’s world view as 
itself implicated in the passively actualised content of intuition. 
 As mentioned above, the manifold propositional content passively actualised in intuition 
is co-extensive with the capacity for a corresponding judgment. Hence, one’s world view is 
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implicated in intuition only in so far as one’s ability to judge. However, one’s ‘world view’, as 
it is implicated in the passively actualised content of intuition, isn’t implicated as a free 
exercise of one’s conceptual capacities, as if one in intuition voluntarily drew upon a select 
few capacities from a reservoir of conceptual capacities. Intuitional content rather – to 
forestall Kantian idealism –  is given. 
 One’s world view, as implicated in the propositional content of experience itself, can also 
be seen as self-determined because of the possibility  for the reflective review and revision of 
the conceptual capacities available for passive actualisation in experience. So the content of 
intuition is not merely self-determined because of the constitutive social norms dimension, it 
is also intelligibly  self-determined because one has the ability to revise this background 
theoretical structure. Indeed, McDowell claims that we are under an ongoing obligation – 
have the responsibility  as rational agents – to continually  revise and improve our rational 
engagement with the world through reconsideration and revision of the commitments that 
make up our world view. 
 These, then, are the two dimensions of what McDowell sees as the secondary aspect of 
self-determining capacities implicated in the passively given propositional content of 
experience itself. It is via positing these notions that he hopes to situate an acceptable 
idealism, which avoids the Myth of the Given, while also avoiding the problematic form of 
idealism he finds in Kant. 
181
B. Travis and Self-Determination
 The object and content distinction which comes to characterise the divide between Travis 
and McDowell in the rational entitlement picture is also one which comes to critically inform 
and shape how each philosopher supposes self-determining capacities to be implicated in 
experience and perceptual judgement. 
 As discussed, Travis’s account of perception situates the non-conceptual object  in a 
verdictive relationship with perceptual thought. Because of Travis’s preference for such a 
configuration of the conceptual and the non-conceptual, in which the non-conceptual has a 
determinate cognitive significance in the space of reasons yet outside the space of the 
conceptual, this in turn engenders some significant differences between his own respective 
account of the self-determining capacities involved in thought, and rational entitlement, 
compared to that of McDowell’s picture.
 At a broader level of the picture, Travis has no use for a Kantian picture of thought itself, 
nor, for that matter, the Kantian-like idealism of McDowell, viz., that conceptual capacities 
are involved in experience itself. According to Travis, Kant’s ‘Clue’ can only  lead towards a 
‘bad picture of perception’  – one which ultimately prevents an awareness of the outer world. 
 While Travis does acknowledge the differences in the problems which concern Kant and 
McDowell respectively, and thus how each accordingly puts the ‘Clue’ to use, McDowell no 
less than Kant has a (Kantian-like) picture of perception and judgment which, according to 
Travis, does nothing but ‘cut us off from the world entirely”.175 So, for Travis, no idealism of 
182
175 Travis, ‘Unlocking the Outer World’. p. 25. 
any kind will do in answering the fundamental question of perception – viz., how it  makes the 
world bear for the perceiver on what to think.176 
 With no concern for McDowell’s unacceptable problematic of sensibility  without  the 
involvement of conceptual capacities – McDowell’s version of the Myth of the Given – Travis 
adheres to his own Fregean model of perception. His Fregean model of perceptual judgment 
posits a functioning dualism between the sensory and the intellectual, and so prohibits 
conceptual content from epistemically  interceding between perceptual thought and having the 
object of perception directly in view.  
 So, at  least as Travis would assess the situation, the pictures of self-determination which 
hold respectively between him and McDowell may be further distinguished by which model 
of thought is proffered, one which stems from Kant, or that of Frege’s. The most important 
aspect being, that self-determining capacities, just like conceptual content, are in no way 
implicated in experience itself. What becomes apparent is that, according to Travis and his 
Fregean model of thought, there are points of irreconcilable conflict  between the Fregean 
model and a Kantian-like model of thought, the latter of which supposes the ‘putting 
together’ of concepts, separate thinkable parts, in the exercise of judgement.
 Travis, via Frege, supposes that there is only the model of perceptual judgement which 
involves recognition. Contra McDowell’s first kind of rational entitlement, there is no task of 
‘putting significances together’ in thought. Indeed, Travis’s account would suppose that the 
incoherence of such a task, as one which evidently  falls into the ‘building block’ model of 
thought, spells the end of McDowell’s conceptual account of experience177.  
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 In the sections that follow I discuss Travis’s own position on perception, judgment, 
modes of self-determination, and external constraint. 
1. Space of Reasons and Space of Freedom: the Instancing Relation 
Travis : “I now remark: the mind can only shape what is in its power to shape. It can only guarantee the 
shape of what it is in its sole power to shape. What would thus be in its power?178
Travis: “Our minds cannot change the non-conceptual — what there is for the conceptual to reach to — 
excepting that part of it which just is their being as they are. This, in essence, is what Frege’s side of 
his coin says. But they can furnish our ways of  articulating the non-conceptual. How we carve up the way 
things are into particular ways for things to be may depend on the means thus supplied. The way our 
minds work can thus matter to what bits of  the conceptual we have, or can get in mind — what there is 
within our grasp with reach to the non-conceptual. This is Wittgenstein’s reverse side of Frege’s 
coin. Minds can do this working jointly, forming a community of  thinkers. Following Wittgenstein’s 
unfolding of Frege’s core ideas, I have just argued that there is no other way for them to do so”179
Travis: “But the non-conceptual—things being as they are, or a thing being as it is—can settle our 
questions what to think only if we can appreciate, grasp, its bearing on what is so”180
 To begin with, as in McDowell’s case, the self-determining capacities which are in focus 
in the discussion of Travis are operative in the context of rational entitlement and so in taking 
something as a reason. And Travis, much like McDowell, aligns the domain of self-
determining capacities with the domain of the conceptual. So that, in a slogan (to borrow from 
McDowell) – the domain of the conceptual is the domain of freedom. 
 However, because Travis extends reason’s reach to the non-conceptual object, so that the 
space of reasons extends to the non-conceptual objects posited as standing in verdictive 
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relations to perceptual thought, such an account consequently  shifts all self-determining 
capacities to the exercise of judgment. So that, quite intentionally, the space of reasons is 
precisely not aligned with the space of freedom. Travis’s space of reasons extends beyond 
both the space of the conceptual and the space of freedom, given that the last items which are 
taken to be reason-providing are non-conceptual objects, objects which are most certainly 
beyond our minds power to shape.
 In Travis’s picture, therefore, that  which is taken as a reason, and that which stands in a 
verdictive relationship  to thought, in no way in itself involves self-determining capacities. 
Freedom remains bound to conceptual capacities, yet the bounds of reason extend beyond 
conceptual content. Self-determining capacities all belong upon the conceptual response side 
– and precisely end where that propositional content extends beyond itself to the non-
conceptual.   
 And yet, in Travis's picture, because the space of freedom, which is so bound to the 
conceptual, extends to the non-conceptual in such a way, self-determining capacities (sense, 
expertise and recognition) are in fact rationally bound to external constraint. So, much like in 
McDowell’s story, the two functions cannot be understood as operating without the other in 
place. While there is a dualism of sorts, the ‘gap’ is perhaps not as glaringly problematic as 
McDowell would have us believe.  
2. Self-Determination and Articulating the Non-Conceptual 
 Travis posits rational relations as holding between conceptual contents and non-
conceptual objects, doing so through a Fregean paradigm of generalities and instances. This in 
turns implies that the self-determining aspects of conceptual capacities are situated 
entirely upon the response side of judgment – judgment understood as a rational response to 
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the non-conceptual object as visibly in view, not mere endorsement of the given as in 
McDowell.
 For Travis, in the context of perceptual judgment, it is the function of perception merely  
to bring into view the object of visual awareness and thought – providing no epistemic 
intermediaries whatsoever. To perceive is not to invest experience with any value or content – 
no conceptual capacities are yet engaged.  For experience and its sensible objects to in any 
way become rationally relevant to the conceptual, we must  draw upon our capacity  for 
recognition – a capacity which is precisely not yet drawn upon in perception itself.
 Our perceptual judgments are not  made true by anything self-determined by us as rational 
thinkers – that is, in the context of a particular judgment aimed at particular object in the 
immediate surroundings. Rather, our perceptual judgments are made true by precisely  that 
which is not up  to us to self-determine – viz., things directly in view being as they  are. 
Reason’s reach necessarily  extends beyond propositional content – it extends outside of itself 
– to take as its object the verdict-dictating non-conceptual object immediately in view. 
 That said, according to Travis, that  which is in fact within our self-determining power to 
determine, what  our minds can shape and influence, is the articulation of the non-conceptual. 
As I will discuss, the self-determination involved in articulating the non-conceptual manifests 
itself it empirical thought – in judgment, with recognition and expertise.
 However, in Travis’s picture there are also aspects to the self-determining picture which 
go beyond the immediate exercise of a perceptual judgment – self-determining capacities 
which inform the background capacities which enable the very possibility of that particular 
judgment. And, as with McDowell, these capacities to determine the articulation of the non-
conceptual are best understood via a notion of ‘community’. 
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 Indeed, conceptual capacities, as Travis would have it, are acquired in a communal 
setting. They depend upon shared practices, and in order to intelligibly align conceptual 
content  – the ways in which we speak – with the world – the way things are – conceptual 
capacities also depend upon a shared sense of agreement as to how the two sides of the 
sensible and non-sensible are rationally bound.
3. Thought’s Social Nature: ‘Counts as’ and Sense
 Travis ultimately puts many of the social aspects of thought and self-determination to use 
primarily  for understanding how we can entertain a thought when that which is in mind, so to 
speak, is not visibly present before one.  (This yet again connects with Travis’s account of the 
connection between the conceptual and the non-conceptual). 
 What emerges in Travis’s discussion is that to have a conceptual capacity is to have a 
sense as to what would be an instance of a particular kind. It is that sense which also comes to 
characterise a community. And it is also that sense which makes possible the capacity  for 
empirical judgment which aims at truth.
 So a conceptual capacity for Travis is not merely the ability  to produce discursive 
representations in judgment. With that manifest conceptual ability in judgment comes a 
capacity which extends beyond the propositional form and content, the ability  to recognise a 
visible object in the realm of the non-conceptual. In other words, an ability to grasp how the 
non-conceptual bears on what it  is that one ought to think. This is a capacity the exercise of 
which characterises and enables the rational relationship between our minds and the non-
conceptual.
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 It is in the context of this notion of sense that I propose we can come to situate, in Travis, 
the McDowellian secondary  aspect to self-determining capacities, as outlined above. The self-
determining capacities in play are intimately  linked to the non-conceptual, so that the rational 
relation between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, indeed the very possibility and 
dependence of the former upon the later, is further reinforced. 
Travis writes :
“Thought’s social nature means: I think things to be some given way only where some extendible range of 
thinkers would agree (and agree with me) sufficiently as to what would count as things being that way; 
only where, so to speak, there is a (potential) community of agreement (or of agreers).”181
 Travis maintains that ‘a way  for things to be’ is only possible where a community of 
thinkers can agree as to what would count as things being that way – with the community 
defined as thinkers sharing an ability  to think the thing in question.  So to think something is 
to belong to a range of thinkers – a community  of thinkers –  who are in agreement in respect 
to that which would count, and what would not count, as something being so.
 However, it’s not that agreement must have already taken place, as that would leave no 
place for the novel. Agreement comes rather in an agreement in sense. Agreement as what 
would count as an instance of a kind is what it is to share a sense in relation to the conceptual. 
Moreover, that which would be agreed to as counting as an instance of a way for things to be 
can be expanded.  So, to speak of a community in ‘agreement’ is not to speak of majority 
consent. Rather, it is to speak of there being such a thing as that  which someone with the 
sense in question – a member of the community – would find. 
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 So, suppose that one is an outsider to a particular community, simply  meaning one does 
not know the meaning (use) of a particular way of talking about something. In order to 
determine what it is that a community has in mind, when speaking of a way for things to be, 
one has to look at that which they would recognise as a case of counting as things being that 
way. One has to in a sense identify  (or carve out) those items, or aspects, on the side of the 
non-conceptual, in order to identify that which the community has in mind when they speak 
of a way  for things to be. So really, finding out the meaning of a way for things to be involves 
being able to identify what would make true that particular way of speaking.
 This aspect of thought also ties into what has already been said about the general form 
which is intrinsic to the conceptual. The particular case, available in view in perception, the 
non-conceptual object, falls under something general. Thought, in Travis’s picture, contains 
something which reaches beyond the particular case. Thought represents the particular case as 
a certain way. The thought reaches to a range of cases. So a way for things to be shares a 
thought’s generality.  On the other hand, the particular case in question lacks such generality. 
The particular case is bound to the way things are, as opposed to a way for things to be. 
Whereas a way for things to be has reach, the way  things are has no such reach. The particular 
is precisely what the conceptual, the general, reaches to.    
 What is ours to determine is that which reaches to the non-conceptual – the shared sense 
of a way  for things to be. We can determine, as a community – we can carve up – the way 
things are into ways for things to be. The latter involves self-determining capacities, the 
former not.
 So, for Travis, it is the social aspect of thought which makes possible the extension of the 
space of reasons to the non-conceptual. However, that communally determined 
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aspect precisely recedes into the background at the point when propositional content reaches 
to the non-conceptual. The social dimension of thought and self-determining capacities make 
that reach possible, for a community  in agreement; however, the non-conceptual, as the 
objective, the way things are, stands independently of that self-determination. Hence, the 
space of reasons, whilst made possible by  belonging to a community in agreement, extends 
beyond the determination of it or one’s own mind. 
4. Judgment, Expertise, and Self-Determination
 Travis: “One can tell how given barking, or grunting, bears on what is so. Its so bearing lies within the 
scope of reason — is a rational relation to what is so — insofar as it actually settles questions,  or provides 
evidence, or etc. Barking, to one who can tell when it is threatening, a snout to one who can tell when it is a 
pig’s, does bear, when he hears,  or sees, it, on what he is to think. Where one so skilled takes it to be the 
bark of  a dog about to bite, that the dog will bite just is what it is rational for him to think. He can think 
no other; nor should he. Such is one thing rationality is like.”182
Travis: “Correspondingly, if,  knowing a peccary when you see one, you now say of the beast before 
you, ‘That’s a peccary’, you have (though it sounds grandiose) exercised expertise. You take it to be a 
peccary in grasping how its being as it is bears (thus far) on what it is. You grasp — can tell — how it does 
bear. That is what expertise here is.  You thus take it to bear as it does. The beast’s being as it is thus bears, 
for you, on what to think — on the right thing to think in this matter.  Thus may the non-conceptual bear a 
rational relation to what one is to think”.183
 Having discussed Travis’s account of, what I take to be the equivalent of McDowell’s 
secondary  aspect of self-determining capacities via the notion of sense, and so the background 
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capacities which inform and make possible perceptual judgments, I now turn to Travis’s 
account of perceptual judgment.184 
 As mentioned, Travis’s picture of perceptual judgment is one which is modelled on  his 
take on Frege’s. According to Travis, the function of perception is merely – ‘silently’ – to 
bring into view one’s immediate surroundings. In turn, those non-conceptual objects which 
are so brought into view, the visible, can bear verdictively  upon empirical thought. Those 
objects can determine what one ought to think. So, in making a judgment, we precisely do not 
rationally reflect upon and thereafter endorse a given propositional content, as in Mind and 
World. Rather the conceptual content of perceptual judgment only manifests itself with a 
rational response to the non-conceptual in recognition. 
 To judge (commit oneself to) that which is presented in perception as a way for 
something to be is a learned capacity, and this has two aspects as it were. Firstly, it  is a 
capacity which comes with visual acquaintance with the non-conceptual. What we also might 
call experience with the external constraint. Secondly, the learned capacity also depends upon 
belonging to a community of language users – a community who share in their agreement as 
to the sense of what counts, in any given case, as instancing a way for things to be. 
  So, with such visual acquaintance (external constraint) and agreement (self-
determination) in place, one could thus be said to have the relevant expertise, – an expertise 
which allows one to make an appropriate classificatory  judgment (commitment) in respect to 
objects in one’s surroundings. And indeed, Travis speaks of the ability to determine how the 
non-conceptual bears on the conceptual as a matter of expertise. Expertise is a capacity for 
making the rational linkages between the visually given non-conceptual object and its bearing 
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on what is so. This notion of expertise can thus be understood in terms of recognitional 
capacities. Furthermore, Travis’s notion of expertise is also one of the means available in his 
account for capturing those distinctively internal aspects of rational capacities that are 
implicated in making a  judgment – internal aspects of the normative picture which, rather 
than immediately acting as external constraint, manifest in our rational recognitional 
responses to that which is visibly in view. 
 In Travis’s picture, once such a sense is acquired, and the relevant expertise in place, then 
it is not really up to one to decide what to think. So, just as McDowell’s secondary aspect of 
freedom normatively  constrains the exercise of judgment, so too does Travis’s notion of 
‘sense’. When one acquires a particular sense, as part of a community, one at the same time 
acquires, for any particular case of perceptual judgement, rational external constraint upon 
perceptual judgment. This is very  much akin to McDowell’s involuntary actualisation of 
conceptual capacities. However, rather than the representational content being given in 
experience, it figures solely as the content of perceptual judgement in recognition. This makes 
such judgment no less rational however – because the rational relation is between the non-
conceptual object  as visibly  present, and the exercise of one’s conceptual capacities, 
expressing one’s sense of what counts as an instance of a kind.
 Travis asserts that  the exercise of recognitional capacities means that perceptual thought 
is a function of compulsion – ‘he can think no other’. So the involvement and degree of 
freedom associated with the exercise of the perceiver’s conceptual capacities, in the form of a 
truth-apt rational response, is necessarily  constrained via the sensible. But what is the nature 
of that constraint, and is it to the point of eliminating self-determining capacities?
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Self-determination, in Travis’s account, remains bound to rationality, but rationality upon the 
response side. The ‘self-determining’ aspect  of thought can thus be understood via the 
representational mode of thought. The judgment is self-determined in that 
the representation in thought, of the perceived object, is not given. Self-determination is a 
constituent feature of the form of rational response in judgment to what is otherwise there and 
as yet unrepresented in what  the senses visually afford us. And yet the representation of the 
sensible, as an expression of one’s shared communal sense of what counts as an instance of 
what, is externally  constrained, in Travis’s picture, because of the verdictive relationship 
between thought and the sensible.
5. External Constraint
 Travis has that which functions as external constraint upon thought as the non-conceptual 
object. Because of the verdictive relationship between the conceptual and the non-conceptual, 
such relations do not then reduce to merely causal ones, as in McDowell’s reading of 
Davidson’s picture. Indeed, if the sensible object merely caused propositional thought, such a 
relationship  would apparently disallow not only the subject’s capacity  to rationally determine 
or respond to that item, but would also slight the intelligibility of one’s exercise of freedom in 
perceptual judgment. Rather, in Travis’s picture, although the object is situated outside the 
domain of the conceptual, its relationship  with the conceptual is rational. Keeping in mind 
that Travis refuses what McDowell takes Davidson’s key insight into rationality to be: that 
reasons-relations hold only between conceptual contents.
 Travis, therefore, much like McDowell, has external constraint upon judgment as 
rational constraint. And also much like McDowell, the rational external constraint  only 
becomes operative once the relevant conceptual capacities are in place. With the relevant 
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expertise, and so with the relevant recognitional capacities in place, comes rational external 
constraint upon thought from the non-conceptual. 
 In McDowell’s picture of self-determination, freedom in judgment was externally  
constrained by  the conceptual content  passively actualised in experience. And as discussed, 
that content of experience was itself to be understood as the product of self-determining 
capacities (inherited and revised social norms) and the external constraint of the object as it 
impressed itself upon receptivity.  
 This provides a point of contrast to Travis. Where McDowell seeks to align the secondary 
aspect of self-determining capacities to external constraint, by contentful receptivity, Travis 
rather, by positing external constraint upon thought with simply  the object of perception, and 
so precisely not with conceptual content, thus offers a model in which the function of external 
constraint is quite deliberately separated from that secondary aspect of self-determination. 
 Now while the secondary aspect of self-determination – evident in Travis’s Fregean /
Wittgenstein model – is rationally  implicated in judgment as a committed response to that 
presented in perception, by way of sense and background practices, there is a functioning 
dualism between the sensory and the conceptual. The secondary aspect of self-determination 
does normatively constrain judgment, but it does not do so as external constraint; rather, it 
does so through a capacity  for sense and recognition – what I refer to as internal self-
determined constraint. And although those conceptual capacities are intricately linked to 
external constraint by objects, indeed they  are rationally bound to such external constraint, 
according to Travis’s model, such a dualism – in which the senses (without content 
themselves) merely give us acquaintance with the sensible – is necessary in order to avoid 
being ‘cut off from the world’, as Travis supposes McDowell’s form of idealism is. 
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 So, because Travis is intent upon refusing the idealist model which he finds in both Kant 
and McDowell, he manifestly adopts a more ‘traditional’ picture of self-determination and 
external constraint. On his account, aspects of self-determination occurs entirely within the 
exercise of perceptual judgment. So that, accordingly, that which externally constrains 
judgment is simply the object of perception itself. Verdictive external constraint upon 
judgment is not discursive representational constraint, as in McDowell’s propositional picture 
of experience. Hence, external constraint in Travis’s picture is not by the world as fact, but 
rather the world as object. As he would put  it, things being as they are – non-conceptual items 
on the left hand side of Frege’s line – externally constrain judgment.
6. World View, External Constraint, and Inter-Subjective Variation
 Although the world of objects is in some sense visually present to all perceivers, the 
rational external constraint provided by  that world of objects differs according to one’s 
expertise in recognising one’s surroundings. 
 With recognitional capacities and expertise so related to the sensible aspect of perception, 
a variation thus develops between those subjects who have such capacities, and those who do 
not. While the sensible aspect of perception may  in some sense remain constant and 
uniform between subjects with differing recognitional abilities – i.e. they are visually afforded 
the very  same surroundings – differing expertise and background conceptual capacities 
implies that there is a distinct  disparity in how each of them is rationally related and 
engaged with the sensible given. It therefore also implies different rational constraints upon 
thought – constraints that are not merely deferent to the sensible object, as external constraint, 
but constraints also understood as via the internal aspects of conceptual capacities which are 
already in place. 
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 We should not however overestimate any  gap which obtains between the self-
determination of judgment (background practices of recognition) and the constraint of the 
non-conceptual object. Interestingly, where McDowell bound receptivity and the content of 
social norms in experience itself, Travis also, in a way, binds the two functions.  
 As discussed, according to Travis , to have a conceptual capacity  is to have a sense of the 
non-conceptual. That sense can come to constrain and compel judgment, provided that in 
perception one is presented with the appropriate instance. Now while the function of external 
constraint can indeed be attributed to the object in view, that object can only rationally 
externally constrain in the context of the judgment. And that  judgment is made possible by the 
relevant background capacities – specifically  a shared sense of what counts as an instance of 
what. It is only with these background capacities and a shared sense in place – internal aspects 
of rational constraint – that we can get the rational external constraint upon judgment. 
 Where McDowell supposed background capacities were engaged in external constraint 
itself, Travis rather, situates them entirely upon the side of judgment (and commitment) and 
internal aspects of rational constraint upon it. So in Travis’s picture of judgment, in contrast to 
McDowell’s, we do get a shift in emphases from the external, to the internal, in respect to the 
rational constraint of one’s world view and background capacities upon perceptual judgment.
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C. Self-Determination in McDowell’s Revised Account: 
 In the following discussion, I will explore the breakdown in the function of external 
constraint and self-determining capacities in McDowell’s new account of intuition and 
perceptual judgment. I shall also revisit the issue of the ‘putting together of discursive 
significances’. While McDowell maintains that the conceptual realm remains without bounds, 
the self-determining capacities which once informed such a picture are no longer available 
throughout the conceptual realm. So it is difficult for McDowell to maintain that the realm of 
the conceptual is the realm of freedom, as he once did in the Mind and World paradigm. This 
is due to a lack of any substantive notions of self-determination applying to intuitional content 
itself. This yields one of the many  similarities which McDowell’s revised account now shares 
with Travis’s account of self-determination and external constraint, as detailed above: self-
determination only enters the picture at the point of our rational responses to what perception 
brings directly into view. 
1. The Passive Actualisation of Conceptual Capacities in Intuition 
 According to McDowell, the space of reasons is the realm of freedom. Via Davidson’s 
amended dictum, McDowell extended the space of reasons to sensory experience itself. 
However, in order to avoid the perceived problematic idealism of Kant, McDowell forewent 
Kant’s take upon the active involvement of the Understanding in experience, and instead 
posited his own secondary aspect to self-determination as operative in experience itself – an 
aspect involving background content-constituting social norms, and the responsibility to 
rationally update one’s rational engagement with the external world (one’s world view). This 
enabled McDowell to align the space of reasons with the space of freedom, without falling 
foul of a problematic idealism. So according to McDowell’s picture, self-determining 
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capacities and external constraint functioned in unison, and not in a dualistic fashion. The 
intelligibility  of this was thus founded upon treating experience itself as having propositional 
content.
 In McDowell’s new picture, however, the space of the conceptual does not  simply 
coincide with with the realm of freedom. This is because that which is passively actualised in 
experience, that which is given, is not propositional content. Indeed, as McDowell would 
have it, experience does not involve discursive content, nor discursive concepts whatsoever. 
Experience no longer represents as so. And yet McDowell insists upon the fact that experience 
has conceptual content, intuitional content, so that sensibility is not placed outside the 
conceptual sphere. Experience is conceptual in virtue of its potential to figure in propositional 
articulation. 
 Given that the space of the conceptual is commensurable with the space of reasons in 
McDowell’s picture, as opposed to Travis’s, the positing of such non-discursive intuitional 
content in experience warrants an alteration in both such spaces – that is, given how they were 
framed in the Mind and World paradigm – such that they can intelligibly accommodate for 
McDowell’s new conception of experience. 
 McDowell’s idealism was partly  constituted by the fact that, in the context of the rational 
entitlement picture, reason’s reach extended only so far as one’s self-determining capacities 
(as realised in one’s world view) in actual fact allowed for. So that one’s capacity for rational 
entitlement extended to those propositional reasons which were passively given in experience. 
Now, of course, this still allowed external constraint from the world of objects to figure in the 
thinkable content; however such external constraint could only figure as such as incorporated 
into the self-determined propositional content itself.
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 With the change in the form of how we are to understand McDowell’s space of reasons 
and space of the conceptual – now extended to ‘reason-providing’ content, rather than a self-
constituted reason itself – McDowell must  accordingly change his picture of how self-
determining capacities now figure in perceptual judgment. With discursive propositional 
content now removed all together from experience, the self-determining aspects pertaining to 
self-determined social norms and one’s world view are no longer a constituent feature of the 
content of intuition. So we can see that the substantial actualisation of self-determining 
capacities occurs in rational functions now removed from the function of external constraint 
itself.   
 In McDowell’s Mind and World picture, he connected conceptual capacities with a 
possessor’s rationality  and responsiveness to reasons. However, while McDowell now posits 
an amended stipulation of the conceptual, such that a contents mere potential to be exploited 
and thus feature in propositional content is sufficient  for it to qualify as conceptual, the new 
stipulation of the conceptual is not  one which is readily amenable to the self-determining 
capacities once so evident with his propositional model of experience in Mind and World. 
 With intuitional content re-conceived as it is, such self-determining capacities are not so 
apparent at  all. In fact, there is no intelligible picture offered by McDowell, in which the 
secondary  aspects of self-determining capacities are implicated in experience in anyway 
whatsoever. So one of the central aspects which informed the idealism which McDowell once 
offered in his Mind and World picture is no longer apparent. Again, there occurs an apparent 
‘fracturing’ of sorts – that mirrors the breakdown in McDowell’s picture between external 
constraint (rational entitlement) and verdictive answerability, as was discussed in the previous 
Chapter. 
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 Where McDowell once incorporated external constraint within the very function of self-
determining capacities within intuition, now such incorporation is not a feature of the given 
conceptual content  of experience. As was discussed earlier in this Chapter, it was essential to 
McDowell’s picture that external constraint from objects was to be incorporated within an 
intelligible notion of how to conceive self-determination in intuition. So that external 
constraint, from objects that exist independently of our thinking about them, was to function 
as such via conceptual content (propositional content) which was intelligibly self-determined. 
 With the breakdown in external constraint  (rational entitlement) and verdictive 
answerability  (discussed in Chapter 2), so also is there a deconstruction of sorts, between 
external constraint, via intuitional content, and self-determining capacities. This is a result  of 
conceptual content as constituted by social norms no longer being passively actualised in 
experience. 
 Just as McDowell lost his ability to claim that experience passes ‘verdicts’ upon 
perceptual thought, with the displacement of content constituted by social norms from the 
content of experience, he similarly loses his ability to claim that experience intelligibly 
involves self-determined capacities. So that, at least from the perspective of binding the realm 
of freedom with the space of reasons, by having self-determining capacities involved in 
experience itself, McDowell has lost most of the intelligibility which informed his experience 
as conceptual picture. 
2. Intuition, Recognition, ‘Carving Out’ , and Self-Determination’
 In respect to the notion of entitlement  which involves recognition, the object as it is 
immediately in view, via intuitional content, can be seen as providing the necessary external 
constraint; and the judgment, as a rational response involving recognition, can be seen as the 
exercise of self-determining capacities. So that  yet again, there is no comprehension of one, 
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without the other. External constraint and self-determination are necessarily bound together. 
However, this relationship is not given within intuition content, but comes into being with 
discursive rationality, and drawing upon conceptual capacities, in recognising what intuition 
brings directly into view.
 This can be seen as essentially  the very same structure as is to be found in Travis’s 
account in respect to external constraint and self-determining capacities. Except, of course, 
that the entitlement is said to stem from the non-conceptual object via intuitional content, 
rather than simply from the non-conceptual object itself. 
 Of course it  is necessary, according to McDowell, in order to avoid the Myth of the 
Given, that conceptual capacities are involved in intuitional content  itself, and thus one would 
think capacities of self-determination. However, in respect to the latter, no account of how 
these might be understood to be involved is offered. So that, as in Travis, in perception, the 
object stands immediately in view, and it is only  at the point that we draw upon our 
recognitional capacities with respect to it that self-determining capacities enter the picture. 
 And in respect  to the ‘carving out’ entitlement picture, McDowell can be seen as binding 
external constraint and self-determining capacities within the propositional content that results 
from unifying ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition into whole discursive content. Unlike in the 
Mind and World paradigm, external constraint  and self-determining capacities do not, 
however, come already  bound within the content of experience. McDowell’s take on rational 
entitlement in such cases requires a nuanced involvement of discursive rationality. I will 
return to this issue shortly.
 In sum, where McDowell once supposed that both external constraint and self-
determination manifested their function in the very same content of experience, now there is a 
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break such that each is accounted for in different functions: we have external constraint as a 
non-discursive having in view of the object, with self-determining capacities manifesting in 
the processes of discursive rationality which follow, as a rational response, thereafter.  
3. Secondary Quality Concepts, World View and Intuition
 In Mind and World, concepts relevant to ‘secondary qualities’ themselves were seen as 
passively  actualised in intuition – concepts which were ‘minimally integrated’ into a ‘world 
view’185. Now, however, not even those discursive concepts of the common and proper 
actually figure in intuition itself. Whilst this unburdens intuition of representational content, it 
also dramatically reflects how it is that a subject’s world view, which was once so heavily 
implicated in the content of experience, is now excluded from that content.
 As McDowell makes clear in the cardinal example, despite differences in recognitional 
abilities between two perceiving subjects, that which is visually present, immediately in view, 
is shared by both – with the content of intuition similarly reflecting this correspondence. 
Differences in conceptual capacities, relating to differences in recognitional ability, are not 
themselves manifest in the intuitional given, and only come into effect with recognition. 
 Of course, differences in revisable conceptual capacities may determine how aspects are 
‘carved out’ and recognitional capacities are drawn upon. However, this is revision in respect 
to the exercise of rationality, not in respect to the passively actualised content of intuition. 
And, indeed, no amount of conceptual/world view revision, it seems, could change the 
intuitional content of experience. 
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185 McDowell, Mind and World,  p. 31.
 This then marks a shift in McDowell’s account of self-determination, specifically the 
secondary  aspect of self-determination, such that it is more reflective of Travis’s account of 
the normative constraints upon judgment, constraints which are best conceived of as internal 
normative constraints rather than provided by the function of external constraint. The revision 
of one’s world view and one’s conceptual capacities only manifests itself in one’s rational 
response to that which is visually  in view. In no way  does it alter the given passively 
actualised content of experience itself. 
4. The First Entitlement Story 
 McDowell: “To make such an aspect of  the content of an intuition into the content associated 
 with a capacity that is discursive in the primary sense, one would need to carve it out, as it were, 
 from the categorically unified but as yet unarticulated content of the intuition by determining it 
 to be the meaning of  a linguistic expression,  which one thereby sets up as a means for making 
 that content explicit. ” 186
 McDowell: “In discursive dealings with content, one puts significances together. This is 
 particularly clear with discursive performances in the primary sense, whose content is the 
 significance of a  combination of meaningful expressions. But even though judging need not be 
 conceived as an  act spread out in time, like making a claim, its being discursive involves a 
 counterpart to the way one puts significances together in meaningful speech.” 187 
 In respect to the first entitlement story, the process of ‘carving out’ aspects provides one 
of the new means by which the given intuitional content of experience can come to enable 
a manifold of entitled claims. According to McDowell, intuitional content as the given, is 
given in a form in which it is suitable to be content ‘associated’ with a discursive activity, 
provided that it is firstly ‘carved out’. In this way is the content of sensory receptivity 
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186 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 263.
187 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 263.
supposed to be intelligibly rationally bound to propositional content, yet not as given, but via 
‘association’. What I wish to illuminate in the following discussion is the nature of that 
‘association’ relationship – between intuitional content and discursive significances – 
specifically in respect to the rational and the self-determining capacities which may inform 
that relationship. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, according to McDowell’s picture, the discursive fragments  – 
or the sub-propositional parts of the whole proposition – are rationally related to aspects of 
intuitional content, with such (unarticulated) intuitional content already  involving (newly 
stipulated) conceptual capacities. So the discursive significances and the whole propositional 
content is bound to that which, in a sense, is actualised outside the discursively articulated 
content, and yet that which is outside, nevertheless, involves the function of the 
Understanding. Again, this is a reflection of McDowell’s Kantian model of the Understanding 
as involved in intuition as well as in judgment. 
 With McDowell no longer maintaining the position that experience passively actualises a 
manifold of propositional content, the picture of perceptual judgment as an ‘endorsement’ of 
the content given is no longer applicable. As discussed, there is a decisive shift in his picture 
of judgment, from an ‘endorsement’ of propositional content given, to the ‘carving out’ and 
association of aspects of intuitional content with discursive significances. So that thinkable 
discursive content is brought about in perceptual judgment only  via the ‘carving out’ of such 
aspects and the ‘association’ of them with meaningful expressions. 
 With no longer any given propositional content  in experience, reflective rationality does 
not consider the truth or falsity  of purported ‘perceptible facts’, a given thinkable sense. 
Rational capacities, rather, in order to obtain discursive content, must ‘work up’, so to speak, 
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from the given intuitional content to the propositional content of thought. As discussed, such a 
picture of ‘carving out’ and ‘putting significances together’ is intended to allow for an 
entitlement picture which navigates a course between Davidson’s picture and the Myth of the 
Given. This picture of ‘carving out’, however, is one which may be susceptible to criticisms 
of an incoherent model of thought. 
5. Travis, Frege, Kant and Models of Thought
 Travis claims that the correct model of thought (and experience) is that of Frege’s. 
According to Travis, this Fregean model of thought stands in opposition to a Kantian picture 
of judgment – exhibited in ‘The Clue’ – in which a unification of ideas (or in McDowell’s 
case concepts) takes place, such as would be amenable to a ‘building block’ model of thought. 
So that  in perceptual judgment we start with distinct thinkable concepts and then build up  to a 
whole thought by putting them together. 
 Travis’s Fregean model of thought claims to place the word ‘true’ to the fore, and then 
proceeds to thoughts as the things by which truth can come into question at all.188 Travis’s 
purpose is to discredit the (Kantian) notion that concepts/meaningful expressions obtain 
independently and are then unified into a whole thinkable in the function of judgement. 
 Now, while it is that McDowell does indeed draw upon aspects of Kant in respect to the 
Understanding being involved in intuition itself, his picture in respect to ‘carving out’ aspects 
of intuitional content and their association with ‘discursive significances’ is one that does not 
require the unification of concepts as if they obtained independently from the whole.  So that 
McDowell, as I will discuss, can just as well accommodate for the principal aspects of a 
Fregean picture of thought, albeit with conceptual content obtaining in experience itself. So 
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188 Travis, ‘Unlocking the Outer World’, p.1. 
then, how is it that we can reconcile, as it were, McDowell’s ‘putting together of discursive 
significances’ with Travis’s insistence upon a Fregean model of thought and its whole?  
 To begin with, McDowell’s notion of the ‘putting together’ of discursive significances is 
not used to the supposed Kantian end, as Travis may  have it, nor does it, as mentioned in 
Chapter 1, posit a different structure to thought itself, as Travis may indeed assume. Despite 
how McDowell may  outwardly present his account, we can see (most clearly) how his rational 
entitlement picture coheres with the fundamental features of the Fregean structure of thought, 
by situating McDowell’s notion of the ‘associating’ relationship as itself only  occurring in the 
context of a whole propositional thought. 
 Where McDowell’s picture evidently  offers a picture of building up to the whole 
thinkable content (so as to illuminate the external rational entitlement via conceptual content), 
we can just as well start with a Fregean whole propositional content – and then break down 
the rational entitlement story into those (explicit) aspects of intuitional content which come to 
rationally entitle propositional thought. So, while McDowell’s account may suggest that one 
does in fact put parts of the whole thought together, as if one ‘built up to’ to propositional 
content – via his model of speech acts – McDowell, as will become apparent, can just as well 
assume the same starting point as Travis’s Frege: truth and propositional content. We should 
distance the speech analogy from the way in which speech acts are ‘spread out’ in time and 
read it as pertaining to the rational underpinnings of whole thoughts. 
 It is important to note, however, that what immediately follows in this discussion is an 
account which attempts to offer a charitable presentation of McDowell’s rational entitlement 
picture, one that is more perspicuous than he himself has offered, and one which has taken 
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into due consideration the potential criticisms of Travis and a ‘building block’ model of 
thought. 
6. ‘Building Blocks’ 
 McDowell states explicitly  that the discursive significances, which have been associated 
with the ‘carved out’ intuitional content, ought not to be taken as separate ‘building blocks’ to 
thought, as if they were separately thinkable contents, outside of their contribution to the 
whole sense of the thought. McDowell maintains that one can think the significance of a 
predicative expression only in the context of a thought in which that content occurs 
predicatively.189  He thus claims that, whilst the composite elements are not separately 
thinkable, they are nevertheless to be understood as ‘put together’, in a way  modelled upon 
(as ‘a counterpart’ to) overt meaningful expressions. 
 However, with this notion of discursive significances being ‘put together’, there is a 
concern that McDowell’s rational entitlement picture does, in fact, inadvertently  fall foul of 
the problematic ‘building block’ model of thought. Indeed, McDowell does not assist his 
account by the (chronological) way in which he presents it, by first addressing the 
‘associating relationship’ , and then secondly invoking the model of ‘speech’ by which to 
understand the constituent contents of thought. So that, quite contrary to his explicit intention, 
a ‘building block’ model of thought  does in fact appear to be the  model preferred according 
to how he presents his account. 
 Indeed, merely  by the way that McDowell presents his account, he almost invites a 
reading of the notion of ‘carved out’ intuitional aspects and their associated discursive 
significances, as if the association between the two – the discursive fragments and the non-
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discursive intuitional aspects – obtained prior to and independently from the whole 
propositional content (a whole which is to be modelled upon speech acts). So that, despite 
McDowell’s protestations, if such associations did obtain independently  from the thinking of 
the whole thought in judgment, this would indeed be to fall precisely  into the ‘building block’ 
model of thought. This is exactly  the kind of picture that, from McDowell’s standpoint, the 
first kind of rational entitlement must not take.
 As discussed in Chapter 1, a distinction between two aspects of propositional content, 
that which pertains to meaning, and that  which pertains to rational entitlement, is one which I 
claim is absolutely essential if McDowell’s rational entitlement story is to be successful, at 
least in respect to its internal coherence. In order for McDowell to avoid the ‘building block’ 
model, the whole sense of the thought – the togetherness of the internal logical relations of the 
propositional content necessary for meaning – must in a relevant way precede (the answering 
of) any questions of the rational entitlement of the propositional content incorporating 
relevant aspects of intuitional content. 
 This is not to deny that  rational entitlement does indeed ‘stem from’, or is instigated via, 
intuitional content. However the ‘carved out’ intuitional aspects are only  made explicit, and it 
is only determined which ‘carved out’ aspects come to figure in the rational entitlement, only 
once a whole propositional content has indeed been formed in the exercise of a judgment. 
Only in the context of a judgement can it be ascertained how the constituent meaningful 
expressions of the relevant proposition are ‘associated’ with the intuitional content.
 The best  starting point in order to fully  appreciate McDowell’s account is once again 
coming to terms with the particular ‘model’ offered by  McDowell, the model by which we are 
to understand the ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition and the associating of them with discursive 
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significances. As mentioned previously, the models offered are used for the purposes of 
elucidating intelligibility through certain aspects of relevance. They are not intended as 
strictly analogous to what they  are being applied to. Being aware of the analogous and 
disanalgous aspects of the model presented – in this case, the speech act model – is of 
importance because, as will be seen, McDowell otherwise may indeed be taken to fall foul of 
the ‘building block’ model of thought. 
 As mentioned above, McDowell claims that one ‘carves out’ an aspect of intuitional 
content and associates that aspect with a meaningful expression. This is presented as the 
means by which the content  of intuition is made explicit and by which the content of intuition 
is to feature in the rational entitlement picture. Importantly, however, this ‘association’ is not 
to be conceived of as the initial step, a step  preceding the putting together of discursive 
significances – as if the ‘association’ occurred previously in time to the judgment itself. 
Rather, this is merely one of the aspects of the rational entitlement picture – it is not the first 
step, as it  were, which is then followed by the putting together of the separate thinkable parts 
(as in Travis’s Kant). So chronology in this respect is not McDowell’s concern. 
 That one puts significances together is, in accordance with the speech model of 
intelligibility, merely a means provided of illuminating the parts of the thinkable contents 
which inform the whole. The claim model is best  understood by assuming the whole thinkable 
content at the outset, with the discursive elements which inform that whole having a rational 
underpinning, which is to be explained via the association with the ‘carved out’ intuitional 
content. 
 Making a claim – considered as the linguistic expression of a propositional content – can, 
on a certain understanding, be thought of as the temporally extended stringing together of 
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independently existing meaningful linguistic expressions. This is precisely the aspect of the 
speech model which, for McDowell’s purposes, is disanalogous to the rational entitlement 
picture concerning thought. If this point is not made, then McDowell’s rational entitlement 
picture is bound to fall into a ‘building block’ interpretation. 
  Of greater importance, the analogous aspect to such a model, in relation to the 
association of aspects of intuitional content with discursive significances, is that, just as an 
utterance, as the linguistic expression of a propositional whole, is informed by a logical 
togetherness of concepts, so too is the relevant association.  
 In the Mind and World paradigm, McDowell spoke of the ‘logical togetherness’ of 
exercising conceptual capacities. The unity was understood as occurring within the 
propositional content – the concepts of ‘red’ and ‘pyramid’, for example, were logically 
exercised together, so as to jointly inform a meaningful whole sense. In accordance with his 
revised account, McDowell can maintain that  unity and logical togetherness in the context of 
his ‘carving out’ rational entitlement story, whilst eschewing the idea that the particular 
concepts exercised are in anyway independent from the whole. 
 What McDowell’s notion of associating aspects of intuitional content with discursive 
significances does, rather, is to address rational relations without (outside) that propositional 
content. The parts, the concepts, which inform the propositional whole and which are 
logically exercised together, in each case has, as it were, its own rational underpinning, an 
aspect of the intuitional content, which rationally binds it to the content of sensory receptivity.  
 If McDowell’s picture is not to fall into the problematic ‘building block’ model of 
thought, the ‘association’ between the ‘carved out’ intuitional aspects and the discursive 
significances cannot occur prior to the exercise of judgment. Nor can the association between 
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the intuitional contents and the discursive significances occur independently from judgment as 
a whole propositional content. The associations only occur in the context of whole 
propositional judgments. This is not to deny  the independence, in a sense, of the intuitional 
aspects that are to feature in the discursive content. However, because the association only 
occurs in the context of a whole judgment, the intuitional contents as ‘carved out’, are only 
made fully explicit  within the context of the judgment. 
7. Intuitional Content Made ‘Explicit’ via Propositional Content
 McDowell claims that the ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition are only made ‘explicit’ via 
their association with meaningful expressions. This means, given what has been said above, 
that which particular aspects of intuition actually come to feature in the rational entitlement 
of any particular perceptual judgment is only determined in the context of, and not prior to, 
that judgment – despite the aspects (ontologically) obtaining prior to judgment. So that, that 
which is made explicit from experience is not propositional content; rather, the content  which 
is made explicit is intuitional content via propositional content, with the propositional content 
of a perceptual judgment the means of expressing that intuitional content. Hence, that 
intuitional content is not content which can ‘feature’ in reflective rationality, prior to the 
exercise of judgment, or the logical togetherness of its conceptual parts. 
 Even so, to reiterate, this is not to say  that the ‘carved out’ aspects of intuitional content 
do not obtain prior to judgment. Indeed this is something which McDowell insists upon. So, 
in order to explore how such aspects may obtain prior to judgment I shall introduce a notion 
of the ‘seeing of an aspect (feature) of an object’, which may indeed shed some light upon 
how aspects of intuition obtain prior to judgment, and thus before they are made explicit. And 
accordingly, I shall propose a model of self-determining capacities which may necessarily  be 
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involved in the carving out of an intuitional aspect, prior to the paradigmatic exercise of 
conceptual capacities in a judgment.
8. Attentional Intentionality 
 McDowell: “ [...] one needs to carve out that content from the intuition’s unarticulated content 
 before one can put it together with other bits of content in discursive activity. Intuiting does not 
 do this carving out for one.”190 
 As discussed, the potential ‘building block’ criticisms of McDowell’s revised account 
were seen as a concern only in respect to the internal aspects of the propositional content, 
leaving untouched how that content is related without, that is, to the intuitional content as a 
‘carved out’ aspect. However, while the ‘building block’ model can be seen as inapplicable to 
McDowell’s account, there are nonetheless certain rational considerations which McDowell 
does not explicitly address, aspects of the total self-determining picture, which raise 
interesting issues in respect to the intelligibility of his rational entitlement picture.  
 McDowell may well refuse the model of ‘building blocks’, a point concerning the 
internal logical relations of the propositional content and their unified composition. However, 
with his new picture of entitlement, a rational point is made also, one which connects the 
whole sense, and the concepts figuring in that whole sense, with intuitional aspects that 
provide rational external constraint upon judgment. So the rational point concerns the external 
relations in respect to the intuitional content situated outside of the articulated content  with 
sense – the content which is ‘carved out’, and from which the associated thinkable discursive 
content obtains its rational entitlement. 
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190 McDowell, ‘Avoiding the Myth of the Given’, p. 263
 A central issue here concerns how the aspects of intuitional content obtain prior to the 
whole propositional content, prior to their association with discursive significances. This is a 
concern which transcends, or precedes, the avoidance of the ‘building block’ model of 
thought. It concerns the processes involved in the ‘carving out’ of aspects prior to their 
supposed discursive associations. 
 McDowell claims that one first needs to carve out an intuitional aspect and then 
associate it  with a meaningful expression (and as discussed this occurs in the judgment as a 
whole). So the aspects of intuitional content, according to what McDowell says, certainly 
obtain prior to and independently from their discursive association. How then is it  that we are 
to understand that independence of intuitional aspects, specifically in respect to the self-
determining capacities which are involved in carving them out prior to discursive association? 
 One way to potentially understand how such content could intelligibly obtain prior to 
discursive association is via a notion of ‘attentional intentionality’ – the seeing of a visible 
aspect, which itself occurs outside of a discursive characterisation and which does not itself 
constitute a thinkable cognitive episode. Such an episode of directed attention may thus 
provide a necessary  pre-condition which enables perceptual judgment, and appealing to it  may 
be a means by which to understand how a ‘carved out’ intuitional content can obtain prior to 
discursive association.
 Of course, McDowell’s primary concern is in respect to rational entitlement, and so 
discursive rationality, in the context of making a perceptual judgment. However, his notion of 
‘carving out’ intuitional aspects does seem to introduce a self-determined intentional act – 
which I propose can be understood via this notion ‘attentional intentionality’ – that precedes 
the formation of a whole discursive content itself. So that, applying this idea, we can say the 
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following: in seeing an aspect (feature) of an object, in a self-determined directed paying of 
visual attention to that  aspect (feature), we are to be understood as simultaneously ‘carving 
out’ an aspect of intuitional content.
 The term ‘aspect’ can be used in a variety of ways. McDowell’s primary  use of the term 
‘aspect’ is in respect to intuitional content and its association with discursive rationality. 
Whereas there is an unproblematic common sense notion of ‘aspect’, which may be usefully 
employed to interpret McDowell’s own account of ‘carved out’ intuitional aspects: this 
pertains to the paying of attention to certain visible features of that which is immediately 
present in experience. So it is the literal seeing of a visible/perceptible feature – aspect – that I 
associate with this notion of ‘attentional intentionality’, with a view to offering an intelligible 
account of how ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition may obtain prior to discursive articulation. 
 At the outset, certain comparisons between ‘attentional intentionality’ and ‘intuitional 
aspects’ do hold in fact. The seeing of an aspect (feature), a directed paying attention to an 
object, can occur prior to judgment. The seeing of an aspect of an object does not represent 
anything according to it, nor does it purport something to be the case. So it is neither 
thinkable nor does it have a sense. Until a rational articulation in respect to it – a judgment – it 
remains outside of discursive articulation, meaningful significances and inferential judgments, 
in respect to its characterization.  
 So an aspect of intuitional content can be seen as the content which is demarcated by  the 
literal seeing of an aspect (feature) of a visible object in a directed paying of attention to it. 
The visible aspect (feature) ought not to be conflated with the accompanying aspect of 
intuitional content; rather, the latter ought to be understood as the aspect of content given in 
intuition which enables us to have some feature of an object literally in view and in focus. So 
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that the ‘carved out’ aspect  of intuitional content is the content of a literal seeing of an aspect 
(feature) of a visible object.
 So attentional intentionality  does not itself rationally underpin the perceptual judgment; 
rather attentional intentionality  engages aspects of intuitional content, and the latter in turn 
rationally underpin the discursive significances of the whole discursive judgment. Whilst the 
attentional intentionality  obtains prior to a judgment, the aspect of intuitional content carved 
out by it is itself only made fully explicit (in the rational entitlement picture) with the exercise 
of judgment as a whole – with the discursive significances specifying their respective 
intuitional content underpinnings.  
 Again, it ought to be kept in mind that the discursive significances are not associated with 
the visible aspects of the object itself to which we direct  our attention. The discursive 
significances are associated with the content of the ‘carved out’ aspects of intuition. Again, 
one must keep an object/content distinction in mind. If the discursive significances were to be 
associated with the visible features of seen objects, we would fall into the building block 
model of thought. 
 The notion of attentional intentionality  is introduced merely  as a means of understanding 
the self-determining capacities which seem necessarily to be in play  in order for the ‘carved 
out’ intuitional contents to obtain prior to judgment, prior to their association with discursive 
significances. 
 The ‘carving out’ of an aspect would appear to necessarily engage the 
intentional capacities of the subject. And, as discussed, because the intuitional aspect becomes 
associated with the discursive, the aspect must obtain somehow, at least initially, 
independently of the discursive significance. Such an isolating of the intuitional aspect can 
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thus be said to have introduced a new (in focus at  least) self-determining dimension necessary 
for perceptual judgment, one which, because it is not yet associated with discursive 
significances, is perhaps better characterised as pertaining to those self-determining capacities 
at a sub-discursive level, those better associated with attentional intentionality, rather than 
reflective rationality. 
 McDowell, according to his revised account, of course denies that the formation of 
(unified) intuitional content is ‘prediscursive activity’. However, he denies no such 
characterisation of the ‘carving out’ of intuitional content. So perhaps we serve McDowell’s 
purposes well by  characterising this isolating of an intuitional aspect as a pre-discursive 
activity – involving self-determining capacities. And while the self-determining capacities 
engaged in carving out aspects of intuition do not do not yet exhibit one’s particular world 
view, nor involve the applicability  of truth or falsity, the exercise of such capacities is 
apparently a necessity for generating truth purporting content. 
 So, in McDowell’s new picture, we appear to have self-determining processes which 
occur at a sub-propositional / sub-discursive level. This can be seen as complementing his 
extension of sorts of the space of reasons outside of propositional content, to that which is 
rationally entitling, yet is not in the form of a reason in itself. So that, prior to judgement, we 
utilise sub-discursive self-determining capacities of directed attention, in order for intuitional 
content to intelligibly rationally entitle judgment.
 And, while the self-determining capacities engaged in ‘carving out’ aspects of intuition 
do not themselves attract notions of truth or falsity, the exercises of  such capacities is 
apparently  a necessity for generating truth purporting content, and thus the applicability of 
verdictive answerability, that is, in the context of entitlement. The sub-discursive carving out 
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of aspects is a critical dimension of the very formation of perceptual judgment – which indeed 
aims at truth. 
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Conclusion
 McDowell’s particular form of idealism takes it shape according to two characteristic 
features of his account of experience and perceptual judgment. The first, discussed in Chapter 
2, is that our perceptual judgments stand in verdictive relations to the world of propositional 
fact. The second is that the conceptual realm is unbounded, so that sensory  experience itself 
involves the actualisation of our conceptual capacities. These two features combine such that 
the given content of experience, if all goes well, thereby constitutes a fact  of the world. In this 
way there is ‘no gap’ between thought and the world. 
 As has been discussed, McDowell presents an account, in Mind and World, such that our 
rational self-determining capacities are implicated in both of these two features of his idealism 
– answerability  to the world and sensory experience – as they  come to inform his picture of 
empirical thought. So the formation of McDowell’s idealism, as has been the focus in this 
Chapter 3, can be understood by the way it  comes to posit  the particular involvement of self-
determining capacities in the formation of perceptual judgment based on experience – the 
common content of which constitutes (in veridical cases) a fact of the world. 
 In respect to answerability and the world as fact, McDowell insists that  we are to 
understand the notion of being answerable to the objects of the empirical world – his idea of 
rehabilitating objectivity – by way  of the concept-constituting content of social norms. These 
norms are laws which we have made for ourselves – understood as a communal activity – and 
are intrinsic to the practice and content of thought itself. So this provided one level, so to 
speak, of how to conceive of self-determining capacities as being involved in perceptual 
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judgment, and more importantly, in experience itself: they are implicated in such thought via a 
shared community of social norms that constitute its conceptual content.  
 
 Self-determining capacities also come to be implicated in perceptual judgment and the 
experience on which it is based (which provides a perceiver’s individual ‘openess’ to the 
world of fact) by way  of one’s ability to revise one’s background theoretical world view – and 
so the concepts which one has available in experiencing and rationally responding to the 
empirical world. 
 This ‘secondary gloss’ on self-determining capacities thus comes to complement the 
paradigmatic form of self-determination, that  being the exercise of conceptual capacities in 
judgment itself. Of special note, those self-determining (communal and individual) capacities 
which, according to his secondary gloss, come to inform both the given content of experience 
and the facts to which one is verdictively answerable are to be understood, according to the 
Mind and World account of experience, by way of its propositional content. 
 Another feature of McDowell’s idealist, yet purportedly  therapeutic philosophy, is that  we 
situate external constraint within our rational self-determining capacities, with such a union of 
their function occurring in the given propositional content of experience itself. In this way, 
McDowell sought to provide an account of conceptually shaped experience which could avoid 
the pitfalls of the Myth of the Given as well as the rationally unconstrained picture of 
perceptual judgment offered by Davidson. 
 As McDowell saw it, Davidson’s eschewing of rational external constraint from 
experience, in effect, made the exercise of self-determining capacities in constructing a world 
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view entirely impossible, given that he could not ensure the very content of thought in the 
first place. Moreover, by incorporating rational external constraint in the form of what is 
passively  given in receptivity, McDowell’s idealism – in respect to the positing of the world 
as fact as that to which we stand in verdictive relations – could counter claims that his idealist 
picture could not, as so constituted, acknowledge how external reality  is independent of our 
acts of thinking.191 
 McDowell maintains that our rational (conceptual) capacities are constitutive of the realm 
of freedom. One of the ways, therefore, that McDowell’s notion of conceptual experience 
purports to be successful is that it posits self-determining capacities, understood in terms of 
his secondary  gloss, as implicated within sensory experience itself. So that, according to the 
propositional model of experience in Mind and World, self-determining capacities come to 
infuse the shaping of sensory consciousness itself, which is traditionally conceived of as 
definitely beyond the space of freedom or one’s powers of influence and rational self-
determination.  
 In this way, McDowell purported to reconcile, so to speak, a dualistically conceived 
relationship  between the functions of external constraint and self-determination which inform 
empirical thought. This, of course, complemented his anti-dualistic stance in respect to the 
intellect and sensory, which was discussed in Chapter 1. Indeed, such a pervasive anti-
dualistic stance towards objective-subjective relations – which begins with positing the 
conceptual content of experience – becomes crucial for McDowell in order to avoid the 
‘interminable oscillation’ which he  identifies in Mind and World.
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191 McDowell, ‘Conceptual Capacities in Perception’, p. 142. 
 With his secondary  gloss on self-determining capacities, McDowell also sought to avoid 
the problematic form of idealism which he finds in Kant. Distancing himself form Kant, he 
thus came to distinguish the representational content of experience in terms of its involuntary 
givenness. The actualisation of conceptual capacities in experience came to be understood as 
involuntarily given, and yet whilst involuntary, experience nevertheless involved self-
determining capacities, according to his secondary  gloss. In this way, McDowell posited the 
involuntary involvement of self-determining capacities in the content  of experience, which 
nevertheless, as passively given, enabled one to be open to the independent world of fact, with 
the requisite external constraint upon perceptual judgment. 
 Travis presents a model of experience and perceptual judgment according to which no 
self-determining capacities are implicated in experience itself. Travis, of course – via his 
notions of expertise, sense, and recognition – does provide an account of certain self-
determining aspects which come to inform what is involved in one’s possessing a certain 
conceptual (classificatory) capacity in relation to perceptual judgment. However, contra 
McDowell, those self-determining capacities, as Travis sees them, do not occur as bound to 
the function of external constraint, nor in experience itself. This accords with the role he 
posits for perception: it  merely brings into view those non-conceptual objects to which we can 
stand in verdictive relations. 
 McDowell, in Mind and World, associates the idea that ‘it is really  not up to us what we 
perceive’ with the notion that we are given representational content.192 As just noted, he then, 
differentiating himself from Kant, proceeds to distinguish the given content of experience as 
that which is involuntarily given, and which we do not ourselves put together – while being 
221
192 McDowell, ‘Self-Determining Subjectivity and External Constraint’, p. 96. 
content that  nonetheless implicates our self-determining capacities, according to his 
secondary gloss.  
 When Travis addresses this issue – what he refers to as ‘compulsion’ in empirical thought 
– he does this in the context of discussing ‘expertise’, and holds firm to the notion that 
reasons-relations can hold between non-conceptual objects and conceptual thought. So, rather 
than conceptual content determining (compelling) perceptual judgment, it is the non-
conceptual object itself which rationally compels one’s response in judgment – provided that 
one has the suitable expertise in place, and so the capacity  (shared sense that  enables one) to 
identify a particular instance as belonging to a certain kind. 
 Indeed, Travis supposes that this is precisely  what rationality in perceptual judgment is – 
rationality is exhibited in the non-conceptual bearing upon what one should think. It is in this 
way that we see the particular dynamic unfold between external constraints and aspects of our 
self-determining capacities as they come to inform Travis's account of perceptual judgment.
 So Travis, much like McDowell, does illuminate certain secondary aspects of self-
determining capacities which come to inform and normatively constrain the exercise of 
judgment. However, unlike McDowell, these aspects are understood as internal to the 
exercise of judgment as a rational response, and are precisely not, as McDowell’s early 
propositional model would suppose, involved in experience and external constraint itself. 
 
 In this way also, to reiterate, Travis does not bind the space of reasons to the realm of the 
conceptual, or the space of freedom, as McDowell would have it. Because Travis situates the 
realm of non-conceptual objects as that to which we stand in verdictive relations, the space of 
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reasons necessarily  extends beyond that which is in the mind’s power to shape and self-
determine. Our self-determining capacities are not engaged internally to the mere perception 
of that objective domain itself.   
 Nevertheless, as Travis presents his account of perceptual judgment, the relationship 
between external constraint and self-determining capacities is presented such that a mutual 
interdependence of sorts does indeed obtain between the two functions. So, while Travis may 
embrace a dualism of a kind between external constraint and self-determining capacities 
(which are implicated only in one’s rational responses) – a dualism which McDowell is set 
upon avoiding – such a dualism is not so glaringly problematic, that is, if viewed 
independently of McDowell’s  particular concern about, and conception of, the Myth of the 
Given.       
 To return then to McDowell. Under the authority of Kant, McDowell claimed that the 
space of reasons is the realm of freedom.193 By associating the space of reasons, the bounds of 
the conceptual and the realm of freedom in the way that he did, McDowell ensured (in his 
Mind and World account) that the content which could entitle and thus stand as a reason for 
perceptual judgment extended only so far as one’s self-determining capacities were 
implicated. 
 However, with McDowell’s revised account of intuition, and with the new stipulation of 
the sense in which its content is conceptual in terms of the mere potential of that content (now 
less than a fully constituted reason in itself) for discursive articulation in judgment, a central 
feature of McDowell’s idealism would appear to come under considerable pressure. Surely 
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McDowell now lacks the wherewithal to posit self-determining capacities as implicated in 
experience itself. 
 The social norms – laws which we make for ourselves – in terms of whose content we 
were to understand answerability to the empirical world and, which were implicated in the 
content of experience itself, no longer find a place in the revised account of intuitional 
content, as non discursive content that merely enables a bringing into view 194 . And, without 
discursive content, there is also no way  to understand how any revision of one’s world view, 
could in any way alter what can be given in intuitional content. 
 McDowell could previously purport to provide a substantial account of self-determining 
capacities as being implicated in the content of a conceptual shaping of sensory experience 
itself, in the terms of concept-constituting social norms and one’s background world view. His 
revised account of experience, however, is such that it can no longer draw upon the same 
robust models of intelligibility once used to substantiate his stipulation of the conceptual. Nor 
is McDowell able to draw upon those models (supplied by Sellars and Kant) which gave 
credence to self-determining capacities being implicated in the shaping of sensory 
consciousness itself. Intuitional content, as now understood, is without propositional content 
and without those concepts which are involved in discursive thought, and which in turn 
allowed for the intelligible implication of self-determining capacities in experience itself. 
 Experience, reconceived as it is without discursive content, evidently  creates an uneasy 
tension for the idea that the bounds of the conceptual coincide with the realm of freedom. 
McDowell may insist that the conceptual remains unbounded, according to his new 
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world to which we stand in verdictive relations, we do not stand in such relations to the content of experience itself.
stipulation of conceptual content. Intuitional content cannot, however, as it  is now to be 
understood, comfortably  accommodate for the idea, central in the Mind and World picture of 
perceptual judgment and experience, that the bounds of freedom extend (suitably understood) 
to experience itself.  
 Of course, McDowell’s idealism, as it  takes shape according to the revised account of 
experience, can purport to remain in place, given that we remain verdictively answerable to 
facts and the unboundedness of the conceptual is ensured via intuitional content. However, 
now with his new stipulation of the conceptual, these two aspects, as they come to inform 
empirical thought, no longer occur jointly in experience itself, given that we are no longer (in 
intuition) given propositional facts. Furthermore, where self-determining capacities once were 
implicated in both such aspects, now however, the unboundedness of the conceptual in respect 
to the content of experience in no way involves self-determining capacities.
 Consequently, it would appear that the functions of external constraint and self-
determining capacities are not as jointly bound as they once were, that is, in the given content 
of experience itself. McDowell’s two kinds of rational entitlement – ‘carving out’ and 
recognition – are such that self-determining capacities only enter the picture as a rational 
response to that which is visibly in view via intuitional content – a relationship between the 
two (self-determining capacities and our rational responses) which is supported by Travis’s 
account. McDowell’s notion of involuntarily actualized conceptual capacities that implicate 
our powers of rational self-determination – which was tied to the function (content) of 
external constraint – simply recedes with the demise of propositional content within 
experience itself. 
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 This break between external constraint and self-determining capacities is perhaps most 
perspicuous in McDowell’s account of that kind of rational entitlement which involves 
drawing upon recognitional capacities – with the content of its judgment outstripping the 
potential for discursive articulation given in unarticulated and non-discursive intuition. Such 
rational entitlement supposedly  stems from an object via intuitional content, rather than 
simply  Travis’s non-conceptual object. However, as has been discussed, self-determining 
capacities are not implicated in the intuitional content itself, and evidently only enter upon the 
scene when a perceiving subject draws upon their capacity for recognition. 
 And, in respect to the revised entitlement story that involves the ‘carving out’ of 
intuitional aspects and their association with discursive significances, self-determining 
capacities – again not implicated in the non-discursive intuitional content itself – clearly  only 
enter the picture with the ‘carving out’ of aspects of such content as we direct our attention to 
specific features of an object in view, and the association of such aspects with discursive 
significances within whole judgments that, in their propositional parts, reflect such ‘carving 
out’ activity.
 This new fractured situation can indeed be seen as resulting from certain pressures 
provided by  Travis’s account of perception and perceptual judgment – and, in particular, the 
idea that experience is a mere bringing into view which does not itself involve propositional 
content. While McDowell may  continue to resist certain aspects of Travis’s account in relation 
to verdictive answerability, and the necessity of positing conceptual content in experience so 
as to avoid the Myth of the Given, what does seem to be beyond dispute is that he now has a 
separation between the function of external constraint and self-determination, as they  come to 
inform perceptual judgment. In his earlier Mind and World account, McDowell tried to refuse 
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the notion that self-determining capacities are first involved only at the point of our rational 
response to what is anyway given to us in receptivity. With his newly  stipulated notion of the 
conceptual as it  figures in intuition, this would appear to be exactly the kind of model which 
he now has. The fact that intuitional content is merely  discursively conceptualizable means 
that such a diminished notion of the conceptual prohibits those self-determining capacities 
from being implicated in experience itself – the very capacities which once provided the key 
to understanding how his purported therapy for the ‘interminable oscillation’, by way of 
verdict-dictating conceptually shaped intuition, was to have its effect.  
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Conclusion: Revisiting the Myth of the Given
  McDowell’s commitment to avoiding the Myth of the Given fundamentally  informs each 
of the three crucial aspects of experience and perceptual judgment which have been discussed 
in the three Chapters of this thesis. Indeed, the entire apparatus of McDowell’s notion of 
conceptually shaped experience – both in Mind and World and in his essay ‘Avoiding the Myth 
of the Given’– rests upon the premise that sensibility by itself – without passively  given 
conceptual content – cannot make the empirical world available for knowledge. According to 
McDowell, the stipulation of experience with conceptual content  is the only  means whereby 
perceptual judgment can be seen as procuring rational external constraint, without falling foul 
of the Myth. 
  The connection between rational relations and conceptual content is an important one. 
And it is one which, in its detail, comes to reveal the various differences which obtain 
between McDowell’s and Travis’s respective accounts. As has been discussed, McDowell’s 
requirement that rational external constraint upon perceptual judgment is to be performed by 
conceptual content is attributable to his continued adherence to the spirit  of what he takes to 
be Davidson’s central insight into rationality, viz., that ‘reason’s reach extends no further than 
conceptual capacities can take it’. And while McDowell no longer claims that experience has 
the same content as judgment (as his amended dictum once had it), and so in this way is 
drawn closer to Travis’s notion of perception as a mere having in view, McDowell refuses to 
relinquish the relationship between rational relations and conceptual content (as indeed Travis 
has done), however that content is now to be understood.
   As a result of this, however, McDowell is left with a significantly weakened notion of 
conceptual content. A content which, as discussed, cannot draw upon his earlier and more 
robust models of intelligibly conceiving experience as conceptually  shaped. To begin with, 
McDowell’s notion of the space of reasons as extending all the way  to sensory impressions 
themselves is reconfigured such that the content of experience is not something which can 
itself stand as a self-constituted reason. Whilst entitlement ‘stems’ from that which is given in 
experience, such non-discursive content cannot  itself enter the full panoply of rational 
relations which characterizes the logical space of reasons (between propositional contents) as 
McDowell otherwise conceives it. That the content itself cannot justify a claim sits rather 
anomalously in the overall context of McDowell’s project. McDowell in turn loses certain key 
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aspects which once substantiated his conceptualist account of experience; such as mere 
‘appearings’, ameliorating Davidson’s apparent ‘blind spot’, Kant’s ‘The Clue’ (as investing 
intuition with representational and thinkable content), and the notion of thinking in the 
sensory.  
  In respect to objectivity, whilst in the discussion I do not deny that McDowell continues 
to treat our perceptual judgments as standing in verdictive relations to propositional facts, 
viz., the layout of the world, it  now turns out that that notion does not itself require that 
experience be constituted by propositional, conceptual content. Nor does the fact that our 
perceptual judgments stand in verdictive relations to that  which can truly be said to be the 
case require any longer that we be verdictively answerable to the given content of (veridical) 
experience itself. Indeed, this is a notion which is no longer available to McDowell’s revised 
account of experience anyway. Moreover, situating aspects of the world (as fact) as that relata 
(beyond experience) which (on the right hand side of Frege’s line) normatively determine the 
truth of perceptual judgments is, on the face of it, a position perfectly consilient with a 
conception of experience as altogether lacking conceptual content – though for McDowell, of 
course, concerns about the Myth block embracing any  such non-conceptualist picture of 
experience.
  Furthermore, as became clear in the discussion of Travis, we can have self-determining 
capacities and external constraint bound together in such a way that the exercise of freedom in 
thought is possible – while such thought is, at the same time, rationally and externally 
constrained – without requiring that self-determining capacities be implicated within 
experience itself, conceived as conceptual in content. Indeed, where McDowell once situated 
his secondary gloss on self-determining capacities as implicated in experience itself, as it is 
according to his newly revised account, those capacities now come to inform merely  the 
exercise of one’s perceptual judgment, conceived of as a rational response to that which is 
merely in view. So, as McDowell himself now re-conceives experience, it turns out that the 
necessity of self-determining capacities being bound to the function of external constraint 
does not require that experience itself be constituted by  conceptual content that implicates 
these capacities. Indeed, once again, this is a notion which is no longer available to 
McDowell’s revised account of experience anyway.
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 McDowell’s insistence that our (perceptual) relationship with the empirical world is one 
conditioned by our second natures as language users is a penetrating one. However, the 
question which now remains is whether he really requires conceptual content in experience in 
order to assert his notion of permeated mindedness. Considering the above discussion, 
McDowell’s positing of conceptual content in experience is most certainly  in serious 
difficulty. This leaves one with little choice other than to doubt the connection which 
McDowell insists upon between conceptual content in experience and our rationality. Despite 
my attempts to give a charitable reading of McDowell’s account – especially in respect to his 
entitlement notion of ‘carved out aspects’ – his problematic and impoverished new stipulation 
of conceptual content in experience is one which is arguably  even more than ever driven by 
his concern to avoid the Myth of the Given, as he conceives that Myth. This would seem to 
suggest that McDowell ought to revisit and reconsider his own particular take on the Myth, 
and how that take has come to shape his account of experience and perceptual judgment.
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